JOSEPH GLANVILL AND THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY REACTION AGAINST ENTHUSIASM

Marian Joan Waller

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



1968

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

JOSEPH GLANVILL

AND THE

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY REACTION AGAINST ENTHUSIASM

A THESIS

PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of

THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

by

MARIAN JOAN WALLER



Th 5482,

DECLARATION

This thesis has been composed by myself, and the work of which it is a record has been done by myself. It has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a Research Student in October 1955, being a graduate of the University of Sheffield, and at the time of admission an Assistant Librarian in Queen's College, Dundee, and have prosecuted part-time research for at least nine terms in the Department of English, first under the supervision of Dr. R.H. Carnie, and later under the supervision of Dr. R.P. Doig.

CERTIFICATE

I certify that Marian Joan Waller has spent the statutory period in Higher Study and Research under my direction, has fulfilled the Ordinance and Regulations for the degree of Ph.D. of the University of St Andrews, and is therefore qualified to submit this thesis for the degree.

Supervisor.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to express my appreciation for the advice and encouragement given to me by Professor A.F. Falconer, Dr. R.H. Carnie, and Dr. R.P. Doig, of the University of St Andrews. I would also like to thank the members of staff of various libraries for their unfailing helpfulness and courtesy, and I would mention especially the staff of Bradford Public Libraries, Cambridge University Library, Essex County Library, Leeds University Library, the Plume Library, Maldon, St Andrews University Library, and Sheffield University Library. But above all I would like to acknowledge the tremendous faith and patience shown by my family, and by my husband in particular.

ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THE LISTS OF REFERENCES AND THE GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY.

B.I.H.R.	Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research.
E.L.H.	Journal of English Literary History.
H.L.B.	Harvard Library Bulletin.
H.J.	Hibbert Journal.
H.L.Q.	Huntington Library Quarterly.
J.E.G.P.	Journal of English and Germanic Philology.
J.H.I.	Journal of the History of Ideas.
J.H.M.	Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences.
M.L.N.	Modern Language Notes.
M.L.Q.	Modern Language Quarterly.
M.L.R.	Modern Language Review.
M.P.	Modern Philology.
N.Q.	Notes and Queries.
N.R.R.S.	Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London.
P.Q.	Philological Quarterly.
Philosoph.Q.	Philosophical Quarterly.
Phil.Trans.	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London.
P.B.A.	Proceedings of the British Academy.
P.M.L.A.	Publications of the Modern Language Association of America.
Q.R.	Quarterly Review.
R.E.S.	Review of English Studies.

Abbreviations employed in the Lists of References and the General Bibliography, cont.

S.P.	Studies in Philology.
T.B.M.	Temple Bar Magazine.
Y.R.	Yale Review.

NOTE

There is some confusion as to the spelling of Saducismus Triumphatus. This form appears in the first edition, but in the fourth edition the title is given as Sadducismus Triumphatus. I have followed the earlier spelling in the text, but, as the references were drawn from the fourth edition, I have followed the later spelling in the lists of references and bibliography.

CONTENTS

Contents: Chapter I, cont.

Contents: Chapter I, cont.

Contents: Chapter I, cont. Page

CHAPTER II: THE VANITY OF DOGMATIZING

Contents: Chapter II, cont.

Contents: Chapter III, cont.

CHAPTER IV: THE PEOPLE'S CHARTER.

Contents: Chapter IV, cont. Page

CHAPTER V: PHILOSOPHIA PIA

Contents: Chapter V, cont. Page

CHAPTER VI: A MISERABLE TYRANNY OF PASSION AND SELF-WILL

Contents: Chapter VI, cont. Page

CHAPTER VII: RELIGION IS AN HOLY LIFE

Contents: Chapter VII, cont. Page

Contents: Chapter VII, cont.

CHAPTER I - GLANVILL'S LIFE, TIME AND WRITINGS

1. Scope of the thesis.

The Seventeenth Century in England was an extraordinarily fascinating and complex age. It has often been labelled as the beginning of the modern world, and it is true that many new ideas and attitudes were developing then, which have influenced every part of modern thought. But alongside these new ideas and attitudes lay the traditional beliefs of centuries. Sir Thomas Browne was not the only Janus of the period. In his Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1) he attempted to examine scientifically a welter of myths and legends which had been accepted for centuries, but later More and Glanvill were to use the same methods to try to prove the existence of witchcraft. Despite the flood of Puritan tracts, education, even in the universities, was still largely medieval, whilst many of the experiments of the newly-formed Royal Society were more akin to alchemy than to modern science. But men were conscious that a revolution was taking place, not only in science, but in their whole way of life, and the controversies of the age were to a large extent the result of the clash between conservatism and the forces of progress. Such questions as whether the Ancients or the Moderns were supreme, whether nature and man himself were in fact deteriorating, whether man was justified in exploring the universe, were inextricably bound up with this conflict.

It is extremely difficult to segregate the different facets of seventeenth century thought. Religion still had an important influence on nearly every aspect of English life. Politics were bound up with it, many of the early scientists were also eminent churchmen, even the development of prose style to some extent reflected the effect of religious beliefs. But the Seventeenth Century also saw the beginning of specialisation and the divorce of science and religion, whilst the humanistic conception of a divine unity in all things disintegrated. The growth of a new critical spirit laid everything, even religious belief, open to question. Nevertheless, in spite of increasing specialisation, even after the Restoration men such as Evelyn, Pepys and Dryden preserved the Renaissance tradition of scholarly versatility, and Glanvill himself was typical of the complexity of his age in that his varied interests were so closely interwoven as to be inseparable. His religious beliefs coloured his scientific attitude, his desire for the rational influenced his religious doctrines, and, as his ideas developed, so also did his prose style, moving from the stirring, optimistic, often beautiful rhetoric of The Vanity of Dogmatizing (2) to the plainness, even sparseness, of such works as his Essays (3). Mitchell (4) claims that this stylistic development was due to convention rather than conviction, and it is true that Glanvill, even in his later sermons, tended to return

to the vivid metaphors of an earlier style of preaching. Whilst it may alter our judgement of the man himself, this criticism cannot affect our evaluation of Glanvill as an exponent of the literary ideals of the age in which he lived. Indeed, it must strengthen the belief that he did try to mirror closely the development of much seventeenth century English thought, but that in the end his own judgement and personal taste defeated his attempt to conform to convention. The reasons both for his development of the plain style, and his later return to a more passionate style will be studied more fully in a later chapter of this thesis.

Joseph Glanvill was both the product and the victim of his age. He was the product in that he was intensely aware of current trends and changing ideas, and, in expressing them, became almost a microcosm of the thought of the period during which he wrote. Modern critics have varied in their evaluation of his work, but most agree that he was one of the first great popularisers of the new science at a time when it was becoming not only an outstanding interest for many men, but also a vital influence on every aspect of contemporary thought. In The Vanity of Dogmatizing he attempted to combine the mysticism and visionary enthusiasm of Browne with the rationalism of Descartes. In his later works, both these influences gave way to that of Bacon and the Royal Society; Jones (5)

points out how his ideas changed after he became a member of the Royal Society.

In religion, he showed the swing from Puritanism to Anglicanism. Wood (6) went so far as to accuse him of being a turncoat, but, though there may have been a certain amount of self-interest in his conversion, the change was more likely to have been the result of his own developing ideas, a development and a result common to ma of his contemporaries. In fact, as this thesis will attem to show, hatred of Enthusiasm was perhaps the strongest and most consistent influence on the development of his ideas. Against Wood's accusation, it may be argued that, even after his ordination into the Church of England, Glanvill carried on a friendly correspondence with the Non conformist Baxter, and expressed his admiration for him at a time when Baxter was being bitterly attacked. It might also be argued that his admiration for the Cambridg Platonists should help to repudiate Wood's criticism, but, as Glanvill failed to grasp the full depth of their thought, and insisted on ignoring any Puritan influence on their ideas, it cannot really be urged in his defence.

But he was also the victim of his age. The scepticism of his earlier writings had to be qualified as he realise the dangers of his position. He laid himself open to charges of atheism, and, in order to repudiate them,

attempted to prove scientifically the existence of witches. Like Henry More, he argued that belief in evil spirits was essential to religion, and, in his defence, it must be pointed out that even such a scientist as Robert Boyle was prepared to accept the possibility of witchcraft. As Butterfield, writing of Bacon, points out, "The mistaken science of the past always appears as blind superstition to the future"(7), and Glanvill's ardent support of the existence of witchcraft laid him open to the ridicule not only of his contemporaries, but also of succeeding generations of critics. In the same way, his Origenism and somewhat flamboyant style of writing were regarded askance by some of his Royal Society colleagues, and they did not help to further his reputation as a serious scientist.

The growth of specialisation, already referred to, left increasingly little room for the amateur scientist. The tendency towards analysis led in part to the separation of various branches of learning, and the divorce of science and religion was emphasised by the scientists' willingness to consider certain fields of thought sacrosanct, in order to clear themselves from charges of atheism and to free other areas for investigation. And so for various reasons Glanvill gradually faded from the scientific scene, becoming a typical, perhaps slightly absurd, country clergy-

man. Even his religious doctrines were open to question, and it is ironic that in his later years he laid himself open to accusations of popery. His later works have more than a touch of disillusionment. Optimism and vision gave way to materialism, mysticism to didacticism, vocation to duty.

In many ways Glanvill appears strangely contradictory to the modern reader. But in one thing he remained consistent throughout his adult life, and that was in his hatred of Enthusiasm. His reaction was so strong that he himself became guilty of some of the sins for which he attacked the Enthusiasts. He accused them of pride and intolerance, of arrogance and unreasonableness, but his own writings showed exactly the same faults on occasion. It was this hatred which often lay at the root of apparent self-contradiction.

Cope claims that Anglicanism was the guiding principle of Glanvill's thought and development:

> The religious enthusiasm which had manifested its worst tendencies so vigorously in the splintering internecine holy wars of interregnum England was not only the chief target for Glanvill's Anglican apologetic, but his reaction against it was also the compass by which he oriented his whole conception of the role of the Anglican establishment. (8)

Whilst one may agree with Cope's stress on the violence of Glanvill's reaction against Enthusiasm, it is possible to argue against his definition of Glanvill as an Anglican

apologist. The Anglicanism which he advocated was more akin to Cambridge Platonism than to the Established Church and it is significant that he chose to ignore the Puritan strain in Cambridge Platonism, and to force it into the pattern of Anglicanism. As will be shown in a later chapter, the Church of England did not appear to inspire Glanvill to any great extent, and he seems to have regarded it as a defence against Enthusiasm rather than as an ideal religion in itself. To him, Anglicanism was the religion of moderation, the Middle Way between the dangerous extremes of Enthusiasm and Roman Catholicism. It was the religion of stable government, of law and order. It was traditional, it was secure from fanaticism, it was based on rationalism, and his arguments in support of it were grounded on commonsense rather than on genuine and complete conviction.

To some extent, Cope tends to ignore the fact that Glanvill was typical of his age. The reaction against Enthusiasm was not confined to Anglicans, but was to be found even among the moderate Nonconformists. It was a reaction which profoundly influenced the development of the later Seventeenth Century, and it showed itself in many ways. Educational reform was delayed, because people feared to be connected with the Puritans who had advocated it so strongly. Stylistic development, whilst it was

affected by the new science and various other factors, also showed the reaction against the cant of the Enthusiasts. A desire for moderation and toleration, which was clearly apparent during the later part of the Seventeenth Century, was due in part to dislike of the arrogance and intolerance of the Fanatics. Examples of the effect of this widespread reaction were to be found in every field of seventeenth century English thought, and Glanvill is significant in that he, more perhaps than any other writer, co-ordinated the various attacks on the Enthusiasts, and expressed most fully the violence of the general reaction against them. It is Glanvill's reaction, set against the wider background of his age, which is the subject of this thesis.

2. Glanvill's life and writings

Surprisingly little is known definitely of Glanvill's life. Even his actual writings are a source of confusion, as the same work was published under different titles, or an early work formed the basis for several later versions. Some of his writings were privately or anonymously published, and others are known only in a single manuscript, so that it is practically impossible to see every work.

It is generally accepted that Joseph Glanvill was born in 1636 at Plymouth, the third son of Nicholas

Glanvill, "pleb. of Halwell, Whitchurch, Devon" (9), and from his own Plus Ultra (10) we learn that he was brought up strictly in the Puritan religion. On 19th April, 1652, he became Battelier at Exeter College, Oxford, remaining there until 20th July, 1656, and graduating B.A. 11th October, 1655. His tutor was Samuel Conant, and, according to Wood, he was "severely disciplin'd in religion, Logick, and Philosophy" (11). At first, as he himself admitted in Modern Improvements of Useful Knowledge (12), as a youth he had delighted in notional subtleties, and perhaps his later realisation that "I could amaze and astonish Ignorance with Distinctions and Words of Art, but not satisfie ingenious Inquiry by any considerable and material Resolutions" (13) was the beginning of his revolt against the traditional education of his University. As yet, however, there was no sign of his later revolt against the Puritanism of his family. He graduated M.A. 29th June, 1658, from Lincoln College, then under the Mastership of Paul Hood. Apart from the entries in the registers of the Oxford Colleges, there seems to be no trace of his residence there.

In 1658, he joined Francis Rous, Cromwellian Provost of Eton, as his Chaplain. Again there is no evidence of his life there. Rous died a few months later; possibly, had he lived longer, this "first genuine Puriten mystic"

(14) might have had a moderating effect on Glanvill's anti-Enthusiasm. After Rous's death, Glanvill returned to Lincoln College, and was ordained into the Church of England.

Several biographies state that Glanvill then left Oxford to become Rector of the parish of Wimbish in Essex but this was in fact another Joseph Glanvill or Glanfield a graduate of the University of Cambridge (15). Of this period, Remusat says "il se lia, dit-on, alors avec Baxte Il l'admirait beaucoup, mais la restauration les séparer" (16). In a letter to Baxter dated 3rd September, 1661 (1 and published by Baxter after Glanvill's death, Glanvill mentioned going from Oxford to Kidderminster about three years before to hear Baxter preach, and several later letters (18) show clearly the admiration which Glanvill felt for Baxter. In the Preface to Saducismus Triumphatu (19) we are told that, after his return to Oxford, Glanvill became zealous for the Commonwealth, but was later to discover his mistake. He must, however, have been busy writing, as his first major work appeared in 1660, whilst, according to his Praefatory Answer (20), the Letter ... Concerning Aristotle (21) was written before Glanvill was 23.

The Vanity of Dogmatizing appeared in 1660. Glanvill claimed that originally the whole work was to constitute

merely the preface to a work on immortality, "as a Corrective of Enthusiasm, in a Vindication of the use of Reason in matters of Religion" (22), but, in the end, this was th only part to be published. Wood stated that it was writte "only to gain himself a name among the virtuosi" (23), but in fact it was the modified later version, Scepsis Scientifica, which was to be presented to the Royal Societ and was to gain him his membership of that body. The Vanity of Dogmatizing was a popular exposition of the aims and methods of the Royal Society, written in a style strangely reminiscent of Browne's, and full of optimism and an almost mystical belief in the wonders and power of science. There were minor alterations in the version published as Scepsis Scientifica, which are noted by Prior (24), and an apology for its style in the Preface to the Royal Society. It reached its final form as the essay Against Confidence in Philosophy, and Matters of Speculation (25) where, as Jones (26) points out, it shows litt sign of the appreciation of language so clearly apparent in The Vanity of Dogmatizing. There is no evidence that Glanvill had been a member of the Invisible College, and the laudatory poems in his first major work did not bear the names of any well-known scientists, but nevertheless it was an exceedingly popular and successful book. Worthington, in a letter to Hartlib dated 19th April, 166

refers to its publication, and to the admiration which the author expressed for Descartes and More. He continues

> He is a young man, and abating some juvenile heat, there are good matters in his book. As are said of the parts of pregnant young men, we may guess what the wine will be; and it will taste better when broach'd some years hence (27).

His tendency to "juvenile heat" was a criticism to be echoed by several of Glanvill's contemporaries. Incidentally, it is interesting to note in The Vanity of Dogmatizing signs of the influence of French, rather than British, philosophy; reference has already been made to the intense admiration for Descartes which it expressed, whilst the Encyclopaedia Britannica (28), in its article on Glanvill, compares his use of scepticism to support faith to the methods of Pascal. Jones (29) comments that utilitarianism held a secondary place in Glanvill's works; he enthused about systems rather than the concrete experiments beloved by the Royal Society. But Glanvill rapidly altered his ideas when he became a member of the Royal Society. Cartesianism gave way to Baconianism, and, along with Thomas Sprat, he became one of the great apologists for the aims and methods of the Society.

There is conflicting evidence as to the date and authorship of the Ballad of Gresham Colledge (30), ori-

ginally ascribed by Dr. Henry Power in his letterbook to a W. Glanvill. Weld (31) follows Power, and the first suggestion that it might be by Joseph Glanvill appears in Masson (32). Stimson (33) agrees with this ascription, but it is denied by Sherwood Taylor (34), who believes that William Godolphin wrote it in 1661. In view of the fact that the Ballad is satirical rather than laudatory, and shows little inspiration or beauty of language though it was probably written 1661-3, at a time when Glanvill was enthusing about the possibilities of the new science, it seems unlikely that it was written by him. Stimson claims that the Ballad is enthusiastic, but that does not seem the right adjective to apply to such lines as the following:

> Our Merchants on th'Exchange doe plott
> T'increase the Kingdom's wealth by trade.
> Att Gresham Colledge a learned knott
> Unparallel'd designes have laid
> To make themselves a Corporation
> And knowe all things by Demonstration...
> By demonstrative Philosophy
> They plainly prove all things are bodyes,
> And those that talk of Qualitie
> They count them all to be meer Noddyes.
> Nature in all her works they trace
> And make her playne as nose in face...
> When the king hath made them a Societe,
> They'll demonstrate all things but a Dietie...(35)

The style is almost suggestive of Samuel Butler's. No mention of this piece of doggerel was made by any of Glanvill's opponents, and yet it would have seemed good material for invective had he indeed written it.

Between 1661 and 1670 Glanvill was corresponding on friendly terms with Baxter. Reference has already been made to his letter of 1661, and to the collection in Dr. Williams's Library in London, which cast an interesting light on their friendship. Unfortunately Glanvill's letters are mostly undated, and have been arranged in the wrong order. The third letter in the series appears to be the earliest in the collection, and in it he mentions sending Baxter a copy of Lux Orientalis (36). He stresses that Baxter was one of the first people to know that he himself had written this work, which was published anonymously. He continues:

> But from yu Sir I expect the exercise of candor & ingenuity; especially since this bold Attempt of mi is in a manner the Product of yor own instruction. Yu have taught mee to think honourably of my Maker; And to admit no suspicions contrary to the infinite foecundity of his Goodness; From yu I first learn't not to doat upon mens opinions; but to indulge Free & impartiall Inquiry. And to owne truth under any name; & in whose handes so'ere I find it." (37)

The following letters are mainly concerned with a discussion on pre-existence, and it is interesting to note that Baxter himself had considered publishing a work on the Drummer of Tedworth. Cope traces very fully the development of their friendship, and points out that, though Baxter criticised Glanvill after his death for his apparent treachery in The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant (38), "it was simply that the principles

lying behind the earlier works had taken political form in Glanvill's final tract" (39).

In 1662 the publication of Rust's Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen (40) aroused Glanvill's interest, and he wrote a letter which is reprinted in the Huntington Library Quarterly (41). It was dated 20th January, 1661, and Mullett, in his introductory note, puts the argument in support of the belief that the letter was written to Rust, although in actual fact there is no direct evidence of this. The letter is mainly a series of questions about various aspects of Origenism, and is largely concerned with the several states through which man is supposed to pass. Mullett suggests that this letter is the link between the original draft of Lux Orientalis (a manuscript entitled The Soul's Immortality), and the final version.

Glanvill's next successful work, Lux Orientalis, appeared in 1662, and was dedicated to More and to Francis Willoughby. In it, Glanvill attempts to prove pre-existence scientifically, believing that he will thereby vindicate the love of God, "For there is nothing more for the interest of Religion, than that God be represented to his Creatures as amiable and lovely" (42). As in nearly all his works, he emphasises the essential reasonableness of God, and of the Church of England.

Glanvill apparently sent a copy to Boyle as a way of introducing himself. The accompanying letter is undated, but it refers to "this little trifle" on pre-existence, and continues "If such as you cherish these beams of restored Platonism, they will shine more and more to a perfect day" (43). In the Conway Letters (44) there are several references to Lux Orientalis. More sent Lady Conway a copy early in 1663, and as late as 1670 he mentions Van Helmont, the original scholar gypsy, asking for a copy. Nicolson's interesting article (45) on the scholar gypsy traces the relationship between Lady Conway, More and Van Helmont, and refers to Glanvill's connection with Van Helmont. Nicolson believes that More's reference, in a letter dated 29th August, 1662, to "another good ingenious book of pre-existence come out lately" (46) is also to Lux Orientalis. Glanvill, More, and Lady Conway were all fascinated by the occult, and engaged in debates on the subject, and Greenslet (47) notes that Glanvill was a guest at Ragley, the home of Lady Conway, in 1665. Howard (48) claims that the meetings of an informal psychic society at Ragley in that year led to the writing of Saducismus Triumphatus (49). Glanvill's Lux Orientalis was attacked by E.W. (probably either Edward or Erasmus Ward) in his No Praeexistence (50).

On 27th May, 1662, Glanvill had become Chaplain "at the salary of 50 pounds per annum" (51) to Sir James Thynne, and in November of the same year he was presented by the same patron to the living of Frome-Selwood, after the eviction of the previous incumbent. In the same collection of letters there are three further letters from Glanvill to Sir James Thynne, written from London, but purely of a personal nature. It was probably during his residence at Frome-Selwood that Glanvill married his first wife Mary Stocker, but there is no record of any children by his first marriage.

Apparently an early version of The Drummer of Tedworth appeared the following year, as More mentions sending a copy to Lady Conway in a letter dated 31st March, 1663 (52). In another letter later in the same year, More says, in relation to this narrative:

> Dr. Creed of Oxford should have sett them out, but the papyrs are in the hands of a friend of mine, who had made some consyderable progress in that affair had not a violent fever seiz'd on him and brought him to the very brink of his hope of enlargement out of this earthly prison into the more open world of spirits (53).

Nicolson notes that this refers to Glanvill, who had been seriously ill that year, and Glanvill himself refers to his illness in his letter to White in Scepsis Scientifica. Pepys, in an entry dated 15th

June, 1663 (54), remarked on books about the Drummer of Tedworth, but makes no mention of Glanvill by name. On 25th December, 1667, he refers to "my wife reading to me 'The History of the Drummer of Mr. Mompesson', which is a strange story of spies, and worth reading again" (55), but again he does not refer to Glanvill by name. The case of the Drummer of Tedworth had caused widespread interest; Mr. Mompesson, the owner of the supposedly haunted house in Wiltshire, and several witnesses described the various noises which the spirit was supposed to produce, and Glanvill himself spent an alarming and exhausting night there. Mr. Mompesson does not seem to have been too pleased with the notorie he obtained, as Glanvill, writing to Baxter the day after he returned from Tedworth, after remarking on the fact that Baxter himself was apparently anxious to publish a relation of the Drummer, continues "I find th Gentleman is not willing to have a Narrative publisht, till the disturbance bee over, & then it will bee fully & particularly done" (56). This may, of course, have been to discourage Baxter and protect his own interests, but possibly Mr. Mompesson was a little tired of having to entertain so many people anxious to hear for themselves the noises which the Drummer produced. From the Preface to the second part of Saducismus Triumphatus, which is confirmed by a letter of the Earl of Chester-

field quoted by Wheatley (57), we learn that Mr. Mompesson was later accused of having confessed that the Drummer was a fraud, but he denied it vigourously.

In 1665, Glanvill republished The Vanity of Dogmatizing along with his address to the Royal Society an Apology for Philosophy, and the separately paginated Scire/i Tuum Nihil Est (58) (this was his reply to an attack by Thomas White, and will be studied more fully later in this chapter) under the title Scepsis Scientifica, and it was presented to the Royal Society by Lord Brereton on 7th December, 1664. Glanvill was elected a member at the following meeting. His work was received warmly by the members of the Society. Oldenburg, in a letter to Boyle, refers to the reading of Glanvill's "pretty long dedication", and continues

> the author expresses a very great respect to the said body and their design; which I was very glad, and so were others, to find to be so well understo at last, by some, though, I fear, the great expectation, he raiseth of their enterprise, may be of more prejudice, than advantage to them, if they be not completely endowed with a revenue, to carry on their undertakings.(59).

But Glanvill does not appear to have taken a very active part in the Society's meetings, despite the fact that Birch, in his obituary, refers to him as an "eminent member" (60) of the Society. Although, as wil be shown later, there are references to his attendance at various meetings and social gatherings in London,

there is no further mention of Glanvill by Birch until 1667, when the first of his papers on the Mendip mines was read. Between 1667-9 Glanvill produced reports on the Mendip mines and on the Bath springs (61), but Gough (62) suggests that it was Locke rather than Glanvill who first stimulated interest in these mines, and that Glanvill was merely answering a questionnaire prepared by Boyle. Weld's History contains only brief references to Glanvill, noting the publication of Plus Ultra, and Glanvill's controversy with Stubbe and Crosse. But he does mention "a curious pamphlet in the British Museum, entitled Propositions for the Carrying on a Philosophical Correspondence already begun in the County of Somerset, (63), upon encouragement given from the Royal Society, and published in 1670" (64), which was apparently written by Glanvill. Glanvill had become Secretary of a philospohical correspondence between the Royal Society and interested persons in Somerset, although most of the work, including the tracing of some of Professor Samuel Foster's papers on astronomy, appears to have been done by a Mr. Paschall. The Royal Society Library contains some letters (65) from Glanvill, which are mainly concerned with scientific enquiries. They also refer to some of his own writings, to the setting up of the Philosophical Correspondence, and to attacks by Stubbe on the Royal Society and on various of its members.

However, if Glanvill did nothing more for the Royal Society than write Plus Ultra, which was to appear in 1668, he was worthy of his membership.

1663 had seen the beginning of Glanvill's first literary controversy, with the publication of Thomas White's, or Albius's, Scirri, Sive Sceptices (66), in answer to The Vanity of Dogmatizing. According to Wood (67), White, the grandson of the great Elizabethan lawyer Edmund Plowden, and himself a Roman Catholic secular priest, was a "most noted Philosopher", who could vanquish even Hobbes in a philosophical argument. Glanvill answered White's attack by including in Scepsis Scientifica Scire/i Tuum Nihil Est: or, the Author's defence of the Vanity of Dogmatizing, which consists of an apology for writing in English, a letter to White, his Defence, and the Letter to a Friend concerning Aristotle. He treats his opponent with respect, and claims that it is only out of consideration for White's reputation that he has even troubled to answer his arguments, for he himself is against disputes. He is mainly concerned to clear himself from accusations of Pyrrhonic scepticism, and to reinforce his earlier attack on Aristotle, but he also takes issue with White over such topics as the creation and composition of the soul, the workings of the memory,

and other theories which were originally debated in The Vanity of Dogmatizing. It is a dignified and tolerant reply to White's criticism, though Krook (68) points out that Glanvill missed the point of White's unanswerable argument.

Between September and November 1665 (69), Samuel Pepys mentions visiting the house of a Mr. Glanvill, a friend of Captain Cocke, in order to leave contraband there. Captain Cocke or Cook was admitted to the Royal Society in 1666, and it was possible that Glanvill met him at earlier scientific meetings, if indeed it was Joseph Glanvill to whom Pepys refers. Despite several visits, Pepys makes no mention of meeting Glanvill himself, so presumably he was away at his parish in Somerset, from whence he sent his first paper to the Royal Society during the following year. In June 1666, he became Rector of the Abbey Church, Bath Writing two years later, Pepys mentions attending this church, when "a vain, pragmatical fellow preached a ridiculous, affected sermon, that made me angry... (in the afternoon) the same idle fellow preached; and I slept most of the sermon" (70). It is ironic that Glanvill (for presumably it was not he himself preaching who wrote so much about the need for plain, simple sermons, should have been burdened with such a preacher

his own church.

It is apparent from correspondence sent to Boyle that Glanvill was very active at this time. Writing in October 1666, Beal says

> Mr. Glanvill intendeth something theologically in defence of the emergent providences for the season of all ages, and of the gifts of God's holy Spirit for inventions to the benefit of the worthy against atheists and scoffers. And he hath a flowry pen, and may do well, if we can ballast him from Origenian Platonism and extravagant adventures. To which purpose I have given him the trouble of much scribble and suggestions, both historical and prudential, which he seems to accept of, and professeth conformity; but his genius is apt for sublime adventures.(71)

It is illuminating to read these comments by Glanvill's contemporaries.

In 1667, Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft (72) appeared. Like so many of Glanvill's works, it had a complicated histor It was originally written as a letter to Robert Hunt, entitled A Philosophical Endeavour Towards the Defense of the Being of Witches and Apparitions (73); Wood (74) lists it under its second title as appearing in 1666, whilst Green (75) notes it under its second title for both 1666 and 1667. On 24th November, 1666, Pepys mentions that he read "the late printed discourse of witches by a member of Gresham College... the discourse being well writ, in good stile, but methinks not very convincing" (76). The first edition was destroyed in the Great Fire, according to Green, but it was re-

printed in 1667, and a third edition appeared in the same year, along with the Mompesson narrative and A Whip for the Droll Fidler (77), the whole being entitled A Blow at Modern Sadducism (78). A shortened version appeared in the Essays, and a reprint of the longer version, along with other material, in the posthumous Saducismus Triumphatus, which was edited by More. Glanvill, in his dedication to the Duke of Richmond and Lenox, claims that his design was "to secure some of the outworks of Religion, and to regain a Parcel of Ground, which bold Infidelity hath invaded" (79). It was in part an answer to Reginald Scot's Discoverie of Witchcraft (80) and John Webster's The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft (81), and in part an attempt to refute charges of atheism which had been levelled against him.

Glanvill apparently sent a copy to the Duchess of Newcastle; "Mad Madge", as she was called, attended a meeting of the Royal Society in 1667, and it is possible that Glanvill met her there. In any case, they exchanged several letters. Seven of Glanvill's letters, which may be said to be laudatory rather than informative, though he did try to answer some of her enquiries about reason, the plastic faculty, and pre-existence, and to counter the objections she raised to witchcraft, appear in a volume published in 1676 (82). Unfortunately, they are

not arranged in chronological order, and, as so often, Glanvill omitted to give the year in which he was writing. Glanvill also sent a copy of his book on witchcraft to More, along with his sermon, A Loyal Tear (83), which he claimed was published without his consent. His letter (84) to More of 13th March, 1667, also notes that Mr. Mompesson seemed unwilling to contribute further to the narrative of the Drummer of Tedworth, though Glanvill knew of no reason for his reluctance. This bears out his earlier statement to Baxter, to which reference has already been made.

Wood (85) mentions a Fast Sermon for the King's Martyrdome as appearing in 1667. This was Glanvill's sermon, A Loyal Tear, listed by Green for the same year, and reprinted in Some Discourses, Sermons, and Remains (8

Glanville-Richards refers to Glanvill's difficulties with the fanatics at this time. In August 1667, Beale wrote to Williamson mentioning Glanvill's troubles both at Bath and at Frome, whilst Glanvill himself wrote of them in a letter to Beale in September of the same year (87).

These were not his only worries. In a public controversy with Robert Crosse, "a noted Philosopher after the antient way" (88), in which Crosse had supported Aristotle and academic learning, and had attacked the Royal Society, Glanvill was generally considered to have

come off the worse, and had also laid himself open to attacks on his religious beliefs. Determined to defend both himself and the Society, he wrote Plus Ultra in 1668, which Cope claims was "the best answer to the "wits" that any champion of the "new science" in the seventeenth century produced" (89). It reveals the influence of Hakewill's Apologie (90), and in its turn affected both Blount's Essays on Several Subjects (91), and Wotton's Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning (92). Jones (93) traces these literary interrelations of the Seventeenth Century.

Oldenburg probably refers to Plus Ultra when he wrote to Boyle on 1st October, 1667, of "a certain gentleman, a florid writer, one of our royal collegiates, who intends to print shortly some paralipomena, relating to the history of our Society" (94), which was to be a supplement to Sprat's History (95). One result of Glanvill's and Sprat's endeavours was that together they became the chief target in the Royal Society for criticism and abuse by its opponents. Glanvill sent a copy of his work to Evelyn. Writing to acknowledge it on 24th June, 1668, Evelyn commended "this worthy vindication... this excellent piece of yours", and claimed that it would prove the innocence not only of Glanvill, but of the entire Royal Society, despite the

accusations of the "snarling adversary", Crosse (96). Despite Stubbe's claim, in a letter to Boyle of 17th December, 1669 (97), that Plus Ultra was written by a ca al, it was presented under Glanvill's name to the Royal Society in June, 1668. But unfortunately it did not silence criticism. Casaubon's letter to Du Moulin (98) attacked the materialism of the new science, and there is a reference in Birch's Life of Boyle to a letter from Du Moulin of 1669, in which he wrote

> It grieves me to see a feud between that noble (i.e. Royal) Society and the universities, to which Mr. Glanvill's books have much contributed (99).

This antagonism between Glanvill and the Universities is referred to by Stubbe, who comments of Glanvill "he is a man whom the universities hate and scorn... whose credit is now irrevocably lost" (100).

There appears to be some confusion over the next work to appear in the controversy between Glanvill and Crosse. The Chew or Chue Gazette was published privately, and only 100 copies were printed. Green (101 notes that it was written by Crosse against Glanvill, and was privately printed without a licence. Jones (102) says it was based on slanders by Crosse, which Glanvill sent to a friend in London, who published them without Glanvill's knowledge. Wood claims that it was actually written by Crosse, and sent by Glanvill to Dr. Nathaniel

Ingelo of Eton; he goes on to quote from a jingle composed about the two antagonists by the wags at Oxford, beginning

> Two gospel knights,
> Both learned wights,
> And Somersets renowne a..." (103)

Biographica Britannica (104) states that Glanvill obtained an account of an unprinted letter by Crosse, and that he wrote to Dr. Ingelo quoting from it, and refuting some of the arguments. Glanvill himself says

> I represented the Contents of his (i.e. Crosse's) Book in a private letter to Dr. Ingelo, that afterwards, coming to a Friends hands in London was printed by him, and call'd the Chue Gazette... It was printed, but there were not an hundred copies of it.(105)

He goes on to note that there was a fuller Latin version of the Gazette. Crosse apparently replied by unprintabl doggerel.

Despite the success of Plus Ultra, and the support of Evelyn, there were already signs that Glanvill's reputation was declining. Writing to More in 1668, Worthington enquired if Glanvill had published a new edition of his book on witchcraft, and continued "What doth he write of the Lady that was likely to turn Roman Catholick?" (106). A few months later he wrote

> That J.G. (i.e. Glanvill) should seem disturbed at what is in your later writings, is no such wonder. There is required a greater measure of humility and of judgment, to do that which he is displeased at.

> They were smiling at Sir Michael Armyn's (who was at the Bath last summer) when they told the story of the Preacher at Bath, how spruce and trim he was, with his white gloves and handkerchief and periwig (which must now and then be pulled) and how romantic in preaching. There is a great deal of purification which some young men need...Nor would such (i.e. the purified) have been easily mistaken about the lady turned Papist. But young men, that think it a fine thing to converse with such, and to receive some respects, are apt to be transported. (107)

Nicolson (108) suggests that it was only More, of all the Cambridge Platonists, who had any real affection for Glanvill, and that the rest found him slightly comical. Perhaps this insiduous, satirical amusement did more harm to Glanvill's reputation than all Stubbe's invective. It is certain that Glanvill did not live up to his own principles and aspirations, and there is a note of personal bitterness in his attacks on the wits and scoffers of the age.

In the same year that Plus Ultra appeared, Glanvill also published Palpable Evidence of Spirits, but, according to Wood (109), this was practically a reprint of the Mompesson narrative. No wonder Wood commented about Glanvill's writings

> Some of them are new vamp'd, have fresh titles, and sometimes new dedications put to them: which, whether it was so contrived to make the world believe that he was not lazy, but put out a book every year, I leave others to judge.(110)

The sermon, Catholick Charity Recommended (111), which was first preached in London, appeared in 1669. Glanvill stresses the same qualities which the Cambridge

Platonists emphasise so frequently: love, moderation and virtue. But Glanvill himself advocated only a limited toleration, and his love did not extend to the Enthusiasts. This sermon, as well as The Way of Happiness (112), a sermon which appeared in 1670, were reprinted in Glanvill's Some Discourses. In 1670, too, Glanvill published his visitation sermon, ΛΟΓΟΥ ΘΡΗΣΚΕΙΑ, or, a Seasonable Recommendation, and Defence of Reason (113). This was apparently published anonymously originally, but in 1671 Glanvill added it as a second part to Philosophia Pia. On the title-page of that work it is given as A Recommendation, and Defence of Reason in the Affairs of Religion, but it appears under its original title in the text. It will be referred to hereafter as A Seasonable Recommendation.

1670-1 saw the main publications in Glanvill's controversy with Stubbe, a controversy traced by several critics (114). But once again there is some confusion as to detail. Brown (115) quotes from a biography of Baldwin Hamey, which states that this member of the Royal College of Physicians retained Stubbe to attack the Royal Society because he felt that it constituted a rival to the College of Physicians, rather than on moral or religious grounds. Brown continues

If this account be true, and there seems no reason

> to suspect it is not, the view that the Royal Society was attacked as impious and atheistic by men who had spiritual reasons at heart is in need of revision, and Stubbs becomes a pamphleteer of no consequence, hired by a jealous supporter of an older institution.(116)

Wood says that Stubbe, "bearing no good will to the conceited proceeding of Glanvill"(117), encouraged Crosse to continue the controversy. Stubbe himself (118 merely denied the story that Crosse had hired him to oppose Glanvill. Writing to Lady Conway on 14th March, 1670/1 (119), More refers to Glanvill's claim that he had heard Stubbe railing against More himself in the Oxford coffee houses. More had already written to Glanvill to rebut Stubbe's accusations that he had criticised the Royal Society (120). More goes on to say that Glanvill

> informs me that after he had writt an answer to Stubbes his last booke he went to Oxford, and he found Stubbes so generally lookt upon there for a madman that he was asham'd of his Adversary, and thought to lay his papyrs aside, and have no more to doe with so contemptible an Antagonist. But being otherwise adviz'd at London, by no mean person, he was content to lett his Answer to goe to the presse, which he writes me word he thinkes is out by this.

In an interesting sidelight on a possible cause of some of Glanvill's troubles, More continues

> In both these letters of Mr. Glanvills I am very well assured of his vertu and probity, and that he is basely defamed by some former Enemyes of his, that are prophane and Atheisticall pot-companions, in to whose rage he fell by marrying a gentlewoman

> to a friend of his from whom some of that clan as he calles it expected a booty... I am very well satisfyde that he is a vertuous and well dispos'd person, and resolves to be so, at which I am well pleas'd.(121)

It is interesting to note that, though Stubbe attacked not only Glanvill but the whole of the Royal Society, and though the issues involved in this controversy were so much wider than those involved in Glanvill's earlier controversy with White, yet on this occasion both contestants made great use of personal invective, and Glanvill sank to the level of the pamphleteers, despite his earlier protestations. Nevertheless, it is pleasant to know that Glanvill preached Stubbe's funeral sermon in 1676, even though he "said no great matter of him" (122). Stubbe attacked the Royal Society on several counts, and accused it particularly of being atheistic, incompetent, and detrimental to the relationship between Church and State. Interwoven with these accusations was the old argument as to whether the Ancients or the Moderns were superior.

Stubbe, a physician then resident in Bath, published four works during 1669-70. His Legends No Histories (123) contained the Plus Ultra... Reduced to a Non-Plus (124) and Campanella Revived (125), which were also published separately. In this work he claims

that he is anxious to defend religion and the education of youth, rather than restrict the controversy to Glanvill's attack on the faculty of Physicians. It was followed by A Censure upon Certaine Passages Contained in the History of the Royal Society (126). In 1671, Glanvill published his Praefatory Answer to Mr. Henry Stubbe, and followed it up with A Further Discovery of M. Stubbe (127), which he claimed was only published on the advice of others, and in which he denied Stubbe's accusations that Plus Ultra was compiled by a group of writers, or that he had suffered any reprimand from his Bishop for his work. Stubbe retaliated in the same year with his Reply unto the Letter written to Mr. Henry Stubbe, which also contained the Preface Against Ecebolius Glanvill, and his Reply... to the Calumnies of Eccebolius Glanvile (128), which appeared in Lord Bacon's Relation of the Sweating-Sickness. In this latter work he attacked Bacon himself, though, as Cope (129) points out, he had himself employed Baconian methods in Legends No Histories. In 1670, too, there appeared an anonymous pamphlet A Letter to Mr. Henry Stubs Concerning his Censure upon Certain Passages Contained in the History of the Royal Society (130), which attacked Stubbe's arguments relating to the Church of England.

In his preface to the Praefatory Answer, Glanvill refers to Meric Casaubon's pamphlet of 1669, the Letter to Peter du Moulin, which had criticised Plus Ultra. Casaubon, whilst he praised the Royal Society, defended Aristotle, and warned of the danger of atheism inherent in the new philosophy. Glanvill claims that he had answered Casaubon in another discourse, which he intende to publish in his next reply to Stubbe. However, the discourse did not appear, and in Modern Improvements of Useful Science (131), Glanvill states that he carried th controversy no further. Cope (132) suggests that Glanvill's next work, Philosophia Pia (133), which appeared in 1671, was in fact his answer to Casaubon's criticisms. In it, he again defends the new science against charges of atheism, and emphasises the value of reason to faith. Philosophia Pia was reprinted, in a modified and moderated version, as The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion (134).

Glanvill exchanged his living of Frome-Selwood for that of Street and Walton in 1672, and also became Chaplain in Ordinary to Charles II. During the following years, he apparently visited London fairly frequently. Evelyn (135) refers to hearing sermons preached by Glanvill at Whitehall on 28th February, 1675, and at St. James's on 11th November, 1677. Hooke'

Diary (136) notes three meetings with Glanvill. On 16th November, 1672, at Blackfriars, Glanvill advised Lord Chester, ill of the stone, to drink a quart of cider, in which four red hot oyster shells had been quenched. On 28th November, 1677, Hooke met Glanvill at Dr Holder's, and he met him again on 1st December of the same year.

From 1672, onwards, most of Glanvill's writings, apart from new editions of earlier works, were concerned with religious topics. He was immersed in the life and problems of a minister of a country parish, and seems to have had little time or inclination for wider interests. Indeed, Cope goes so far as to claim that Glanvill was "A divine by heart and philosopher by expedience" (137), but he perhaps underrates the genuine interest which the new science inspired in Glanvill. It is significant that his later works, written when he had largely withdrawn from the scientific scene, were less inspiring and more pessimistic than his earlier writings.

In 1672, Glanvill published An Earnest Invitation to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper (138), a simple little manual for his parishioners. That it must have proved popular is shown by the fact that it had reached a fourth edition by 1680. In the same year, Marvell

published the first part of The Rehearsal Transpos'd (139), which was an answer both to Samuel Parker's Discourse of Ecclesiastical Policy (140), published two years earlier, and to the same writer's attack on the Nonconformists in his preface to his edition of Bramhall's Vindication (141), which also appeared in 1672. In it, Marvell puts the case for the Nonconformists in a typically controversial style, in which arguments serious and witty are interspersed with personal vituperation. This apparently aroused Glanvill's anger, and in the second part of The Rehearsal Transpos'd (142), which appeared the following year, Marvell quotes from a letter signed "J.G." (presumably Joseph Glanvill), which threatened dire consequences if Marvell made any further attacks on Parker. An anonymous pamphlet appeared in 1674, An Apology and Advice for Some of the Clergy, Who Suffer Under False, and Scandalous Reports Written on the Occasion of the Second Part of the Rehearsal Transposed (143), which is probably by Glanvill. It is mainly a defence of the Anglican clergy against various scandalous accusations, a defence which Glanvill expanded in later works. Though it was mainly concerned with the slanders levelled against Parker by Marvell, it was clearly written by someone who had suffered similar attacks.

It is interesting that Glanvill was supported in this controversy by Stubbe, who wrote Rosemary and Bayes (144 in 1672, in answer to the first part of Marvell's work.

In 1673, there appeared the anonymous Character of a Coffee-House, with the Symptoms of a Town Wit (145), which is reprinted in the Harleian Miscellany (146). It is possible that this vivid and vituperative piece was written by Glanvill. Weiss (147) notes similarities between it and Glanvill's A Blow at Modern Sadducism, and Cope (148) asserts that Glanvill was almost certainly its author. It is a biting attack on seventeenth century London characters, and incidentally it is surprising how little many of these have changed. But the fullest descriptions and the most acid comments are reserved for the town wit, "the jack-pudding of society, a fleering buffoon; a better kind of ape in the judgement of all wise men" (149), whose witticisms are confined to atheistic or bawdy jokes. There is again a touch of personal bitterness in the attack, and a brutality in the choice of epithets. The writer stresses the bestiality of the characters who frequent the coffee-house, which, significantly, he describes as "a lay-conventicle, good-fellowship turned puritan, ill-husbandry in masquerade" (150).

In 1675 Robert Ferguson published The Interest of

Reason in Religion (151). It was in the main a reply to Sherlock's Discourse Concerning the Knowledge of Jesus Christ (152), but Ferguson also attempted to answer Glanvill's charges, in Philosophia Pia, that the Nonconformists were anti-rational, and supported an incomprehensible religion. Ferguson claims that reason is indeed necessary to faith, but that human reason has been corrupted by the Fall, and by personal sin. Like Glanvill, he stresses that reason saves men from Enthusiasm, "For not only the grossest Follies, but Doctrines palpably repugnant both to Reason, and to one another, have been delivered by Enthusiasts and pretended Inspirato's" (153). In his arguments on such topics as the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, Ferguson frequently echoes Glanvill's own arguments. But, unlike Glanvill, he is careful to differentiate between the Nonconformists, and the Quakers and "other Wild Enthusiasts" (154). And he goes so far as to attack the so-called Rational Divines for their irrationality. Glanvill attempted to answer Ferguson by An Account of Mr Ferguson his Common-place-book (155), which Cope describes as "more blustering than ingenuous"(156). In it, he accuses Ferguson of borrowing material from The Vanity of Dogmatizing, but does little to advance his own views, or to answer Ferguson's criticisms. The work consists of two letters,

firstly Glanvill's to Sherlock, which attacks Ferguson by claiming that he had copied many phrases from Glanvill's own works, and secondly Sherlock's reply, in which he widened the scope of Ferguson's alleged plagiarisms to many other authors.

During 1676, Glanvill published two rather more substantial works, the first dedicated to the Earl of Worcester, the second to the Marchioness, his wife. The volume of Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion is described in Biographia Britannica (157) as his most mature work, but it must be remembered that most of these essays are in fact merely re-arrangements of works which had already appeared. The ideas were much the same as in the earlie versions, but the style is considerably less rhetorical, and the arrangement more orderly and logical. In the Preface, Glanvill notes the original form of most of these essays. Essay I is based on The Vanity of Dogmatizing, Essay II on his reply to White, Essay III on his reply to Stubbe and Casaubon, Essay IV on Philosophia Pia, Essay V on the visitation sermon, A Seasonable Recommendation, and Essay VI on Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft. Of them all, the seventh and final essay is the most interesting, as it is completely

new. It is a continuation of Bacon's New Atlantis (158) and an earlier form of the essay exists as a manuscript, Bensalem (159), now held by the University of Chicago Library. In his edition of Worthington, Crossley (160) refers to possessing the manuscript, but little else is known of its history. It is reprinted in an abridged form by Cope (161), who notes the main differences betwe it and the later essay. Glanvill gives brief sketches of the work and writings of several Latitudinarians, and continually emphasises their opposition to all forms of religious fanaticism, including Roman Catholicism.

The work dedicated to the Marchioness, Seasonable Reflections and Discourses in Order to the Conviction, & Cure of the Scoffing, & Infidelity of a Degenerate Age (162) is a collection of four sermons. The first one, on scoffing, was to have been published alone, but Glanvill felt that the other three should appear with it They were concerned with the bad state of the Church of England, with the evidence of an after-life, and with a future judgement. The style is vivid and picturesque, but the imagery is full of gloom and horror, unlike the beauty of some of his earlier works. The sonorous rhythm of some passages recalls the slow beat of Henry King's Exequy on His Wife (163), other passages echo the macabre imagery of much Nonconformist preaching.

Throughout all four sermons, there is a note of profound disillusionment and pessimism.

During 1677-8, Glanvill was corresponding fairly frequently with Boyle (164). Unfortunately, as so often, Glanvill omitted to give the year in which he was writing, and the letters can only be dated by internal evidence. The letters were mainly concerned with witchcraft. Glanvill asked Boyle for help, and Boyle endorsed Glanvill's belief that well-attested stories of witchcraft would aid religion, whilst at the same time being of interest scientifically.

In his later letters to Boyle, Glanvill refers to his move to Worcester in 1677. Perhaps because of the relationship of his second wife, Margaret Selwin, to the Worcester family, or because of the Earl's appreciation of Glanvill's somewhat flowery dedication to himself and his wife, or possibly because the Bishop of Worcester admired his work, Glanvill was appointed Prebend of the Second Stall at Worcester. But his appointment was made at an unpropitious time. During the following year, the Marquis and the Marchioness were both accused of being Papists, and it was rumoured that the Marquis was involved in the Popish Plot, "though the whole county can testify that he is not only himself a

Protestant, but married the eminently Protestant lady, daughter of the Lord Capel" (165). The whole county was in a state of panic, and rumours were rife. Three of the Marquis's servants were said to be in prison as a result of being involved in the Plot, whilst Glanvill had heard that the Marquis's son had fled, and it was even rumoured that the Marquis himself was in prison (166).

In 1678, there appeared two works by Glanvill on the art of preaching. The Essay Concerning Preaching (167), which shows the influence of Arderne's Directions Concerning Sermons (168), was written at the request of Charles Fountain, and had printed with it a copy of a letter which Glanvill had written to a Member of Parliament about the grave financial position of many Anglican clergy. Both this Essay and his Seasonable Defence of Preaching: and the Plain Way of it (169) stress the need for plainness and simplicity, but Glanvill makes the point that plainness must not sink into vulgarity, nor simplicity into dullness. Running through both works is the same disillusionment that is apparent in several of his later writings. No doubt Glanvill had realised that neither material rewards nor worldly reputations are easily won or preserved.

Glanvill did not die until 1680, but these were the

last works to be published definitely in his lifetime. The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant (170) is dated 1681, though it is possible that it appeared late in 1680, as Aubrey (171) notes that, though it was published anonymously, Glanvill as the author would have been questioned by Parliament for it if he had lived. It was an impassioned attack on religious extremism in England, in the form of a letter to a Member of Parliament. Though Glanvill makes references to the dangers of popery, possibly in order to clear himself from earlier charges of sympathy with that cause, the letter is in the main a stinging attack on the state of the Church of England, due mainly, Glanvill maintains, to the excesses of the Enthusiasts. The letter brought bitter criticism from Baxter in his Second True Defence of the Meer Nonconformists (172). Hitherto, he and Glanvill had corresponded, so far as is known, on terms of mutual admiration, though Baxter describes Glanvill as "a most triumphant Conformist, and not the gentlest Contemner of Nonconformists, and famous for his great wit" (173). But "this rag" (174) really succeeded in angering Baxter. He accuses Glanvill of succumbing to the flattery of the world, and of overvaluing his own understanding. Intolerance and inconstancy are two more charges which he levels against him. In support

of the latter, he appends the letter written to him on 3rd September, 1661, in which Glanvill praises him and his incomparable writings.

Glanvill died on 4th November, 1680, and was buried in the Abbey Church, Bath, where his memorial stone is still preserved. Pleydell's funeral sermon, printed at the end of Glanvill's Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains, is a conventional oration, giving little idea of Glanvill himself, whom Pleydell refers to as "this extraordinary man" (175). He claims that he feels unworthy to describe Glanvill's character, and, rather off-handedly, concludes by asking that God will supply the Church of England with more men "of no worse Learning, Integrity, and Courage" (176), to defend her from the Extremists. Hooke refers in his Diary (177) to learning of Glanvill's death on 9th November, 1680, whilst Birch's History (178) describes Glanvill as an eminent member of the Royal Society, and praises his lively genius, extensive learning, and zealous advocacy of the new philosophy and of religion, against the extremes of Enthusiasm and scepticism. Otherwise his death seems to have caused little stir. Glanville-Richards reproduces his will, dated 3rd October, 1680 (179), which refers to his wife Margaret, and three

children, Sophia, Henry and Mary, as well as to his brother John, of Plymouth. Two servants are mentioned, but there is little else of interest in the document.

In the year following his death, there appeared Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains, a collection of eleven of Glanvill's sermons, some of which had already been published. In the Preface, Horneck speaks of him in most enthusiastic terms:

> The Oriental Pearl needs not the flattering praises of the greedy Jeweller... Death seems to envy the vast parts of so great a man, and in the ascent of his Age, snatch't him away, when the learned world expected some of his greatest attempts and enterprises... His Soul seemed to be spun of a finer thread than those of other mortals, and things look'd with another face when they passed through the quicker fire of his Laboratory... He had a mind fitted for Contemplation, and his thoughts could dwell on a Divine Object, till he had suck't out th Cream and Marrow. (180)

But even Horneck has to admit that his influence was small - due rather to his hearers' faults than to the faults of Glanvill's preaching, claims Horneck. The same themes as had appeared in so many of Glanvill's earlier works recur in this collection of sermons. They were mainly concerned with the danger of scoffing, the poor position of the Church of England, and the need for reasonableness, morality and toleration.

In the same year there appeared Saducismus Triumphatus, edited by More. As has already been noted,

this was to a large extent based upon A Blow at Modern Sadducism. In 1682, the volume entitled Two Choice and Useful Treatises (181) was published, but it consisted of Glanvill's Lux Orientalis and Rust's Discourse of Truth (182), with annotations by More. Ten years later, Mr. J. Glanvill's Full Vindication.of...Mr. Richard Baxter appeared. Quotations from this had already been used by Baxter in his Second True Defence of the Meer Nonconformists, and it was substantially the letter written by Glanvill to Baxter on 3rd September, 1661.

Crossley, in his edition of Worthington (183) refers to possessing several unpublished letters written by Glanvill to More, whilst Wood mentions a letter to the Earl of Bristol, with another to a friend on "the usefulness of the universal character, with the way of learning it" (184), but he notes that these manuscripts were even then probably not extant. In the second part of Saducismus Triumphatus, the editor refers to seventeen sheets written by Glanvill in answer to Wagstaffe's The Question of Witchcraft Debated (185), but these were omitted from the prirted version. Green (186) notes a work, Ad Clerum Somersetensem Epistola, as appearing in 1671, but he was probably misled by Wood, who notes that it formed part of Glanvill's Further Discovery of M. Stubbe.

Ironically enough, it was Glanvill's belief in witchcraft, rather than his scientific or religious ideas, which appeared to arouse most interest for some time after his death, and Saducismus Triumphatus was both translated into Dutch in 1692 (187), and reprinted as late as 1726. Then interest in Glanvill waned until the late Nineteenth Century. There are of course references to Glanvill in such works as Tulloch's Rational Theology (188) and Hallam's Introduction to the Literature of Europe (189), whilst there is an interesting article on him in the volume of the Temple Bar... Magazine for 1893-4 (190), but there was no full length study of him until Greenslet published his work in 1900 (191). On the Continent, Petrescu published Glanvill und Hume in 1911 (192), and Habicht wrote a dissertation on Joseph Glanvill in 1936 (193). H.S. and I.M.L. Redgrove published a work on Glanvill in 1921 (194). Cope refers to an unpublished dissertation of Chicago University of 1930 entitled Joseph Glanvill and the "New Science" (195). Several articles on Glanvill appeared during the next twenty-five years, and, in 1956, Cope produced his comprehensive thesis. This has been reviewed by, among others, Fisch (196) with enthusiasm, Prior (197) with caution, and Woodhouse (198) with disapproval. The Vanity of Dogmatizing was edited by Prior in 1931 (199),

and Scepsis Scientifica by Owen in 1885 (200). The British Museum also has two narratives from Saducismus Triumphatus reprinted by the Mill House Press in 1928 (201), and Cope edited a facsimile of Plus Ultra in 1958 (202).

Critical opinion of Glanvill has varied tremendousl James Collins, the publisher of Lux Orientalis, remarks that Glanvill was reputed to be "one of the most ingenious and florid Writers of his Age" (203), whilst Horneck's eulogy has already been quoted. Tulloch (204) dismissed him almost contemptuously, and Hallam (205) claims that he was acute, bold and able. Lecky (206) praises him highly, claiming that he was important in that he realised that traditional religion must be modified, if it were to harmonise with the new philosophy, and that the spirit of the age required logical rather than moral proof for religion, whilst religion itself must be freed from authoritarianism and dogmatism Morell (207) believes that Glanvill most perfectly expressed the scepticism of the age, and claims that he was the precursor of Hume's theory of causality. Greenslet (208) shows that he had points of contact with all contemporary literary activity, and Baker (209) comments that he was the most graceful publicist for

the new science, although he lacked originality. Willey (210) sees him as a typical modern churchman of the Restoration, and as a microcosm of the development of the Seventeenth Century, whilst Cope (211) devotes his thesis to proving that he was essentially an apologist for the Anglican Church, and that his rational and scientific beliefs were secondary to his religious ones. Popkin (212) summarises the rise and fall of Glanvill's reputation as a philosopher, and, like Morell, notes his position as a precursor of Hume in the critique of causality.

Though he was neither strikingly original nor deeply learned, Glanvill did manage to absorb and to express to a remarkable degree the climate of opinion in which he lived, and, because the Seventeenth Century in England was a complex and fascinating period, he becomes fascinating through reflecting so many of its complexities. But he was more than simply a reflection of his age. Whilst reaction against Enthusiasm was widespread, in Glanvill it was more violent than in many of his contemporaries. It coloured his whole attitude to religion and to life, and remained a constant influence upon all his ideas. Cope over-simplifies his position in arguing that he was essentially an Anglican apologist, and underestimates his belief in

the possibilities of the new science. As religion should be freed from religious dogmatism, so science should be freed from scientific dogmatism. The two were closely related, and Glanvill supported the Anglican Church - or, rather, his conception of it - not only because it was moderate, but also because it was rational.

CHAPTER I - REFERENCES.

1. Browne, Sir T. — Pseudodoxia Epidemica. (In Browne, Sir T.- Works; ed. S. Wilkin. London 1852. Vols I-II

2. Glanvill, J. — The Vanity of Dogmatizing. London 1661.

3. - — Essays on Several Important Subjects. London, 1676.

4. Mitchell, W.F. — English Pulpit Oratory. London 1932.

5. Jones, R.F. — Ancients and Moderns; 2nd ed. St. Louis, 1961.

6. Wood, A. — Athenae Oxonienses. London 1691- Vol.II, item No.431.

7. Butterfield, H. — Origins of Modern Science. London, 1949. P.90.

8. Cope, J.I. — Joseph Glanvill. St. Louis, 1956 P.73.

9. Oxford University. Exeter College. Register.

10. Glanvill, J. — Plus Ultra. London, 1668.

11. Wood, A. — Op.cit., Vol.II, item no. 431.

12. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay III.

13. - — Op.cit., Essay III, p.54.

14. Cope, J.I. — Op.cit., p.4.

15. Edwards, E. and Waller, M.J. "Joseph Glanvill, Divine and Scientist, 1636-80." N.Q., 204 (1959), p.192.

Walker, R.A. — "Joseph Glanvill, Divine and Scientist, 1636-80". N.Q., 204 (1959), p.388.

16. Remusat, C.de — Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre. Paris, 1875. P.188.

Chapter I - References, cont.

17. Baxter, R. — Mr. J. Glanvil's Full Vindicatio of the late... Mr. Richard Baxte London, 1691.

18. Baxter-Glanvill correspondence in the Baxter Manuscript Collection in Dr. Williams's Library, London. Thes are itemised in Cope, J.I. - Op.cit., p.8.

19. Glanvill, J. — Sadducismus Triumphatus; 4th ed. London, 1726.

20. - — A Praefatory Answer to...H.Stubbe London, 1671.

21. - — Letter to a Friend Concerning Aristotle. (In Glanvill, J.- Scepsis Scientifica. London, 1665.

22. - — The Vanity of Dogmatizing. Epistle Dedicatory (p.4).

23. Wood, A. — Op.cit., Vol.II, item no. 431.

24. Glanvill, J. — The Vanity of Dogmatizing; ed. M.E. Prior. New York, 1931.

25. - — Essays. Essay I.

26. Jones, R.F. — "Science and English Prose Style in the Third Quarter of the Seventeenth Century." P.M.L.A., 45(1930 pp.977-1009.

27. Worthington, J. — Diary and Correspondence. Manchester, 1847-86. Vol.I, pp. 300-1.

28. Encyclopaedia Britannica; 9th ed. Edinburgh, 1875-89. Vol. 10, p. 635.

29. Jones, R.F. — Ancients and Moderns; 2nd ed.

30. Ballad of Gresham Colledge. (Originally appeared in Dr. Henry Power's Letterbook ascribed to W. Glanvill.)

31. Weld, C.R. — A History of the Royal Society. London, 1848. Vol.I, pp.79-80.

Chapter I - References, cont.

32. Masson, Sir J.I.O. Three Centuries of Chemistry. London, 1925.

33. Stimson, D. "Ballad of Gresham Colledge." Isis, 18 (1932), pp.103-17.

34. Taylor, F.S. "An Early Satirical Poem on the Royal Society." N.R.R.S.,5(1948 pp. 37-46.

35. Stimson, D. Op.cit., Stanzas 2,6,27.

36. Glanvill, J. Lux Orientalis. London, 1662.

37. Baxter-Glanvill correspondence. Letter I, 174(b).

38. Glanvill, J. The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant. London, 1681.

39. Cope, J.I. Op.cit., pp. 9-10.

40. Rust, G. Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen. London, 1661. (In The Phenix. London, 1707.)

41. Mullett, C.F. "A Letter by Joseph Glanvill on the Future State." H.L.Q.,1 (1937-8), pp.447-56.

42. Glanvill, J. Lux Orientalis. (In Glanvill, J. Two Choice and Useful Treatises. London, 1682.) Preface, p.20.

43. Boyle, R. Works. London, 1744. Vol.V, pp. 627-8.

44. Conway Letters; ed. M.H. Nicolson. London, 1930.

45. Nicolson, M.H. "The Real Scholar Gipsy." Y.R. N.S.18(1928-9), pp.347-63.

46. Conway Letters. P.208.

47. Greenslet, F. Joseph Glanvill. New York, 1900. Ch.3.

48. Ward, R. The Life of...Dr. Henry More; ed.M.F. Howard. London, 1911.

Chapter I - References, cont.

49. Glanvill, J. Saducismus Triumphatus. London, 168

50. W., E. No Praeexistence. London, 1667.

51. Thynne Papers. Book 674, f.69.

52. Conway Letters. P.215.

53. Idem, p.219.

54. Pepys, S. Diary; ed. H.B. Wheatley. London, 1904. Vol. III, pp. 159-60.

55. Idem, vol.VII, p.233.

56. Baxter-Glanvill correspondence. Letter V, 177(a).

57. Pepys, S. Op.cit., Vol.III, p.159n.

58. Glanvill, J. Scire/i Tuum Nihil Est. London, 166 (In Glanvill, J.-Scepsis Scientifica.)

59. Boyle, R. Op.cit., Vol.V, p.328b.

60. Birch, T. History of the Royal Society of London. London, 1756-7. Vol.IV, p.5

61. Glanvill, J. "Answers to Some of the Inquiries formerly publish'd Concerning Mine Phil.Trans., 3, no.28(1667), pp.525-7.
"Additional Answers to the Queries of Mines." Phil.Trans., 3, no.39 (1668), pp.767-71.
"Observations Concerning the Bath-Springs." Phil.Trans., 3, no.49 (1669), pp.977-82.

62. Gough, J.W. The Mines of Mendip. Oxford, 1930.

63. Glanvill, J. Propositions for the Carrying on a Philosophical Correspondence...in the County of Somerset. 1670.

64. Weld, C.R. Op.cit., vol.I, pp.229-32.

Chapter I - References, cont.

65. London, Royal Society. Library. Correspondence G(1) 12-20.

66. White, T. Scirri, Sive Sceptices et Sceptico[rum] à Jure Disputationis Exclusio.. London, 1663.

67. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II, item no. 431.

68. Krook, D. "Two Baconians: Robert Boyle and Joseph Glanvill." H.L.Q.,18(1954-5) pp.261-78.

69. Pepys, S. Op.cit.,vol.V,pp.90, 103, 112, 115, 128, 129, 131-3, 135, 136.

70. Idem, vol.VIII, p.45.

71. Boyle, R. Op.cit., vol.V, p.488a.

72. Glanvill, J. Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft. London, 1667.

73. - A Philosophical Endeavour Towards the Defense of the Being of Witche and Apparitions. 1666(?) (Destroye in Great Fire.)

74. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II, item no. 431.

75. Green, E. Bibliotheca Somersetensis. Taunton 1902. Vol. I, pp.206-12.

76. Pepys, S. Op.cit., vol.VI, p.72.

77. Glanvill, J. A Whip for the Droll Fidler to the Atheist. (In Glanvill, J.- Sadducismus Triumphatus.)

78. - A Blow at Modern Sadducism; 4th ed London, 1668.

79. Glanvill, J. Sadducismus Triumphatus. Dedicatio to the Duke of Richmond and Lenox, p.1.

80. Scot, R. The Discoverie of Witchcraft. London, 1584.

Chapter I - References, cont.

81. Webster, J. The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft. London, 1677.

82. Newcastle, Margaret, Duchess of Letters and Poems in Honour of the Incomparable Princess, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. London, 1676 Pp.85, 98-100, 102-3, 104-5, 123-7 135-6, 137-42.

83. Glanvill, J. A Loyal Tear Dropt on the Vault of our Late Martyred Sovereign. London, 1667.

84. Edelen, G. "Joseph Glanvill, Henry More, and the Phantom Drummer of Tedworth." H.L.B., 10(1956), pp.186-92.

85. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II, item no.431.

86. Glanvill, J. Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains. London, 1681.

87. Glanville-Richards, W.U.S. Records of the Anglo-Norman House of Glanville. London, 1882. Pp.76-81.

88. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II, item no.473.

89. Cope, J.I. Op.cit., p.28.

90. Hakewill, G. An Apologie of the Power and Providence of God. Oxford, 1627.

91. Blount, Sir T.P. Essays on Several Subjects. London, 1691.

92. Wotton, W. Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning. London, 1694.

93. Jones, R.F. Ancients and Moderns; 2nd ed.

- The Seventeenth Century. Stanford, 1951.

94. Boyle, R. Op.cit., vol.V, p.367b.

Chapter I - References, cont.

95. Sprat, T. The History of the Royal-Society of London; 2nd ed. London, 1702.

96. Evelyn, J. Diary and Correspondence; ed. W. Bray. London, 1859. Vol.III, p.204.

97. Boyle, R. Op.cit., vol.I, p.56.

98. Casaubon, M. A Letter to Peter du Moulin. Cambridge, 1669.

99. Birch, T. The Life of Robert Boyle. (In Boyle, R. - Op.cit., vol.I, pp.60-1

100. Boyle, R. Op.cit., vol.I, p.56.

101. Green, E. Op.cit., vol.II, p.342.

102. Jones, R.F. Ancients and Moderns; 2nd ed. P.33

103. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II, item no.473.

104. Biographia Britannica. London, 1747-66. Vol.IV.

105. Glanvill, J. A Praefatory Answer to Mr. Henry Stubbe. London, 1671. P.187.

106. Worthington, J. Op.cit., vol.II, pt.ii, p.289.

107. Idem, vol.II, pt.ii, pp.293-4.

108. Conway Letters. P.471.

109. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II, item no.451.

110. Idem, vol.II, item no.431.

111. Glanvill, J. Catholick Charity Recommended. London, 1669;

112. - The Way of Happiness. London, 1670

113. - ΛΟΓΟΥ ΘΡΗΣΚΕΙΑ, or, a Seasonable Recommendation, and Defence of Reason. London, 1670.

114. For example:-

Jones, R.F. - Ancients and Moderns

- The Seventeenth Century.

Chapter I - References, cont.

Baker, H.- The Wars of Truth. London, 1952.
Cope, J.I.- Op.cit.

115. Brown, H. Scientific Organizations in Seventeenth Century France (1620-1680). Baltimore, 1934. Pp.255-7.

116. Idem, p.257.

117. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II; item no.473.

118. Stubbe, H. A Reply unto the Letter Written to Mr. Henry Stubbe... Whereunto is Added a Preface against Ecebolius Glanvill. Oxford, 1671. Preface against Glanvill, p.58.

119. Conway Letters. P.327.

120. Idem. p.303.

121. Idem. pp.327-8.

122. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II, item no.373.

123. Stubbe, H. Legends no Histories. London, 1670

124. - The Plus Ultra Reduced to a Non Plus. London, 1670.

125. - Campanella Revived. London, 1670.

126. - A Censure upon Certaine Passages Contained in the History of the Royal Society. Oxford, 1670.

127. Glanvill, J. A Further Discovery of M. Stubbe. London, 1671.

128. Stubbe, H. A Reply to... the Calumnies of Ecebolius Glanvile (In Stubbe,H. - The Lord Bacon's Relation of the Sweating-sickness. London, 1671.)

129. Cope, J.I. Op.cit., p.119.

130. A Letter to Mr. Henry Stubs Concerning his Censure upon Certain Passages Contained in the History of the Royal Society. London, 1670.

Chapter I - References. cont.

131. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay III.

132. Cope, J.I. Op.cit., pp.31-2.

133. Glanvill, J. Philosophia Pia; or, a Discourse of the Religious Temper, and Tendencies of the Experimental Philosophy. London, 1671.

134. - Essays. Essay IV.

135. Evelyn, J. Diary; ed. E.S. de Beer. Oxford, 1955. Vol. IV.

136. Hooke, R. Diary 1672-1680; ed.H.W. Robinson and W. Adams. London, 1935. Pp.13, 330, 331.

137. Cope, J.I. Op.cit., p.35.

138. Glanvill, J. An Earnest Invitation to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. London, 1673.

139. Marvell, A. The Rehearsal Transpos'd. Pt.I. London, 1672.

140. Parker, S. A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie... London, 1670.

141. Bramhall, J. Bishop Bramhall's Vindication... London, 1672.

142. Marvell, A. Op.cit., Pt.II. London, 1673.

143. An Apology and Advice for some of the Clergy, who Suffer under False, and Scandalous Reports Written on the Occasion of the Second Part of The Rehearsal Transposed. London, 1674.

144. Stubbe, H. Rosemary & Bayes... London, 1672.

145. The Character of a Coffee-House, with the Symptoms of a Town-Wit. London, 1673.

146. Harleian Miscellany, 6(1810), pp.465-70.

Chapter I - References, cont.

147. Weiss, S.A. "Joseph Glanvill and "The Character of a Coffee-House"." N.Q., 197(1952), pp.234-5, 347.

148. Cope, J.I. Op.cit., p.36.

149. Harleian Miscellany, 6(1810), p.469.

150. Idem, p.463.

151. Ferguson, R. The Interest of Reason in Religion London, 1675.

152. Sherlock, W. A Discourse Concerning the Knowled of Jesus Christ... London, 1674.

153. Ferguson, R. Op.cit., p.57.

154. Idem, p.527.

155. Glanvill, J. An Account of Mr. Ferguson His Common-Place-Book. London, 1675.

156. Cope, J.I. Op.cit., p.37.

157. Biographia Britannica, Vol.IV. London, 1759.

158. Bacon, F. New Atlantis... London, 1659. (Originally published as Sylva Sylvarum... London, 1627.)

159. Glanvill, J. Bensalem... (Manuscript.)

160. Worthington, J. Op.cit., vol.I, p.214.

161. Cope, J.I. ""The Cupri-Cosmits"; Glanvill on Latitudinarian Anti-Enthusiasm." H.L.Q., 17(1953-4), pp.269-86.

162. Glanvill, J. Seasonable Reflections and Discourses in Order to the Conviction & Cure of the Scoffing, & Infidelity of a Degenerate Age. London, 1676.

163. King, H. Exequy on his Wife. (In A Treasury of Seventeenth Century English

Chapter I - References, cont.

Verse; ed. H.J. Massingham. London, 1941. Pp.150-2.)

164. Boyle, R. Op.cit., vol.V, pp.244-5, 628-9.

165. Historical Manuscripts Commission, 12th Report. Appendix pt. ix. London, 1891. p.6

166. Idem, pp.70-1.

167. Glanvill, J. An Essay Concerning Preaching. London, 1678.

168. Arderne, J. Directions Concerning the Matter and Stile of Sermons; ed. J. Macka Oxford, 1958. (Luttrell Reprints. No.13.)

169. Glanvill, J. A Seasonable Defence of Preaching: and the Plain Way of it. London, 1678.

170. - The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant. London, 1681.

171. Aubrey, J. Brief Lives; ed. A. Clark. Oxford, 1898. Vol.I, p.267.

172. Baxter, R. A Second True Defence of the Meer Nonconformist. London, 1681.

173. Idem, p.174.

174. Idem, p.175.

175. Glanvill, J. Some Discourses. A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of Mr. Jos. Glanvill, p.24.

176. Idem, p.25.

177. Hooke, R. Op.cit., p.457.

178. Birch, T. History of the Royal Society. Vol.IV, pp.58-60.

179. Glanville-Richards, W.U.S. Op.cit., p.162.

Chapter I - References, cont.

180. Glanvill, J. Op.cit., Preface, pp.1-3.

181. - Two Choice and Useful Treatises: The Lux Orientalis... The other, A Discourse of Truth, by...Dr.Rust. London, 1682.

182. Rust, G. A Discourse of Truth... (In Glanvill, J.-Op.cit.)

183. Worthington, J. Op.cit., p.300.

184. Wood, A. Op.cit., vol.II, item no.431.

185. Wagstaffe, J. The Question of Witchcraft Debated London, 1669.

186. Green, E. Op.cit., vol.I, pp.206-12.

187. Collie, R.L. Light and Enlightenment. Cambridge 1957.

188. Tulloch, J. Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century; 2nd ed. Edinburgh, 1874. Vol.II.

189. Hallam, H. Introduction to the Literature of Europe. London, 1837-9. Vol.IV.

190. "The Writings of Joseph Glanvill." Temple Bar... Magazine, 98 (1893), pp.250-60.

191. Greenslet, F. Op.cit.

192. Petrescu, N. Glanvill und Hume. Berlin, 1911.

193. Habicht, H. Joseph Glanvill...Zurich, 1936.

194. Radgrove, H.S. and I.M.L. Joseph Glanvill and Psychical Research... London, 1921.

195. Prior, M.E. Joseph Glanvill and the "New Science". (Unpublished Dissertation Chicago University, 1930.)

Chapter I - References, cont.

196. Fisch, H. — Review in R.E.S., N.S.9(1958), pp.324-5.

197. Prior, M.E. — Review in M.P., 55(1957-8), pp.279-81.

198. Woodhouse, A.S.P. — Review in M.L.N., 73(1958), pp.436-9.

199. Glanvill, J. — The Vanity of Dogmatizing; ed. M.E. Prior.

200. - — Scepsis Scientifica; ed. J. Owen. London, 1885.

201. [illegible], J. — The Story of a Languishment. Stanford Dingley, 1928.

- — The Story of Mr. John Bourne. Stanford Dingley, 1928.

202. Glanvill, J. — Plus Ultra...1668... A facsimile reproduction with an introduction by J.I. Cope. Gainesville, 1958.

203. - — Lux Orientalis. The Publisher to the Reader, p.5.

204. Tulloch, J. — Op.cit.

205. Hallam, H. — Op.cit.

206. Lecky, W.E.H. — History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe. London, 1865.

207. Morell, J.D. — An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century; 2nd ed. London, 1847. Vol.I, pp. 330-2.

208. Greenslet, F. — Op.cit.

209. Baker, H. — Op.cit.

Chapter I - References, cont.

210. Willey, B. — The Seventeenth Century Background. London, 1934.

211. Cope, J.I. — Joseph Glanvill.

212. Popkin, R.H. — "Development of the Philosophical Reputation of Joseph Glanvill." J.H.I., 15(1954), pp. 305-11.

CHAPTER II - THE VANITY OF DOGMATIZING.

The Vanity of Dogmatizing was not only the title of Glanvill's first major work, but it was also one of the strongest influences on his whole attitude to life. His ideas, religious, philospohical and scientific alike, were inextricably bound up with his belief that dogmatism was not only erroneous, but that it was actually a sin. Unfortunately, like many theorists, he was unable to live up to his own ideals, and, ironically, his own works were dogmatic in their anti-dogmatism. His unhappy tendency to make sweeping generalisations can be seen in his accusation that all Nonconformists were anti-rational, which provoked Ferguson to write his closely-reasoned and very moderate Interest of Reason in Religion, as well as rousing the ire of his former friend, Baxter. He had an unchristian and uncharitable tendency, too, to refer scathingly to the less well-educated, and his tolerance was, by his own admission, strictly limited. No wonder that Stubbe was able to accuse him of arrogance: "What doth he bring but fresh Testimonies of his intolerable Impudence and Ignorance" (1), whilst Wood (2). though he gave a not unkind picture of Glanvill, obviously thought him somewhat conceited and impetuous. Glanvill advocated scepticism, claiming that once a sceptic had reached a mature decision, he would be unlikely to change his mind

without good reason, and yet much of his own life seems to have been occupied with repairing the damage he did to his own reputation by his often rash assertions. It seemed a noble thing to plead for scepticism, but when an ordained minister of the Church of England was thereby accused of atheism, it was necessary to tone down this scepticism, even if he could not fully explain it away, and to lose himself in the labyrinths of the occult in order to prove his orthodoxy. So, too, the admiration for Descartes displayed in his earlier work had to be qualifie when he became a Member of the Royal Society. Cope (3) studies Glanvill's relationship to the French sceptics and to Descartes, and argues that in actual fact Glanvill misunderstood Descartes, and confused him with the empirical scientists. There are numerous examples of this desire to conform with contemporary beliefs, which must make the strength of his own convictions suspect. But in one thing he was entirely constant, and that was in his hatred of the Nonconformists. Like many of his fellows, he was against authority, particularly in the form of Aristotelianism and the Schoolmen, but his anti-dogmatism was most intense and bitter when it was aroused by the pride, arbitrariness, and, as he believed, anti-rationalism of the Nonconformists.

There were various reasons for the wave of anti-dogmatism which swept over the country during the

seventeenth century. This period saw the beginning of the growth of democracy and individualism (though by the Eighteenth Century the distrust of fanaticism, the importance attached to reason and self-control, and the desire for propriety led to a dislike of any form of eccentricity). This was fostered by the Levellers, by the rise of a powerful and better-educated Middle Class, and by the beheading of Charles I, which helped to end any general belief in the Divine Right of Kings. The military dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell discredited any desire for an absolutist form of government. Even the Royal Society, apart from its scientific achievements, helped to further the cause of democracy, in that its members were elected for their scientific achievements rather than for their aristocratic or financial influence. It helped, too, by the dissemination of knowledge and by the importance which it placed on communication. Because of their greater liberty, men were prepared to question many traditionally accepted beliefs, and, because they were more widely read, they were better able to assess the validity of the various arguments. Then, too, the nation was tired of religious dissension, and accepted the need for toleration and moderation, in order to re-establish peace and a strong government.

The development of science was of course an important

influence in the growing dislike of dogmatism. Bacon had argued against the overvaluing of authority, whether ancient or modern, attacking that overconfidence which sprang from the lack of "due and mature suspension of judgement" (4), and many people realised that the old ideas were crumbling. Donne was not alone in believing that the "new Philosophy calls all in doubt" (5), and by 1660 many of the traditional beliefs and revered authorities were discredited by new discoveries. Even religion itself, by the end of the century, was open to question, and the Church was no longer powerful enough to enforce orthodoxy. Though many of the early scientists were also eminent churchmen, there was a general feeling that the Church had actually hindered science, and anti-scholasticism was closely related to anti-clericalism.

But there were less practical reasons for this reaction, with roots which reached far back into the past. Emphasis on the fallibility of man had always been an accepted Christian method of destroying man's pride, and there was a general belief that man was less perfect in every way since the Fall, and was therefore incapable of knowing everything. This idea recurs again and again; Sir John Davies, in Nosce Teipsum, wrote:

> "Not Adam's body, but his soul did sin
> And so herself unto corruption brought,
> But the poor soul corrupted is within

Ere she had sinn'd, either in act or thought." (6)

and this was echoed by Vaughan, in his aptly-titled poem, Corruption:

> "Sure, it was so. Man in those early days
> Was not, all stone, and Earth,
> He shin'd a little, and by those weak Rays
> Had some glimpse of his birth...
> Sin triumphs still, and man is sunk below
> The Center, and his shroud;
> All's in deep sleep, and night; Thick darkness lyes
> And Katcheth o'er thy people" (7).

Browne (8) listed as the first cause of common errors the common infirmity of human nature, and the same theme re-appeared in every form of literature. Glanvill conformed to this tradition when, in A Seasonable Recommendation, whilst he stressed the importance of reason to religion, he also acknowledged its corruption and weakness. In Scepsis Scientifica he claimed that man before the Fall was a "Copy of the Divinity", a "Meddal of God", and went on:

> "For whereas our ennobled understandings could once take the wings of the morning to visit the World above us... they now lye grovelling in this lower region, muffled up in mists and darkness."(9)

The same idea appears, with various connotations, throughout his writings; because man is imperfect, he should not jump to conclusions, and error is an infirmity rather than an intentional mistake.

But the Seventeenth Century managed to avoid the pessimism inherent in this belief. The Elizabethan, and

more particularly the Jacobean, obsession with time, death and the decay of nature was linked with this idea of the essential corruption of man; Donne, in The First Anniversary, described how this corruption affected first the Angels, then the world:

> "The noblest part, man, felt it first; and then
> Both beasts and plants, curst in the curse of man."
> (10).

Bacon, however, had already shown the way by which men could rise above this pessimism; he believed that man could achieve knowledge, provided that false authority and error were cleared away, and that knowledge was built on a secure foundation of experiment and observation; in other words, it was the methods and conclusions of the past that were at fault rather than man's capacity for knowledge. This belief was reflected in the popularity during the century of works which claimed to list and expose various popular misconceptions and traditions. Then, too, from Bacon onwards, there were deliberate attempts to show that the Ancients were not superior to the Moderns in either faculties or learning. And finally the Baconian method had the advantage that it did not require a superhuman intellect; experiments and observations could be made and recorded by any normal person.

The separation of religion and science helped to restore man's good opinion of himself. It was generally

agreed that certain things were sacrosanct, and could not be known in the rational sense; Browne's statement that "I love to lose myself in a mystery; to pursue my reason to an O altitudo!" (11) was not peculiar to himself; more prosaically, in The Agreement of Reason and Religion (12), Glanvill stressed that, because some things in faith were incomprehensible to reason, that did not destroy their validity. In his History of the Royal-Society, Sprat was careful to point out that the new science did not claim to plumb the mysteries of faith. Even the realisation that man was not the centre of the universe was not a cause for despondency; indeed, it released him from narrow subjectivism and introversion, and gave him a sense of infinity, of space, of immeasurable possibilities. It was not pessimism but a sense of excitement which filled Glanvill when he wrote, of his own efforts:

> "Methinks I have brought but a Cockleshell of water from the Ocean... For all things are a great darkness to us, and we are so to ourselves" (13)

and this sense of almost mystical enthusiasm occurs again and again in his early writings. Fontenelle wrote:

> "when the Heavens were a little blue Arch, stuck with Stars, methought the Universe was too strait and close...but now it is enlarg'd in height and breadth...I begin to breathe with more freedom, and think the Universe to be incomparably more magnificent than it was before." (14)

Perhaps Marlowe had already summed up this sense of vision as vividly as possible, both with Tamburlaine's vivid description of men's "aspiring minds" which are

> "Still climbing after knowledge infinite,
> And always moving as the restless sphere" (15),

and in Faustus's great speech:

> "All things that move between the quiet poles
> Shall be at my command: emperors and kings
> Are but obeyèd in their several provinces,
> Nor can they raise the wind or rend the clouds;
> But his dominion that exceeds in this
> Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man,
> A sound magician is a mighty god:" (16).

The breaking of the medieval circle of perfection has been examined by Nicolson (17), and from a more theological viewpoint by Baker (18). Again, Nicolson describes both the sense of insecurity which resulted from the new astronomy (19), and also "the seventeenth-century awareness of the immensity of space" which inspired many writers of the period (20). Williamson claims that

> "if the new astronomy lent an impetus to the relativity of thought, it brought the final proof of the mutability of things; if it left the mind without 'ends', it seemed to bring the world to an end. The old order was cracking up; it was the decay of Nature, not the beginning of a new order, so far as the imagination and emotions of men were concerned" (21)

From contemporary evidence, however, this appears to be rather a sweeping generalisation. Jonston (22) was not alone in attacking the belief that either the world or man was deteriorating; such a theory, he declared, dishonoured both God, and man's endeavours.

Reference has already been made to the fact that there was a conscious revolution of ideas in progress during this period, and, because they stood midway between the old and the new, the men of the Seventeenth Century were in the position of being able to look both backwards and forwards. Browne was not the only Janus of the period; even some of the most eminent scientists were almost medieval in some of their ideas, and the conflict between the old and the new gave immense opportunity for argument and discussion. But, unlike religious disputes, scientific controversy was on the whole calm and rational, and it was difficult, if not impossible, for one scientist to enforce his opinion on others, without adequate evidenc Science still had room for the unorthodox.

These, then, were some of the causes of the strong feeling of anti-dogmatism which swept over the country. But by the end of the century it had lost its impetus. Toleration to a large extent had become indifference - a danger realised by Glanvill when he pleaded for zeal and affection. The Latitudinarians did indeed carry on the Cambridge Platonists' plea for charity, but it was a charity based on compromise and interest rather than on true Christian love. Anti-Authoritarianism had been softened down, so that the Ancients and the Moderns were each allowed their own fields of pre-eminence, whilst the

scepticism of Descartes had opened the way for the materialism of Hobbes, the tendency to cynicism and utilitarianism of the Eighteenth Century, and the spiritual emptiness of the last two hundred years. By restricting the field of faith, by divorcing it from free enquiry, Glanvill and his colleagues had smothered the true spirit of religion as surely as if they had advocated atheism. It is interesting, too, to note that the defeat of dogmatism was confined mainly to the fields of science and religion; during the Eighteenth Century the arts - particularly poetry, drama, architecture and horticulture - were to be more subject to convention than perhaps ever before.

One of the strongest movements in seventeenth century anti-dogmatism was the reaction against authority, which in part led to the increasing dislike of excessive quotation:

> "T'was this vain Idolizing of Authors, which gave birth to that silly vanity of impertinent citations; and inducing Authority in things neither requiring nor deserving it." (23)

Bacon of course had started the attack, but he was careful to explain that his methods were entirely new, and therefore did not detract from the reputation of the Ancients. By the time that Glanvill started to write, however, it had become quite acceptable to regard many of the early philospohers as practically useless. Even in religion a slight note of disparagement was allowed to creep in; Glanvill was careful to stress his belief that the Church

of England was the most ancient, and therefore the purest form of Christianity, and he praised the Ancient Fathers, but he attacked Biblical commentators for twisting and corrupting their texts, comparing them in this to the hated Nonconformists. Clifford was one of many who expressed this growing dislike of authoritarianism in religion:

> "And truly they who build their Belief wholly upon the Authority of past or present Ages... are in much greater danger of being withdrawn from the Christian Faith, than those who remit the judgment of these things to their own Reason." (24)

It was not only because they disliked being spiritually and intellectually imprisoned that men attacked religious authority, but also because they believed that this form of dogmatism was quite definitely a cause of religious dissension. Again and again Glanvill accused the Schoolmen of arguing over notional subtleties, of quibbling over unnecessary trifles; they were the descendants of the Jesuits, "those Laplanders of Peripateticism" (25), they were the ghosts of Aristotle "in a theological livery" (26). In Anti-fanatical religion, and free philosophy Glanvill praised the New Divines for their refusal to accept authority blindly, or to force their own beliefs on others; to them freedom of choice was a natural right, whilst under the sects

> "We saw nothing of religion but glaring Appearances, and Contention about the Shells and Shadows of it.

> It seem'd to run out wholly into Chaff and Straw: into Disputes and Vain Notions; which are not only unprofitable, but destructive to Charity, Peace, and every pious Practice. All was Controversie and Dissension, full of Animosity and Bitterness" (27).

In The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant, Glanvill claimed that both the Nonconformists and the Roman Catholic churches were alike in binding men's thoughts; only the Church of England could"stand on the grounds of Scripture, right Reason, and the best and purest Antiquity." (28). Cope maintains that Glanvill's main aim was to destroy "false authorities in religion that the eternal authority of God's perfection might regain its ascendancy" (29).

It is difficult to separate religious and scientific anti-authoritarianism in this period. Glanvill argued in Plus Ultra that the new science would promote tolerance and peace, whilst Sprat compared the Church of England to the Royal Society; both have discarded "corrupt Copies, and [are] referring themselves to the perfect Originals for their instruction" (30), and he went so far as to say that the contemporary spirit of free enquiry was a development of the new spiritual freedom which was both a cause and an effect of the Reformation. The arguments defending science against accusations of atheism will be discussed more fully in a later chapter, but this particular argument is relevant here because many people believed that religious dogmatism and tyranny had retarded the progress of

science. Greenslet (31) pointed out that the High Anglican revival of dogmatic theology was grounded on scholastic theories of the universe; the Catholic Church, and particularly the Jesuits, were accused of hindering new discoveries, in order to retain their power over an ignorant and superstitious people; the Nonconformists' dogmatic theology left little scope for freedom of choice or for rational explanations of so-called mysteries. Only the Cambridge Platonists, with their dislike of unnecessar doctrine (Cudworth, for example, believed that man could be brought to God and a holy life through the Scriptures, without any profound knowledge of doctrine), had a liberalising influence on both religion and science, and attempted to hold the balance between dogmatism and scepticism. The Royal Society, though its influence was naturally greater in the scientific sphere, helped to moderate the undue reliance on religious authority by its gradual reassessment of scientific authority, by its spirit of calm rational enquiry, and by its deliberate rejection of wordy disputes. Moloney claims that " the mortal enmity of mediaeval thought toward science and the enquiring mind is a myth born in post-mediaeval times"(32). For an understanding of seventeenth century thinkers it is important to remember that this "myth" was strongly held by them, though later research has revealed that the antipathy was not so strong as has been generally believed.

Cragg (33) points out that the close relationship between Church and University tended to preserve traditional authority and theology, and so the Puritan attempt at educational reform can be seen from a religious as well as a purely educational viewpoint.

It was of course as a scientific authority that Glanvill mainly attacked Aristotle, although in his Letter... Concerning Aristotle he pointed out that Aristotelian philosophy was inextricably woven into European theology, despite the fact that the Ancient Fathers had criticised his theories. By the time that he wrote Plus Ultra he had indeed moderated his attacks on Aristotle, agreeing that young men should be grounded in Peripateticism, and praising his rhetoric, history of animals and mechanics. Yet, throughout his works, he stressed the dangers of undue reliance on Aristotelianism; like Sprat he believed that ancient writers should not be regarded as oracles, but "should be imploy'd, to direct us in the ways, that we ought to proceed, in knowledge for the future."(34) The writings of Aristotle which were still extant he considered to be corrupt, hybridised, or based largely on plagiarism, and the Aristotelianism which was taught by the School-men he held to contain little original truth; it was a source of disputatiousness, whose purpose was

> "to teach Men to cant endlessly about Materia, and Forma; to hunt Chimaeras by rules of Art, or to dress up Ignorance in words of bulk and sound" (35).

Aristotle himself was immoral (an argument which Stubbe later turned back on Glanvill in support of his attack on Bacon), his theories were wordy and obscure, and gave unsatisfactory explanations of natural phenomena.

But Aristotle was not of course the only authority to be attacked on scientific grounds. There was a general movement against the unthinking acceptance of any system or theory, due in part to the new spirit of scepticism and criticism, and the desire for practical utility rather than hypothetical theories. The new individualism - Wolf (36) cites Spinoza as the fullest expression of the modern tendency towards self-reliance and rejection of authority - disliked fanaticism and the imposition of opinions on others. The re-discovery of obscure classical writers helped to reduce Aristotle's pre-eminence. Clifford's Treatise of Humane Reason stressed the dangers of authority. Wotton claimed that the

> "Forming of Sects and Parties in Philosophy, that shall take their denominations from, and think themselves obliged to stand by the Opinions of any particular Philosophers, is, in a manner, wholly laid aside" (37).

Sprat pointed out that contemporary authority was just as great a hindrance as ancient authority. Peacham was one of many who realised the potential danger in the situation:

> "The world hath taken so much upon trust from credulous and superstitious antiquity, that now adaies it will hardly beleeve common experience:"(38

and he was writing well before the movement had reached it fullest strength.

Glanvill was on the side of the anti-Authoritarians. In Scepsis Scientifica he stressed that superstitious reverence for the past was fatal to science:

> "We reverence grey-headed Doctrines; though feeble, decrepit, and within a step of dust...For while we are slaves to the Dictates of our Progenitours; our discoveries, like water, will not run higher than the Fountains, from which they own their derivation. (39)

Knowledge is more ancient than authority, which is a form of tyranny; book-learning is a barren part of knowledge - and here he was akin to the hated Puritans, with their emphasis on utility rather than theory. The same themes recur in the Essays: we should acknowledge the Ancients, but not accept them servilely; the Royal Society respects but does not revere them; the desire for authority and domination is linked with the degeneration of human nature In his attacks on custom and education, Glanvill echoed Bacon's description of the Idols which hindered learning. In Scepsis Scientifica, too, there is a touch of intellectual claustrophobia; the world of the mind has become a microcosm, knowledge is bounded by the rules of the Ancients. Once again we can feel the seventeenth century

man struggling to free himself from the narrowness of medievalism.

There were various methods by which authority, whethe Ancient or Modern, could be destroyed. Bacon, because he did not want to arouse undue opposition to his revolutionary ideas, tried to do it as tactfully as possible. He argued that only the superficial parts of learning had survived; he claimed that his method was entirely new, and therefore could not be compared with the older methods; he stressed that even modern knowledge should not be systematised prematurely. Later writers, more concretely, could point to inventions such as the telescope, or discoveries such as the circulation of the blood, which afforded actual proof that earlier learning was at fault. Others, like Glanvill, compared the various hypotheses, both ancient and modern, which had been put forward to explain various natural phenomena, and pointed out their discrepancies. Cowley attacked the "idle and pernicious opinion" (40) that the Ancients had discovered everything, and recommended tha a Philosophical College should be set up to study practical science, which was neglected by both the Ancients and the contemporary Universities. His Ode to the Royal Society (4 praised Bacon and the Society for defeating authority, and for returning to the study of nature, and of things rather than words.

But even those who attacked authority were not always

consistent. Tulloch (42) refers to Cudworth's undue deference to authority despite his scepticism (it is interesting to note that he considered Aristotle's system more acceptable to piety than Descartes'), and one of the major literary faults of several of the Cambridge Platonists was their over-use of quotation and allusion. There was an equally vociferous opposition to this movement. Thomas Albius defended Aristotle against the charge of being notional. Stubbe, in his Reply... to the Calumnies of Eccebolius Glanvile, referred to the decline of learning in England, and accused Bacon and his followers of being "Plagiaries, and Relators of false and defective Experiments; Contemners of the Ancients, and opinionated concerning themselves".(43) Temple, too, defended ancient learning, pointing out that in actual fact much of it had been lost, and that past ages had excelled in such things as architecture. Among the contemporary hindrances to learning he listed religion, mercenarism, pedantry and pride: modern man's "own Reason is the certain Measure of Truth." (44)

But in the main, as already mentioned, the controversy soon reached a compromise. Glanvill moderated his attacks; Sprat, referring to the Royal Society's move to Arundel House after the Great Fire, wrote:

> "As there we behold new Inventions to flourish amongst the Marbles, and Images of the Dead: so the present Arts, that are now rising, should not aim at the destruction of those that are past, but be content to thrive in their company." (45)

And finally William Wotton, discussing the whole controversy in his Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning, first published in 1694, declared that the Ancients and the Moderns each had their own fields of pre-eminence.

So far this chapter has been mainly concerned with dogmatism based on ancient authority, but many writers also stressed the dangers of imposing any ideas, whether old or new, on others. Bacon's emphasis on lengthy experiments and observation was one way of safeguarding against this tendency, and Sprat devoted a section of his History to "Modern Dogmatists," who were as detrimental to science as were the ancient authorities, for

> "The true Philosophy must be first of all begun, on a scrupulous and severe examination of particulars: from them, there may be some general Rules, with great caution drawn: But it must not rest there, nor is that the most difficult part of its course: It must advance those Principles, to the finding out of new effects, through all the varieties of Matter: and so both the courses must proceed orderly together; from experimenting, to demonstrating, and from demonstrating, to experimenting again." (46)

It is interesting to study Glanvill's own response to this form of dogmatism. His earlier works, The Vanity of Dogmatizing and Scepsis Scientifica, were largely based on Cartesian scepticism (a Scepticism which Greenslet labelled Pyrrhonic, though Glanvill himself had denied this

and many of the arguments were drawn from metaphysics - the creation of the soul, the union of the soul and body, And so he emphasised the weakness of man's faculties, and the vast range of knowledge which was yet unexplored. Dogmatism is only possible where the opposite is impossibl yet man does not know the simplest things, and cannot until he dies. Most of the things we do know are learnt only through our senses and they are false, so that only the shallowest intellects can claim certainty. "We have not as yet Phaenomena enough to make as much as Hypothesis" (47). Confidence is an enemy to certainty, and awareness of ignorance will promote knowledge. Dogmatism provokes disputes and thereby hinders knowledge. No wonder that Borfet wrote of Glanvill:

> "You have made Ignorance a Boast:
> Pride hath its ancient channel lost."

and that P.H. should claim:

> "If any certaintie there be,
> 'Tis this, that there's no certaintie..." (48)

This scepticism was in part the basis for Glanvill's arguments in support of witchcraft: we do not know definitely that it does not exist, therefore we should not deny its possibility. These early works were a deliberate attack on "the root of Pedantry and opinionative Assurance" (49), and, as stated above, laid him open to charges of scepticism and even atheism, from which he had to defend himself.

Contact with the Royal Society helped to convince him that the Baconian rather than the Cartesian method was the best. And so in his later writings, there is a definite change of attitude. In Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy (50) he based the impossibility of complete knowledge on the incomprehensible wisdom of God rather than on the deficiency of man. Against Confidence in Philosophy, and Matters of Speculation (51), though it was based on The Vanity of Dogmatizing, laid greater stress on the need for severe enquiry and careful observation lest "we embrace Shadows of Fancy and Opinion."(52) In Of Scepticism and Certainty (53) he claimed that he attacked both dogmatism and true scepticism. Plus Ultra lists the various advances and discoveries made by the new scientists, rather than metaphysical hypotheses. Popkin, in his interesting article on Glanvill and Hume (54), argues that Glanvill attacked three forms of dogmatism - Aristotelianism, superstition and enthusiasm, and mechanistic atheism - and links his critique of causality with his anti-dogmatism and scepticism. His later works were more concerned with religious than scientific dogmatism, an aspect which will be studied later in this chapter.

Throughout the period there is a stress on the danger of opinions; the later seventeenth century used this term to describe personal beliefs or even prejudices, as opposed to what may be described as universal truths. Glanvill

frequently pointed out that they led to disputes and a consequent loss of charity. The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion (55), which was developed from Philosophia Pia, lists enthusiasm and the humour of disputing as two of the main enemies of religion, and argues that philosophy helps to overcome them by logic and clarity, "and so prevents all imperious Dictates and Imposings, all Captious Quarrels and Notional Wars." (56) Peacham compared opinions to Hercules' Hydra, in that as soon as one head was cut off, another grew, and went on: "Opinion is the Compasse the foole onely saileth by in the vast Ocean of Ignorance." (57) Lloyd, in his funeral sermon on Wilkins, stressed Wilkins' dislike of idle speculation. Sprat, in his History, compared the attack on ignorance and false opinions to a Holy War. Brent emphasised the danger of straying

> "in the wilde Maze of Self-opinion, wherein the greatest part of humane kinde do wander endlessly, and lose themselves at last, being intrapped in the pernicious snares of over-weening Pride, or stupid ignorance." (58)

Glanvill, in a vivid passage in Scepsis Scientifica, compared opinions to "a bagge of Cherry-stones" (59), the rattles of an immature intellect. They revealed a poverty and narrowness of spirit, an undeveloped understanding. They were both a sign and an effect of ignorance, and were unbecoming to men of generous spirit and education. There

are innumerable examples throughout Glanvill's works of this hatred of opinions; perhaps one of the bitterest passages in Scepsis Scientifica describes the power of public opinion:

> "We are bound to our Country's Opinions as to its Laws: and an accustomed assent is tantamount to an infallible conclusion. He that offers to dissent, shall be an Out-law in reputation: and the fears of guilty Cain, shall be fulfilled on him, whoever meets him shall slay him. Thus Custome and Educatio have sealed the Canon; and he that adds or takes away from the Book of Orthodox Belief, shall be more than in danger of an Anathema: And the Inquisition is not confined to the jurisdiction of the Triple Crown. The rankest follies are Sacred. if customary. (60)

One wonders if Glanvill wrote with a sense of premonition, or whether he had already been attacked for his beliefs.

But apart from being a hindrance, overconfidence was an actual sin, in that it sprang from pride. In Saducismus Triumphatus Glanvill referred to "narrow and confin'd Spirits" (61) who would condemn anything they could not understand. In The Way of Happiness he described people who held to their beliefs, not through true faith, but through pride and the desire for glory and reputation. In Scepsis Scientifica he claimed that every man was naturally a Narcissus, and clung to his beliefs through self-love, and again "We hugge intellectual deformities, if they bear our Names." (62) Later in the same work he attacked overconfidence as ill-mannered obstinacy, always allied with untamed passions. What was needed was

humility, charity, tolerance. More tried to obtain this humility by reminding people of "the Limits of our Knowled that we do not vainly, either desire, or attempt, to go beyond the Lists that God and Nature hath set us..." (63) Boyle's Christian Virtuoso praised humility, that "great and ingenuous modesty of mind." (64) Sprat's History of the Royal-Society emphasised the need for humility. They, like Bacon, who had also pleaded for charity, were more concerned with intellectual humility. The desire for spiritual humility will be studied later in this chapter, though obviously the two aspects were closely linked. There was a growing demand for tolerance, not only in religion in order to end the dissensions which had torn the nation apart, but in every branch of thought. "Think and let think..." wrote Fairfax, and he continued

> "For every man's mind is his Castle; and if it can't be taken by strength of reason, the throwing ~~of~~ in Grenadoes, will be nothing but a smutty, stinking token to the World, that ill will would have done more mischief, but weak Gear could not." (65)

It was this attitude of tolerance which lay at the root of much so-called scepticism.

Bacon's Advancement of Learning (66) had pleaded for charity and for the mature suspension of judgement, but he had already realised the dangers both of extreme dogmatism and of extreme scepticism; both would hinder the truth. Stewart (67) has pointed out that though scepticism was

less outspoken in the Middle Ages, it still existed, but it was not until the Seventeenth Century that it reached its greatest power. Descartes was, of course, the supreme exponent of that scepticism which reduced everything to uncertainty, but the British philosophers, though many were enthusiastic about his methods at the beginning, soon realised the dangers. Mention has already been made of Glanvill's gradual disillusionment. Like Bacon, in Scepsis Scientifica he was careful to claim that the scientific scepticism which he preached (and which he was equally careful to differentiate from religious scepticism) was purely to combat dogmatism, and was not intended to lead others into scepticism. By the time he wrote Lux Orientalis he was conscious of the danger of everlasting scepticism, and in Of Scepticism and Certainty (68) he defended himself against accusations of being a Pyrrhonic sceptic. The Ancients, he believed, were sceptics only in order to be different, and their scepticism was not rooted in the desire for knowledge but in despair of ever attaining it. His own brand of scepticism was relabelled free enquiry. The true sceptic, he claimed, was dangerous to both science and religion. And, as Greenslet admitted, Glanvill's belief in both faith and reason were strange in a true sceptic, whilst it is interesting to note that when Glanvill was intellec

tually or emotionally moved, he forgot his carefully cultivated scepticism, and wrote almost lyrically on such subjects as the wonders of astronomy or the possibilities of science. Glanvill was not alone in realising the dangers of extreme scepticism; Sprat attacked distrust and despair, which he differentiated from the desire for caution, among the learned, and, among the Nonconformists, Ferguson's Interest of Reason in Religion constantly stressed the danger of scepticism.

It is ironical that, whilst Glanvill was busy moderating the scepticism to which he had given vigorous expression in his earlier works, it was in fact becoming a much more respectable attitude towards the end of his life Perhaps, as Greenslet claimed, this was because negativism had become positivism, and because people felt that both religion and science were based upon fundamental certainties. But there was, too, an element of the indifference which Glanvill feared; atheism was no longer looked upon as a mortal sin, men no longer felt intensely about religious beliefs, the tolerance advocated by the Cambridge Platonists had become the utilitarianism of the Latitudinarians.

As religious and scientific dogmatism were inextricably interwoven, so also were religious and scientific scepticism. Throughout his earlier works, Glanvill

stressed the moderating effect of the new science, and hov it would promote civil peace, stable government, and the Established Church, and it is significant that he always claimed that the Puritans were diametrically opposed, not only to the Church of England, but also to science and rea on. There was of course a general reaction against the Puritans; Grierson (69) describes how the Puritans were attacked for their strictness, their pride, and their denial of freedom of the mind. (He also claims that they restricted the imagination, but, in view of the fact that their contemporaries blamed their excesses on imagination, and when we remember the vivid passages which occur in Milton and Bunyan, as well as the macabre description of purgatory in some of the Nonconformists' sermons, this may be questioned.) Again and again they were accused of arrogance and intemperance, which led to disunity and anarchy.

> "We have seen multitudes of men and women like empty clouds exhal'd by the heat of strange fire of intemperate zeal from the turgid misty Fogs of Pride and Iguorance" (70),

and Hallywell wrote of "The great Pride and Self-conceitedness" which led to sects and heresies and "the precipitate and inconsiderate Zeal ~~and~~ Fervour of those who took upon them to instruct the people." (71). Parker attacked "Peevish, Froward, Morose, Uncivil, Passionate, Furious,

Talkative, Fanatick Zeal" (72), claiming that

> "Zeal is a fire in the Soul, which unlesse qualified & slaked by meekness and a calme nature, doth not only prey upon the mind, and devour its intellectual Powers, and enflame all the Passions, but its rage breaks forth, and sets whole States and Kingdoms into a combustion, and reduces the whole World to Ashes; the greatest Zealots always proving the greatest Incendiaries" (73).

The whole nation was tired of strife, and religious issues were declining in importance. The one desire was for peac and Glanvill was not alone in turning from Puritanism to Anglicanism, and in seeing in the Established Church that Middle Way between the dangerous extremes of Catholicism and Enthusiasm. Popery was of course feared, but feared politically rather than intellectually; the Roman Catholic Church was accused of hindering science, but there was not the same bitterness and hatred in the attacks made upon it as there were in those made upon the Puritans. It was the Nonconformist Church which was reviled.

Glanvill was in the forefront of those attacks. He referred frequently to the Enthusiasts' pride: Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy (74) contrasted their arrogance and dogmatism with the modesty and reasonableness of the New Divines, showing that the Enthusiasts'

> "Divinity consisted most in Phrases; and their boasted spirituality, in fond affections: That their new lights were but freakish fancies; and old Heresies revived; and the precious Mysteries of thei Theology, but conceited absurdities, and non-sense in a fantastick dress." (75)

He attacked that spiritual pride which "sets men upon the pinnacle, yea it carries them into the clouds of imagination" (76), so that "Thus they swell and swagger in their fantastick imaginations, 'till some other sect as well conceited as themselves endeavour to take their Plumes from them." (77) The Day of Judgement will see the dispensation of justice; though evil appears to thrive in this world Glanvill claimed in his Sermon on the Serious Consideration of the Future Judgement, that the Enthusiasts would be cast down, and the humble and charitable raised up. It was Satan who pushed religion "into meer empty Fantastick Notionality" (78), so that "the poor mistaken Bigot, together with the proud, Pharisaical Dissenter, and the silly conceited Schismatick" (79) were all condemned to eternal damnation. This virulent attack on the Nonconformists was echoed by other writers; the anonymous author of The Counter-plot wrote: "The contempt of Authority linked with an obstinate contumacious and seditious humour, is so very a monster, that it makes an error of judgment, which might otherwise have been venial in it self, a diabolical and damning quality." (80)

It was this pride which led the Nonconformists to hold fast to their opinions, and to attempt to force them upon others. Cope (81) frequently stresses Glanvill's belief that scepticism would help to destroy enthusiasm, and

restore Anglicanism. Glanvill's Catholick Charity was an impassioned plea for toleration, for "Tis but small credit to any Religion to cut its' way by the Sword, or gain upon the world by Power or Policy" (82), and it was the desire to propagate their opinions which made the Nonconformists "vex their Neighbours, provoke their Rulers, and dissettle Government." (83) Religious dogmatism led to dissension, to Popery, to atheism; religious disputes led to the loss not only of peace but of truth. The Nonconformists were unwilling to extend to others that tolerance which they demanded for themselves, and, when all other methods and powers were taken away from them they would persecute with words and with vilification of the Anglican clergy. They were carried away by passion, which

> "doth cloud and darken the understanding, it casts a thick mist before the eye of the Soul, and makes it altogether unapt to discern a difference betwixt Truth, and the error that is nearest to it." (84)

This was an argument constantly repeated by Glanvill, and there was a growing tendency to distrust the emotions and the imagination, a tendency which will be studied in fuller detail in a later chapter. Like Cudworth, Glanvill believed that this form of dogmatism was founded on self-will, and was therefore contrary to God.

As dogmatism and pride were related, so, too, to Glanvill scepticism was allied to modesty and charity, qualities which he praised in the New Divines and the new

scientists alike. He believed, like Whichcote, that

> "Our Fallibility and the shortness of our knowledge should make us peaceable and gentle: because I may be Mistaken, I must not be dogmatical and confident, peremptory and imperious" (85).

But religious scepticism was generally regarded as akin to atheism, and once again Glanvill had to alter his position As has already been said, he was careful to differentiate in his later works between religious and scientific scepticism, and to point out that reason was not inimical to faith; where reason and faith seemed to oppose each other, it was because human reason is imperfect, and faith should be held supreme. Religion, like science, was full of mysteries, and there was no room in it for dogmatism. Prior made the interesting point that scepticism could verge on credulity, as when Glanvill pleaded for the "tentative suspension of disbelief" in order to put forward his arguments in support of witchcraft (86). But equally faith could verge on scepticism, as when an anonymous writer contended

> "To me nothing seems more strange than that any Man should be so ignorant of Gods love, as to presume he knoweth the waies thereof, which are so mysterious and abstruse. We are capable of the Knowledg (si of it no otherwise then by an unbyassed Faith, and a constantly upright Hope: and if we may call this Knowledge, the perfection thereof consisteth in not knowing." (87)

Scepticism, too, was linked with the plea for toleration, both in religion and science. To some extent the

deep desire for some form of toleration sprang from the nation's weariness with strife and dispute, but among theologians and scientists alike there was an increasing awareness that there were as yet many things beyond man's knowledge and comprehension, and that it was better to include, rather than exclude, as many alternative theories as possible. In science, this led to experiment, observation and communication; in religion it led to compromise, so that the less fanatical of the Nonconformists might be attracted into the Anglican Church. Glanvill attacked both the Nonconformists and the Catholics for their tyranny; in contrast he held the Church of England to be reasonable, charitable, and open to free enquiry. The Cambridge Platonists' answer to the need for toleration was to stress that the essentials of religion were few - Cudworth, in his True Intellectual System (88), claimed that there were only three essentials of religion, Lord Herbert of Cherbury listed five essential doctrines, and Hallywell's Deus Justificatus praised the Church of England for confining itself to a few indispensable doctrines. Glanvill said of the New Divines "They were not so fond of their own Opinions, as to think them necessary for all others" (89), whilst he emphasised that free enquiry would not only free men from superstitious fears, but would eliminate petty notions and clarify the "few, certain, operative

Principles of the Gospels." (90) In the same Essay he described how he himself was accused of scepticism and cold neutrality because "counting my self, with a firm assent to the few practical Fundamentals of Faith, and having fix'd that end of the Compass, I desire to preserve my Liberty as to the rest." (91) His sermon on Catholick Charity was an impassioned plea for love and charity in religion, for

> "The necessary Principles of Faith lye in a little room...Religion is an Holy Life, and Charity is a main branch of that; But Opinions are no vital part, nor do they appertain to the Substance of it. And shall we loose a Limb for an Excrescence, or an Ornament; an Essential of Religion for that which is but accessary, and extrinsick; Charity, for an Opinion?" (92)

But it must be admitted that toleration to Glanvill was strictly limited, and that he advocated it rather for the sake of stable government than because, like the Cambridge Platonists, he saw in it an essential Christian virtue.

Closely linked to this aspect of toleration was the Cambridge Platonists' emphasis on practice rather than doctrine. This again was largely a reaction against the Nonconformists' stress on doctrine and on arbitrary Free Grace, which was defended by such writers as Lyford, who claimed that the Nonconformists' concept of the Elect was no reflection on God's infinite love (93), and by Ferguson, who pointed out the dangers of morality without faith and grace (94). Cudworth's sermon of 1647 was a lyrical plea

for true goodness. In the Preface he attacked men who

> "satisfie themselves, with the mere holding of right and Orthodox Opinions...whilest they are utterly devoid within of that Divine Life, which Christ came to kindle in mens Souls" (95),

and the whole sermon is imbued with an almost mystical quality, for God is light and love, and he who loves God "inclaspeth the whole World within his outstretched arms." (96) But the Cambridge Platonists were not alone in this plea for morality. Burnet wrote of Bedell

> "It appeared that he had a true and generous notion of Religion, and that he did not look upon it so much as a System of Opinions, or a set of Forms, as a Divine Discipline that reforms the Heart and Life." (97)

The Calendar of State Papers quotes the King's Directions concerning Preachers, which, though governed to some extent by ulterior motives, did lay stress on the practice of religious and moral duties rather than on controversial doctrine (98). Cowley's Proposition for the Advancement of Learning requested the Chaplain not to engage in controversy but to concern himself with God's commandments and works. So, too, Glanvill's sermon on The Way of Happiness was an attack on false goodness and Nonconformist hypocrisy; the true aim of man should be to live in sober virtue.

As dogmatism was a sin, so scepticism was associated with virtue; "Errour is the Poverty, and Blindness, and Lameness of the mind" (99), whilst truth equalled goodness, and anything which helped to discover truth was therefore

also good. True modesty and charity, which were at the root of the Cambridge Platonists' religious toleration, were also valuable in that they forwarded the cause of science. But above all, throughout the period there was a constant emphasis on the need for humility. As a spiritual quality it was praised not only by the Cambridge Platonists, but by innumerable obscure writers and preachers: R.E., in A Scriptural Catechism (100), stressed the importance of humility in man's duty to God and himself. Robert Dixon's Doctrine of Faith claimed that "Fait is all in all to a Christian...For all such true hearted and humble souls, do belong to Christ his Church." (101) Lukin taught that men should love and fear God (102). Other writers, like Fullwood (103), attributed disobedience and civil upsets to lack of humility. Wilkins praised natural religion as being conducive to man's good: it

> "will remove all those dividing Principles of Selfishness, and Pride, and Covetousness: It will teach the Charity and Meakness, and Forbearance, to study publick Peace and common Good." (104)

Glanvill, in a vivid passage, contrasted the humility of Christ with "those that are Passionate and Conceited, Turbulent and Notional, Confident and Immodest, Imperious and Malicious" (105), the Sectarians; divine love, humility and resignation are essential to our salvation. He frequently referred to the need for humbling ourselves to God in prayer and repentance, and he, too, linked civil dis-

obedience with pride.

But besides spiritual and social humility, there was need, as already mentioned, for intellectual humility. Sprat's History argued that scientists should be humble and willing to learn and co-operate; the true philosopher should be innocent and virtuous rather than knowing. Reference has already been made to Bacon's appeal for charity, and Henry More's reminder of the fallibility of human knowledge. Glanvill, too, took up this theme of intellectual humility (though the passage in the Preface to Saducismus Triumphatus in which he attacked the understanding of the common people shows little sign of it), but again gave it his own personal bias. Again and again he linked the Nonconformists' spiritual pride with intellectual arrogance; their denial of reason opened the way for imagination and self-pride which raised them up into the clouds. In Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy (106), he contrasted the New Divines' spirit of cautious enquiry with the conceit of the sects. In Catholick Charity he differentiated between infirmity of the understanding and the deadly sectarian sins of pride and scorn. In An Apology for Philosophy he classed together those ignorant through stupidity or enthusiasm. In The Serious Consideration of the Future Judgement (107) he compared the loud voice of sectarian folly with the modesty of reason and truth. No longer for Glanvill was

Aristotle the main cause of dispute and dogmatism.

There was another aspect of Nonconformism which represented dogmatism to Glanvill, and this was the beli in an arbitrary Free Grace, which was in direct oppositi to his own belief in a rational God and a rational universe. This too is a theme which will be studied more fully in a later chapter. But he felt that the claim to one of the Elect was a slur on God, who had His own laws and maintained them, not because He could not alter them but because He was the essence of perfection. Arbitrari ness to Glanvill revealed imperfection, and was akin to dogmatism, and it was therefore wrong to claim that God was arbitrary. This argument appeared in Rust's Discour of Truth, in Lux Orientalis, and in Hallywell's Deus Justificatus. In Lux Orientalis Glanvill argued that an arbitrary will governing the universe would destroy any chance of man's ever attaining truth. He believed that the future judgement would be based on rules, not on an arbitrary choice, as otherwise there would be little po in preaching or practising Christian virtues (Glanvill was always conscious of the efficacy of appealing to me self-interest in religion). Arbitrariness, too, led to atheism or superstition.

This seventeenth century belief that the universe essentially orderly and its creator rational, gradually

hardened into the eighteenth century optimistic and some what blind trust that everything was for the best in thi best of all possible worlds, which was satirised in such works as Voltaire's Candide. Similarly, the idea that everything and everybody had his own appointed place in the scheme of things, and should maintain that place, though it developed during the democratising Seventeenth Century, was to reappear in the strict class distinction of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries.

As already mentioned, truth and goodness in Glanvil view were closely akin if not actually identical, and so were the methods by which they were to be attained. Thu pride, both spiritual and intellectual, and dogmatism we opposed to modesty, charity and free enquiry; like the C bridge Platonists he believed that the inductive method, with its necessary suspension of belief, was the best wa of promoting peace and understanding. And though reliane on authority was one facet of dogmatism against which Glanvill fought, the arrogance of the Nonconformists and the superstitious formalism of the Roman Catholics were others. And perhaps in his theories there was an echo of the Elizabethan concept of the four humours; a man's whole personality was inextricably intermingled, so that physical, intellectual and spiritual qualities were all completely integrated.

CHAPTER II - REFERENCES.

1. Stubbe, H. — A Reply...to...Eccebolius Glanvil P.5. (In Stubbe, H.-The Lord Bacon's Relation of the Sweating-sickness.)

2. Wood, A. — Athenae Oxonienses. Vol.II,item r 431.

3. Cope, J.I. — Joseph Glanvill. Ch.5.

4. Bacon, F. — Essays: ed. R.F. Jones. New York 1 p.213.

5. Donne, J. — Poems. London, 1947. P.182.(Every man's Library, no.867.)

6. Davies, Sir J. — Nosce Teipsum. (In Silver Poets o the Sixteenth Century; ed.G.Bulle London, 1947. P.364. (Everyman's Library, no.985.))

7. Vaughan, H. — Corruption. (In The Oxford Book o Seventeenth Century Verse; ed.H.J. Grierson and G. Bullough. Oxford, 1934. Pp.774-5.)

8. Browne, Sir T. — Pseudodoxia Epidemica. (In Browne, Sir T. - Works; ed.S.Wilkin. Vols. I-II.)

9. Glanvill, J. — Scepsis Scientifica. Pp.3,5-6.

10. Donne, J. — Op.cit., p.181.

11. Browne, Sir T. — Works, ed. S. Wilkin, Vol.II,p.33

12. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay V.

13. - — Scepsis Scientifica. To the Royal Society, p.24.

14. Fontenelle, B.de — A Plurality of Worlds; transl. Joh Glanvill. London, 1929. P.115.

15. Marlowe, C. — The Best Plays; ed. H. Ellis. Lond 1947, P.35.

16. Idem, p.176.

Chapter II - References, cont.

17. Nicolson, M.H. — The Breaking of the Circle. Illinois, 1950.

18. Baker, H. — The Wars of Truth.

19. Nicolson, M.H. — "The "New Astronomy" and English Literary Imagination." S.P., 32(1935), pp.428-62.

20. - — "Milton and the Telescope." E.L.J 2(1935), pp.1-32.

21. Williamson, G. — "Mutability, Decay, and Seventeen century Melancholy." E.L.H., 2(19: p.150.

22. Jonston, J. — An History of the Constancy of Nature. London, 1657.

23. Glanvill, J. — Op.cit., p.105.

24. Clifford, M. — A Treatise of Humane Reason. London, 1674. Pp.25-6.

25. Glanvill, J. — Op.cit., p.116.

26. Idem, p.117.

27. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay VII, p.6.

28. - — The Zealous, and Impartial Protes tant. p.7.

29. Cope, J.I. — Op.cit., p.75.

30. Sprat, T. — History of the Royal-Society; 2nd ed. P.371.

31. Greenslet, F. — Joseph Glanvill.

32. Moloney, M.F. — John Donne. Illinois, 1944. P.51. (Illinois Studies in Language and Literature. Vol.29, nos.2-3(1944)

33. Cragg, G.R. — From Puritanism to the Age of Reason. Cambridge, 1950. Introduc tion.

34. Sprat, T. — Op.cit., p.24.

Chapter II - References, cont.

35. Glanvill, J. — Scepsis Scientifica. To the Royal Society, pp.6-7.

36. Wolf, A. — History of Science; new ed. by D.McKie. London, 1950.

37. Wotton, W. — Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning. Pp.364-5.

38. Peacham, H. — The Truth of our Times. London, 16 P.175. (Facsimile Text Society; R.R. Cawley, 1942).

39. Glanvill, J. — Op.cit., pp.102-3.

40. Cowley, A. — Propositions for the Advancement Learning. P.25. (In Cowley, A. - The Essays; ed. A.B. Gough. Oxfor 1915.)

41. Cowley, A. — Ode to the Royal Society. (In Cowley, A. - Poems; ed. A.R.Walle Cambridge, 1905.)

42. Tulloch, J. — Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy; 2nd ed. Vol.II.

43. Stubbe, H. — Op.cit., p.6.

44. Temple, Sir W. — Essay upon Ancient and Modern Learning. p.165.(In Temple, Sir W Works. London, 1740. Vol.I.)

45. Sprat, T. — Op.cit., p.253.

46. Idem, p.31.

47. Glanvill, J. — Op.cit., To the Royal Society, p.

48. - — The Vanity of Dogmatizing. Poems the Author.

49. - — Scepsis Scientifica. To the Royal Society, p.8.

50. - — Essays. Essay VII.

51. Idem, Essay I.

Chapter II - References, cont.

52. Idem, Essay I, p.29.

53. Idem, Essay II.

54. Popkin, R.H. "Joseph Glanvill: a Precursor of David Hume." J.H.I., 14(1953), pp. 292-303.

55. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay IV.

56. Idem, Essay IV, p.26.

57. Peacham, H. Op.cit., p.57.

58. Brent, W. A Discourse upon the Nature of Eternity. London, 1674. P.4.

59. Glanvill, J. Scepsis Scientifica. P.170.

60. Idem, p.96.

61. Glanvill, J. Sadducismus Triumphatus. Preface, p.1.

62. - Scepsis Scientifica. P.99.

63. - Sadducismus Triumphatus. P.131.

64. Boyle, R. The Christian Virtuoso. P.56. (In Boyle, R. - Works. Vol.V.)

65. Fairfax, N. A Treatise of the Bulk and Selved of the World. Pp.32, 34-5. (In Tw Seventeenth-century Prefaces; ed. A.K. Croston. London, 1949.)

66. Bacon, F. Of the Proficience and Advancemen of Learning... London, 1605.

67. Stewart, W.K. "Scepticism." H.J., 29(1930-1), pp. 680-91.

68. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay II.

69. Grierson, Sir H.J.C. Cross Currents in English Litera ture of the XVIIth Century. Londo 1929. Ch.6.

Chapter II - References, cont.

70. The Counter-plot, or, the Close Conspiracy of Atheism and Schism. London, 1680. P.6.

71. Hallywell, H. Deus Justificatus. London, 1668. To the Reader.

72. Parker, S. A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophie. Oxford 1666. P.51.

73. Idem, p.23.

74. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay VII.

75. Idem, Essay VII, pp.26-7.

76. Glanvill, J. Some Discourses. P.135.

77. Idem, pp.391-2.

78. Idem, p.388.

79. Idem, p.393.

80. The Counter-plot. P.23.

81. Cope, J.I. Op.cit., ch.2. "Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apolog P.M.L.A., 69(1954), pp.223-50.

82. Glanvill, J. Catholick Charity Recommended. Pp.18-9.

83. Idem, p.37.

84. Fowler, E. The Principles and Practices of Certain Moderate Divines of the Church of England. London, 1670. xi.

85. Whichcote, B. Moral and Religious Aphorisms. (Campagnac, E.T. - The Cambridge Platonists. Oxford, 1901. P.70.)

86. Prior, M.E. "Joseph Glanvill, Witchcraft, an Seventeenth-century Science." M.P 30(1932-3), p.192.

Chapter II - References, cont.

87. The Causes and Remedy of the Distempers of the Times. London, 1675. p.2.

88. Cudworth, R. The True Intellectual System of t Universe; 2nd ed. by T. Birch. London, 1743.

89. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essey VII, pp.14-5.

90. Idem, Essay IV, p.14.

91. Idem, Essay IV, p.32.

92. Glanvill, J. Catholick Charity Recommended. Pp.29, 31-2.

93. Lyford, W. The Plain Mans Senses Exercised. London, 1657.

94. Ferguson, R. A Sober Enquiry into the Nature, Measure, and Principle of Moral Virtue. London, 1673.

95. Cudworth, R. A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons. Cambridge, 1647. Preface.

96. Idem, p.78.

97. Burnet, G. The Life of William Bedell. London, 1685. P.223.

98. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series...1661-1662 London, 1861. Oct.14.1662.461.

99. Glanvill, J. Op.cit, p.39.

100. R.E. A Scriptural Catechism. London, 1

101. Dixon, R. The Doctrine of Faith, Justificat and Assurance. London, 1668. To Reader, p.1.

102. Lukin, H. The Chief Interest of Man; 2nd ed London, 1670.

103. Fullwood, F. The Case of the Times Discuss'd. London, 1683.

Chapter II - References, cont.

104. Wilkins, J. Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion; 8th ed. London, 1722. P.284.

105. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay VI, p.30.

106. Idem, Essay VII.

107. Glanvill, J. Some Discourses. Sermon VII.

CHAPTER III - THE CANDLE OF THE LORD.

During the period with which this thesis is concerned, the sublimation of the reason reached unparalleled heights. The use of the word 'sublimation' is deliberate, for it is peculiarly appropriate to the seventeenth century conceptic of the reason, a conception shared by many philosophers and theologians alike. The Cambridge Platonists were not alone in looking on it as essentially divine, the Candle of the Lord, the one thing which differentiated man from beast, an gave him closest affinity to God. Although it appears to b a contradiction in terms the Seventeenth Century had an almost mystical belief in the power and quality of reason; no only man, but the universe, and God Himself were essentiall rational, and it was through the reason that man could try both to understand and to worship God and His works. This belief in a rational God and a rational universe will be studied in later chapters of this thesis, but here it is interesting to note that this idea of a fundamentally orderly creation helped to refute any tendency to pessimism The security of the Elizabethan circle had been replaced by the security of perpetual, disciplined motion.

Gradually, however, the spiritual element in the conce of reason disappeared, and by the Eighteenth Century it had become less complex, more earthly, of the intellect rather than of the soul. The modern tendency to regard reason as logic or commonsense is a natural development of the seven-

teenth century desire to separate mind and soul, reason and faith. Many critics have described the fluctuations in the importance of reason during the medieval and early modern periods. Wolf (1) points out that the light of reason was of little consequence to the medieval church, and that it was definitely subordinate to revelation. Bush (2) traces the gradual rise of a rational religion during the Renaissance, which culminated in a rationality divorced from any Christian faith during the later Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Willey claims that by the Eighteenth Century religion no longer rested on revelation, but on nature:

> "Natural religion reaches God not only through the starry heavens above, but also through the moral law within, through Reason as well as Nature." (3)

But the scientists' desire to differentiate between the spheres of faith and of reason was not the only factor in the de-spiritualisation of reason. Other causes included the Calvinist divorce of truth and goodness, and the Puritans' stress on utilitarianism and anti-intellectualism as well as the Latitudinarians' belief in the validity of scientific methods in religion. Baker (4) studies in greater detail this shift in the attitude to both reason and religion.

Bacon, although he was pleading for science rather tha

for religion, stressed the faultiness of human reason in Magna Instauratio (5). But during the Seventeenth Century the position of the reason became more and more powerful. Comenius, in a phrase which recalls the words of the Cambridge Platonists, called it "the inner light or eye of the soul." (6), whilst Hills described it as "a Candle which God hath lighted in the soul of Man" (7), and Hallywell claimed that it was of "Royal Pedigree and Divine Extractio the Vicarious Power of God in the Soul." (8) Other writers were more matter-of-fact. Maynard (9) spoke of the understanding, which included discernment, invention, judgement, and discourse, as being the prime faculty of the soul. Fowler defined reason as "that power, whereby men are enabled to draw clear inferences from evident Principles." (10). Reason, too, was to be a source of restraint; to Goldwell "Nature is the Beast, Reason the Bridle, and Man holds the Reines" (11), and fifty years later Ferguson (12) described reason as the soul under the domination of the mi and understanding, when he defended the Nonconformists against accusationsof anti-rationalism. Lord Herbert of Cherbury attempted to end the conflict between faith and reason, though his works had little influence except on eighteenth century Deism. Carré, writing of his De Veritat claims that "The whole trend of the work is to identify religious ideas with the principle of reason" (13), whilst

Hutcheson, in his edition of De Religione Laici (14), emphasises the importance which Lord Herbert placed on 'right' reason; even faith must justify itself on rational grounds. Cope (15) points out that Glanvill's theory of th relation of reason to knowledge was akin to Lord Herbert's, but acknowledges that, for Glanvill, reason and faith were much more closely related than they were for Lord Herbert. But it was the Cambridge Platonists, with their desire to fuse Anglican rationalism with Puritan mysticism, who were the greatest exponents of the belief that reason was the Candle of the Lord. They were direct descendants of the humanists in that they saw man as a fully integrated being; knowledge could be gained only through the perfection of th whole man, and virtue was more important to truth than was learning. They were not concerned with defending reason against accusations of atheism; to them reason was an essential and a noble part of religion. Throughout their writings there was a constant emphasis on the divine nature of reason, and its importance to the Christian faith. Whichcote repeatedly stressed the use of reason to religion "To go against Reason, is to go against God...Reason is the Divine Governor of Man's Life; it is the very voice of God. (16). Smith argued that

"Unreasonableness or the smothering and extinguishing

> the Candle of the Lord within us is no piece of Religion, nor advantageous to it: That certainly will not raise men up to God, which sinks them below men." (17)

More believed that reason must govern man, and that purity was essential to knowledge, for the true aim of knowledge was to confirm our faith and promote regeneration. Culverwel believed that the reason both discerned and obeye moral laws, although he acknowledged its limitations. Rust Discourse of Truth pointed out that it was not weakness to bound by reason, and that it was no slur on God's omnipoten to say that He, too, was subject to rational laws. And perhaps Culverwel, too, wrote one of the most eloquent defences of divine reason in his Light of Nature; for him,

> "to blaspheme Reason, 'tis to reproach heaven it self, and to dishonour the God of Reason, to question the beauty of his Image, and by a strange ingratitude to slight this great and Royal gift of our Creator."

He went on to claim that "reason...is a weak and faint resemblance of God himself...God himself is the Eternal spring and head of reason." (18)

Glanvill's concept of the reason was closely akin to that of the Cambridge Platonists. He too spoke of it as divine:

> "And the Right Reason of a Man, is one of the Divine volumes, in which are written the indeleble Ideas of eternal Truth: so that which it dictates, is as much the Voice of God, as if in so many words it were clearly exprest in the written Revelations." (19)

In the sermon on The Moral Evidence of a Life to Come (reprinted in Some Discourses), he referred to reason as the noblest and most spiritual faculty, a surety of an afterlife; in this world man is governed by his passions, but reason will recover its control in the world to come, for

> " 'Tis not to be suppos'd that our light shall always be darkned in an Eclipse, and muffled up in clouds; the Moon and Stars may rule the night, but if there be a Sun there must be a day, in which it shall govern." (20)

In the sermon on The Antiquity of our Faith Stated and Cleared (also reprinted in Some Discourses), he, too, referred to reason as the Candle of the Lord, and attacked the Roman Catholics for denying reason. In Of Scepticism and Certainty he defined reason: there are certain fundamental, implicit principles, and

> "These are the Seed of Reason, and all the Conclusions (at never so great a distance) that are truly deduc'd from those first Certainties, are as true and certain as they are; and both together make up what we call Reason." (21)

In The Agreement of Reason and Religion he further expanded this by describing reason as natural truth, and linking it with faith in that reliance on reason "in things clearly perceived, is trust in God's veracity and goodness, and that is an exercise of Faith." (22) And in the final essay in the volume there is a sincere and moving passage which describes the attitude of the New Divines to reason:

> "Reason is a Branch and Beam of the Divine Wisdom; That Light which he hath put into our Minds, and that Law which he hath written upon our Hearts; That the Revelations of God in Scripture, do not contradict what he hath engraven upon our Natures; That Faith it self, is an Act of Reason...That nothing can follow from Reason, but Reason; and that what so follows, is as true and certain as Revelation: That God never disparageth Reason...That to decry, and disgrace Reason, is to strike up Religion by the Roots, and to prepare the World for Atheism." (23)

He did indeed acknowledge that human reason could be faulty, and claimed that the new philosophy and the Royal Society would help both to purify it, and to teach its right use, but, nevertheless, throughout his works, there was a sustained belief in the divinity and the usefulness of reason.

This defence of reason as being bestowed by God was of course linked up with the controversy as to whether or not reason was inimical to religion. Bacon had attempted to avert the conflict by divorcing reason and religion, and this method was followed by many later writers, and particularly by the Deists, with their belief in a universal reason ordering nature and informing man. (Ironically, by revitalising Plato's belief in a world-soul, the Cambridge Platonists, though they themselves stressed the divine nature of this world-soul, helped to advance the cause of Deism.) But there were others who attempted to synthesise reason and faith. Hooker, even as early as the late Sixteenth Century, laid constant emphasis on the importance of reason, not only as a means of knowing physical facts, but

as a source of spiritual aid: "Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding. And the light of that eye, is reason", he wrote, and later he spoke of the power of

> "the light of Reason, wherewith God illuminateth every one which cometh into the world, men being enabled to know truth from falsehood, and good from evil, do thereby learn in many things what the will of God is. (24)

This tradition was followed by Comenius, who believed that "The senses minister to reason, and reason ministers to Faith" (25), by Clifford, who claimed that "I cannot Believ but by an act of the will, nor can I will but according to the directions of the Understanding" (26), and by Sprat, wh wrote

> "Seeing the Law of Reason intends the happiness and security of mankind in this life; and the Christian Religion pursues the same ends, both in this and a future life; they are so far from being opposite one to another, that Religion may properly be styl'd the best and the noblest part, the perfection and the crown of the Law of Nature." (27)

On the whole, as Glanvill claimed, Anglicanism was favourable to reason, and even the moderate Nonconformists pleaded for rationalism in religion. Ferguson, in defendin Nonconformists against Glanvill's charges of anti-rationali admitted that 'not only the grossest Follies, but Doctrines palpably repugnant both to Reason, and to one another, have been delivered by Enthusiasts and pretended Inspiratos'(28) Though he limited the place of reason in religion, he accep it as being useful. Milton (29) argued that the aim of

learning was to know God aright, and thereby be enabled to love and imitate Him. The Anglican Wilkins used scientific methods to prove religion, as did many other philosophically minded theologians, and, in words which might well have been written in the next century, claimed that

> "The Nature of Man... doth consist in that faculty of Reason, whereby he is made capable of Religion, of apprehending a Deity, and of expecting a future State of Rewards and Punishments...The happiness of Man doth consist in the perfecting of this Faculty." (30)

Arderne believed that Christianity was essentially a rational religion, and continued:

> "I need not tell you, what is now said does not debarr the study of reason to conform our Faith, seeing that without this I know not how Religion can bee kept alive it not being sufficient to have it cherished either by Enthusiasm or bare Tradition, both of them bad Nurses." (31)

Cowley, though he certainly did not look on reason as divine, acknowledged its usefulness to faith in contrast to the empty vanity of Enthusiasm:

> "Visions and Inspirations some expect
> Their course here to direct,
> Like senseless Chymists their own wealth destroy,
> Imaginary Gold t'enjoy...
> Though Reason cannot through Faiths Mysteries see,
> It sees that there and such they be;
> Leads to Heavens Door, and there does humbly keep
> And there through Chinks and Key-holes peep,
> Though it, like Moses, bu a sad command,
> Must not come in to th'Holy Land,
> Yet thither it infallibly does Guid,
> And from afar 'tis all Descry'd." (32)

The Cambridge Platonists, with their belief in the divinity of reason, soon realised the dangers inherent in Cartesianism,

which removed the divinity, and left rationalism the supreme power in the iniverse. But that did not alter their trust in the Candle of the Lord.

The writers who at this period attacked reason were on the whole less influential, for many of them were Fanatics, and the age of fanaticism had passed. William Bates denied that philosophy gave any help to religion, and wrote:

> "Thus natural Reason...when 'tis brought from the narrow sphere of things sensible, to contemplate the immensity of things Spiritual and Supernatural, its Light declines and is turned into darkness." (33)

Polhill, in a vivid passage, spoke of the weakness of reason in plumbing holy mysteries:

> "Can it enter into the treasures of the snow, or ride a circuit with the winds, or take a rational turn with the flux and reflux of the sea, or tell how the massie earth hangs upon nothing?" (34)

Du Chastelet argued that atheism was bound up with rationalism: atheists

> "reject Scripture, laugh at Tradition, suspect whatsoever is beyond the reach of a natural understanding, tho it be never so little; and spoiling Faith of all the Authority it has over us, admit of no other principles but Reason, Experience, and the Testimony of their Senses." (35)

But on the whole the moderate Nonconformists, like Ferguson, were willing to accept reason as an aid to religion, though they stressed that it had severe limitations, and that human reason was very corrupt.

Glanvill of course was on the side of reason, and attempted to employ the methods of rationalism even to sup-

port his arguments in favour of the supernatural. He used several means to prove his point that reason was not inimic to faith. In The Agreement of Reason and Religion (36) he claimed that certain phrases in the Scriptures which apparently derogated the reason had in fact been either mistranslated or misinterpreted. In Philosophia Pia he referr to many thinkers who were both scientists and theologians. It is interesting, too, that he stressed their membership o the Royal Society, rather than of the Established Church, a point that might be argued against Cope's thesis.

Reference has already been made to Glanvill's belief that the Christian religion, in its Anglican form, was essentially rational. The Agreement of Reason and Religion laid continual emphasis on this. So, too, faith and reason are complementary and harmonious; belief in reason is an ac of faith, as faith is an act of reason. It is true that th may occasionally appear contradictory:

> "But then either something is taken for Faith, that is but Phansie; or something for Reason, that is but Sophistry; or the supposed contradiction is an Error and Mistake." (37)

Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy contained perhaps the most moving and eloquent of Glanvill's many passages on reason; this has already been quoted (38). Glanvill may have disapproved of the passions, but he could be most passionate himself in defence of his beliefs. Even in his earliest works, where he was more concerned with

science than religion, he was careful to point out that reason and faith were in harmony: "Reason and Faith are at perfect Unisons: the disharmony is in the Phancy." (39) Even in its nature, reason comports better with religion than with men's physical appetites, for Glanvill described it as "severe" (40). In Philosophia Pia he claimed that on of the maxims of reason was "that whatsoever God saith is t be believed." (41) Examples of Glanvill's belief that religion and reason were not only compatible with, but actuall vital to, each other, abound in his writings; it was one belief which did not waver throughout his life.

As reason was essential to religion, so conversely the denial of reason was a direct cause of atheism. A Seasonable Recommendation, and The Agreement of Reason and Religion (42), which was based on the visitation sermon, classed atheism and fanaticism together, and argued that both were the direct results of attacks on reason. The Roman Catholics, and even some of the Anglican clergy, were equally guilty of vilifying reason; Anglican theologians were prepared to argue on grounds of reason against the Catholic church, but denied it when it was used against themselves,

> "So that our denying Reason in Religion is either very humoursom and partial, or 'tis a direct yielding up our Cause to our Enemies; and doing that our selves, which is the only thing they desire, to undo us; and to promote their own Interests upon our Ruines." (43)

Like science, a religion based on anything but right reason was insecure, and open to any wind of change:

> "that Religion that depends upon a warm Phansie, and an ungrounded Belief, stands but till a Disease, or a new Conceit alter the Scene of Imagination, and then down falls the Castle, whose Foundation was in the Air."(44

But it was in his attacks on the Enthusiasts for their lack of reason that Glanvill became most intense. Even as early as Scepsis Scientifica, he referred to their dislike of reason, with its resultant excesses of imagination:

> "Hence we may derive the Visions, Voyces, Revelations of the Enthusiast: the strong Idea's of which, being conjur'd up into the Imagination by the heat of the melancholized brain, are judged exterior Realities; when as they are but motions within the Cranium. Hence Story is full of the wonders, it works upon Hypochondriacal Imaginants; to whom the grossest absurdities are infallible Certainties, and free reason an Impostour." (45)

The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion contained a strong attack on the Enthusiasts for their denial of reason, which

> "leads Men's minds into a maze of confused Imaginations and betrays them into Bogs and Precipices...It takes Religion off from its Foundations, and leaves the Interest of Eternity in Men's Souls, to Chance, and th Hits of Imagination." (46)

Once again, The Agreement of Reason and Religion contained some vivid passages against the Enthusiasts, whom Glanvill argued were against, and not above, reason; they attacked reason because

> "The Impostures of Mens Phansies must not be seen in too much light, and we cannot dream with our eyes oper

> Reason would discover the nakedness of Sacred Whimsies and the vanity of Mysterious Non-sense; this would disparage the Darlings of the Brain, and cool the pleasant heats of kindled Imagination: And therefore Reason must be decryed, because an Enemy to madness; and Phansie set up, under the Notion of Faith and Inspiration...Thus hath Religion, by the disparagement of Reason, been made a Medley of Phantastick Trash, spiritualized into an heap of Vapours, and formed into a Castle of Clouds; and exposed to every Wind of Humou and Imagination." (47)

Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy described how the Enthusiasts "villified Reason as Carnal, and Incompetent and an Enemy to the things of the Spirit" (48), whilst in contrast the New Divines realised " 'Twas time now,in such an Age as this, to assert the sober use of Reason, and to rescue Religion by it." (49) The denial of reason in religion had led to many errors: the propogation of conceits unsound doctrines, spiritual pride, and sectarianism. It had brought religion into ill-repute, so that scoffers and atheists were encouraged in their evil ways, and it had destroyed civil peace and stable government. Underlying many of Glanvill's arguments for rationality in religion was his belief that only through moderation and reason could religious dissensions, which had torn the nation apart, be peacefully settled; the Church of England was the "only Mean between dangerous Extreams" (50); for him " 'tis sobriety that must settle, and secure us." (51)

But nevertheless Glanvill was conscious that human

reason had its limitations. Occasionally the limitations were due to error; "Vain Imaginations, and false Consequences" (52) have often been labelled reason,

> "So that the reason of the far greatest part of mankind is but an aggregate of mistaken phantasms; and in things not sensible, a constant delusion." (53)

In this same section of Scepsis Scientifica Glanvill pointed out how similar were the processes of reason and imagination and how different their results. Human reason, he acknowledged, is indeed corrupt, but this was support for his argument against dogmatism, rather than an argument against the use of reason. That part of faith which rested on revelation was beyond the scope of reason, but

> "if Reason must be called blind upon this account, because it cannot know of it self such things as belong to Testimony to discover; the best Eyes in the World may be so accounted, because they cannot see sounds; and the best Palate dull and dead, because it cannot taste the Sun-Beams." (54)

And even here reason was valuable in that it proved the validity of the Scriptures in which those revelations were recorded. Human reason, too, might be incapable of grasping the wonders of the universe, but at least it made men realise that those wonders did exist.

Side by side with the seventeenth century tendency to sublimate the reason was a growing distrust of the imagination. The term imagination is difficult to define, in that its meaning has varied not only between periods, but betwee

individuals within each period. Earlier Hooker had describe it as "the only storehouse of wit and peculiar chair of memory" (55), essential to the working of the mind, whilst Bacon advocated the use of controlled imagination along with reason to influence the will. Andrewes, however, attacked worship of "imaginations" as "the disease of our age." (56) To Hobbes, imagination was equivalent to memory, and it was inspiration which he distrusted. Thorpe (57) points out that Hobbes in fact dignified the imagination. Later in the Seventeenth Century Burthogge defined imagination as

> "internal Sense, or an (After) Representation of the Images or Sentiments (that have been) excited before in the Sense." (58)

Then, too, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between the use of the terms imagination and fancy; Glanvill appeared to employ them somewhat indiscriminately, whilst Mulgrave wrote:

> "As all is Dullness, when the Fancy's bad,
> So without Judgment, Fancy is but mad...
> Fancy is but the Feather of the Pen;
> Reason is that substantial useful part,
> Which gains the Head, while t'other wins the Heart."(

As he used it here, Mulgrave's fancy was more akin to Bacon conception of imagination, than was Bacon's to Glanvill's. It is interesting that Sprat attacked Enthusiasm frequently in his History of the Royal-Society, but, unlike Glanvill, did not constantly associate it with imagination.

Several critics trace this growing distrust of the

inagination. Among them Williamson (60) and Bond (61) both link it with the reaction to Enthusiasm or Puritanism, whils Jones (62) argues that the distrust of rhetoric and of imagination were interrelated, in that rationalism was hostile to both. Here again it is not always easy to differentiate between imagination and fancy.

Although Glanvill himself distrusted the imagination deeply, as will be shown later in this chapter, his works frequently contained passages of intensely imaginative writing, in the modern sense of the word. Whenever he was deeply moved, by either an idea or an emotion, his style and his imagery have a vividness missing from his more disciplined writings. Like Browne, he had moments of almost mystical enthusiasm, particularly in his early works, but he was conscious not only of the mystery of science, but also of its tremendous possibilities. Presumably he did not consider his scientific prophecies as flights of imagination. In much of his later writings, his imagination was touched with bitterness or gloom; the Character of a Coffee-House, if indeed it was by Glanvill, was typical of this later style. Despite his hatred of Enthusiasm, many of the passages in his sermons on such subjects as death and the Day of Judgement were closely akin to the macabre realism of much Nonconformist preaching.

More shared Glanvill's hatred of the imagination; to

him it seemed a contaminating influence upon the intellect. He wrote of the "dregs and corporeal foulness" of the imagination, which "tinctures and infects this Pure and Spiritual Extension with Corporeal Properties." (63) But he disliked it because it was concerned with material rather than abstract things.

In Glanvill's earlier writings, his attacks upon imagination were comparatively mild. In Scepsis Scientifica he argued that man falls short of knowledge because he is misled by the imagination. It is the misapplied imagination, whereby opinions are made to seem the truth, which is at the root of contemporary Enthusiasm; imagination governs the majority of men, and they in turn govern the world. In A Whip for the Droll Fiddler he described it as a roving faculty, higher than the senses and lower than judgement, and it needed to be ruled by reason and virtue. (This is one of the sections in which he used fancy and imagination apparently indiscriminately.)

It is interesting to study Glanvill's use of the term imagination in his later works. In almost every case it is referred to in conjunction with Enthusiasm, and Glanvill considered it to be both a cause and a result of this form of fanaticism. The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion describes Enthusiasm as

> "a false conceit of Inspiration...[which] hath introduced much phantasy into Religion, and made way for

all imaginable Follies, and even Atheism it self."(64)

Seasonable Reflections defined Enthusiasm as basing belief on fancy. The sermon on "The Way of Happiness described vividly Glanvill's concept of the psychology of Enthusiasm:

> "some men have a natural spice of Devotion in a Religious Melancholy, which is their temper; and such have commonly strong Imaginations and zealous affections, which when they are heated, flame forth into great heights and expressions of Devotion: The warm Fancy furnisheth words and matter readily and unexpectedly, which many times begets in the man a conceit that he is inspired, and that his Prayers are the breathings of the Holy Ghost; or at least that he is extraordinarily assisted by it; which belief kindles his affections yet more, and he is carried beyond himself even into the third Heavens, and Suburbs of Glory, as he fancies." (65)

The Fast Sermon on the King's Martyrdom claimed that the Nonconformist religion was based on pride and self-love, and had swollen men's imaginations "into a Tympany of ridiculous greatness." (66)

Fancy, imagination, frenzy, whimsy, absurdity, nonsens pride; these were all words which Glanvill used to describe the religion of the Enthusiasts. In The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant, he spoke of the doctrine of the Nonconform ists as being "All that the Phancies, all that the Phrensies of conceited and distracted men can invent." (67) The Usefulness of Real Religion to Philosophy described the Enthusiasts as being cast into

> "Raptures, Exstasies, and Deliquiums of Sense, in which every Dream is taken for a Prophesie, every Image of the Fancy for a vision, and all the glaring of the Imagination for new Lights and Revelation." (68)

The conclusion of The Agreement of Reason and Religion is even more caustic, linking imagination and fancy with madnes This idea that the Enthusiasts' imagination was in fact diseased recurred frequently. The sermon on "The Serious Consideration of the Future Judgment spoke of "sick imagination". The Way of Happiness described the excesses of rapture and despair to which the imagination of the fanatic was susceptible.

But, like dogmatism, imagination was not merely an erro it, too, was an actual sin. Against Modern Sadducism linked "warm Imagination, and over-lushious self-flattery." (69) The Serious Consideration of the Future Judgment contrasted sin and virtue; religion was "No dream of imagination, or interest of any lust; but as simple as Innocence, and as cle as the virgin light." (70) The Enthusiasts

> "hugg'd themselves, as the only favourites of Heaven, and warm'd their hands by their own fantastick Fires... flew aloft on the wings of Imagination, and proudly look'd down upon the modest and humble Believer." (71)

The New Divines rebuked this pride of the Enthusiasts, "So that their wings being clipt, they came down to the ordinary level with other mortals." (72) This idea that the Nonconformists were carried away by their imagination recurre frequently. The Fast Sermon contrasted their so-called piety with true Christian goodness:

> "like the Bird of Paradise, they had Wings to flye in th Clouds of Imagination, but no Feet to walk on the groun of a vertuous practice." (73)

But Glanvill went even further than this; false imagination was the instrument of Satan:

> "Thus when kindled melancholly hath inflamed the imagination with hot and scalding conceits, and the fired Fancy gets into the Revelations, opens the Seals pours out the Viols, and fantastically interprets the Fates of Kingdoms; when 'tis mounted on the Wings of the Wind, flys into the Clouds, and flutters there in Mystical nonsense, when it flows into the tongue in an extravagant ramble, and abuseth the name and word of God, mingling it with canting, unintelligible babbl I say, when the diseased and the disturbed Fancy thus variously displays it self, Satan makes men believe they are acted by the Spirit, and that those wild agitations of sick imagination are divine motions."(74

To Glanvill, there were two forms of religion - divine and animal; by surrendering themselves to the imagination, by loosing the restraints imposed by a divinely-given reason, the Enthusiasts had betrayed Christianity, and had opened the way for bestiality and vice, even though they might be hidden under a veneer of self-righteousness.

The Puritans had not always been guilty of these excesses. Tulloch (75) points out that Smith, for example, believed that true enthusiasm was essentially rational, combining imagination and reason. In his later works, Glanvill himself was to plead for greater zeal; rationalism had destroyed affection in Anglicanism. The later Enthusiasts, however, strove not only to divorce reason from religion, but actively attacked rationalism, so preparing the way for the excesses of the extremists. Ferguson, though a Nonconformist himself, was careful to separate himself from the Enthusiasts. (76) Although the Roman

Catholics, too, were attacked for their anti-rationalism (reference has already been made to Glanvill's comments, whilst Crusius wrote "the chiefest parts of Popery are so contrary not only to the Scriptures, but to common sense almost, that they are forced to patch up a parcel of Fables and Traditions of all sorts" (77)), it was the Enthusiasts who, in Glanvill's opinion, were most guilty of destroying true religion. In contrast, he stressed the rationality of the Cambridge Platonists, who were to rescue religion from fancy and imagination, and to restore the empire of the mind Plato's belief in the divinity of man's reason, and his desire for harmony and balance were echoed in the Cambridge Platonists' conception of a fully integrated personality, in which the passions, affections, and imagination were all controlled by the reason. The nation was tired of fanaticism and extremism. Anglicanism was the religion not only of moderation, but also of decorum. It is unfortunate that the later Latitudinarians were so occupied with rationalism that they omitted any note of mysticism, which had made the doctrine, preaching and practice of the earlier Anglicans and Cambridge Platonists so vivid and inspiring.

CHAPTER III - REFERENCES.

1. Wolf, A. — A History of Science; new ed.
2. Bush, D. — Science and English Poetry. New York, 1950.
3. Grierson, Sir H.J.C. — Seventeenth Century Studies Presented to Sir Herbert Grierson. Oxford, 1938. P.377.
4. Baker, H. — The Wars of Truth.
5. Bacon, F. — Instauratio Magna... London, 1620.
6. Comenius, J.A. — The Way of Light; transl. E.T. Campagnac. Liverpool, 1938. P.14.
7. Hills, H. — A Short Treatise Concerning the Propagation of the Soul. London, 1667. P.105.
8. Hallywell, H. — Deus Justificatus. Pp.15, 18.
9. Maynard, J. — The Beauty and Order of the Creati London, 1668.
10. Fowler, E. — The Principles and Practices, of Certain Moderate Divines. P.70.
11. Goldwell, C. — Reasons Metamorphosis, and Restauration. London, 1621. P.4.
12. Ferguson, R. — The Interest of Reason in Religion
13. Herbert, Lord, of Cherbury — De Veritate; transl. M.H. Carré. Bristol, 1937. Introduction, p.61.
14. - — De Religione Laici; ed. H.R. Hutcheson. New Haven, 1944. (Yale Studies in English, vol.98.) Introduction.
15. Cope, J.I. — Joseph Glanvill. Ch.2, section iv.
16. Whichcote, B. — Moral and Religious Aphorisms. (In Campagnac, E.T. - The Cambridge Platonists. P.67.)

Chapter III - References, cont.

17. Smith, J. — The Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion. (In Campagnac, E.T. - Op.cit., p.206.)

18. Calverwel, N. — An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature. London, 16 Pp.2, 114, 121.

19. Glanvill, J. — Lux Orientalis. (In Glanvill, J.- Two Choice and Useful Treatises. P.89.)

20. - — Some Discourses. P.280.

21. - — Essays. Essay II, p.50.

22. Idem, Essay V, p.21.

23. Idem, Essay VII, pp.17-8.

24. Hooker, R. — Ecclesiastical Polity, Bk.I, ch.vii section 2; Bk.I, ch.viii, section 3. (In Hooker, R. - Works; ed.J.Keble 2nd ed. Oxford, 1841. Vol.I.)

25. Comenius, J.A. — Op.cit., p.122.

26. Clifford, M. — A Treatise of Humane Reason. P.90.

27. Sprat, T. — The History of the Royal-Society o London; 2nd ed. P.368.

28. Ferguson, R. — Op.cit., p.57.

29. Milton, J. — Tractate of Education; ed. E.E. Morris. London, 1895.

30. Wilkins, J. — Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion; 8th ed. Pp.16-7.

31. Arderne, J. — Directions Concerning the Matter and Stile of Sermons; ed.J.Mackay. P.6.

32. Cowley, A. — Reason. The Use of it in Divine Matters. Stanzas 2,6. (In Cowley, A - Poems; ed. A.R.Waller.Pp.46-7.)

Chapter III - References, cont.

33. Bates, W. The Harmony of the Divine Attributes. London, 1675. P.130.

34. Polhill, E. Precious Faith Considered. London, 1675. P.50.

35. Du Chastelet, H. A Treatise against Irreligion. London, 1678. Pp.4-5.

36. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay V.

37. Idem, Essay V, p.21.

38. As above, reference no.26.

39. Glanvill, J. Scepsis Scientifica. P.76.

40. - Seasonable Reflections. P.5.

41. - Philosophia Pia. P.81.

42. - Essays. Essay V.

43. Idem, Essay V, p.28.

44. Idem, Essay V, p.24.

45. Glanvill, J. Scepsis Scientifica. Pp.72-3.

46. - Essays. Essay IV, p.20.

47. Idem, Essay V, pp.25-6.

48. Idem, Essay VII, p.6.

49. Idem, Essay VII, p.19.

50. Glanvill, J. The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant. P.8.

51. Idem, p.56.

52. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay V, p.2.

53. - Scepsis Scientifica. P.75.

54. - Essays. Essay V, p.10.

Chapter III - References, cont.

55. Hooker, R. — Op.cit., bk.V, ch.lxv, section 7. (In Hooker, R. - Works; ed. J. Keble. Vol.II.)

56. Andrewes, L. — 96 Sermons; 2nd ed. London, 1632. Sermon of the Worshipping of the Imagination. P.26.

57. Thorpe, C.D. — The Aesthetic theory of Thomas Hobbes. Ann Arbor, 1940. (University of Michigan Publications. Language and Literature. Vol.18.)

58. Burthogge, R. — An Essay upon Reason. London, 1694 P.10.

59. Mulgrave, Earl of — An Essay on Poetry. P.301. (In Roscomon, Earl of - Poems. London, 1717.)

60. Williamson, G. — The Senecan Amble. London, 1951.

61. - — "The Restoration Revolt against Enthusiasm." S.P., 30(1933), pp.571-603.

Bond, D.F. — "'Distrust' of Imagination in English Neo-Classicism." P.Q., 14(1935), pp.54-69.

62. Jones, R.F. — "The Attack on Pulpit Eloquence in the Restoration." J.E.G.P., 30(1931), pp.188-217.

63. More, H. — Enchiridion. P.91. (In Glanvill, J. Sadducismus Triumphatus.)

64. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay IV, p.17.

65. - — Some Discourses. P.40.

66. Idem, p.80.

67. Glanvill, J. — The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant. Pp.24-5.

68. - — Essays. Essay IV, p.18.

Chapter III - References, cont.

69. Idem, Essay VI, p.29.

70. Glanvill, J. Seasonable Reflections. P.170.

71. Idem, p.181.

72. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay VII, p.30.

73. - Some Discourses. P.176.

74. Idem, p.385.

75. Tulloch, J. Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy; 2nd ed. Vol.II.

76. Ferguson, R. Op.cit.

77. Crusius, T.T. The Origine of Atheism in the Popi and Protestant Churches. London, 1684. P.7.

CHAPTER IV - THE PEOPLE'S CHARTER.

The stylistic revolution of the Seventeenth Century has caused perhaps more interest and controversy than any other aspect of the period's literary development. It is impossibl to summarise briefly the conflicting views of the various critics. But it is dangerous to over-emphasise this revolution; reaction against any style which has become formalised and has lost its spontaneity is natural and healthy. The spirit of experiment is not limited to science, nor the desir to explore to geography. Various stylistic fashions, for example Euphuism and the Metaphysical school, have appeared and disapp/eared. As literary criticism became an accepted art, it was only reasonable that the critics should examine the style, as well as the matter and form, of the work with which they were concerned. Then, too, the growth of printing, the spread of education, and the increasing democratisation of the Seventeenth Century meant that new ideas would both emanate from, and influence, a wider audience; the Court and the Church were no longer the main arbiters of literary taste

Although there is a tendency to regard the writers of th later Seventeenth Century as revolutionary in their desire for simplicity, it should be remembered that even during the Sixteenth Century there was a tradition of plainness. Johnson (1) points out that during that century there was an excellent scientific style, which carried on the tradition

inherited from Sir Thomas More and the Humanists, and that, for a century before the Royal Society was formed, scientists were writing popular manuals in a simple style for a wide audience. Howell (2) traces the development of logic and rhetoric during the Sixteenth Century, and refers to John Jewel's plea for plainness in his Oratio contra Rhetoricam of about 1548. Croll (3) describes the development of anti-Ciceronianism, and the rise of 'Attic' prose during the Sixteenth Century. Wallace's study of Bacon (4), though it admits that there was a tendency to admire style rather than matter, also points out that there was a reaction against Ciceronian eloquence even during the early Sixteenth Century. Greenslet (5) remarks on the use of everyday language, and the reaction against over-elaborate prose, in Elizabethan literature. Mackay (6) describes the late Sixteenth Century reaction, on the grounds both of learning and morals, against the fantastic style. Jones writes of Gilbert's De Magnete:

> "In noting the injurious effect upon the advancement of learning of indulging in language which has no counterpart in the material world, Gilbert anticipates Bacon and Hobbes, and at this early date [1600] expresses a linguistic attitude which constituted an integral part of the scientific movement in the seventeenth century, and which was responsible for the stylistic program adopted by the Royal Society" (7).

What is interesting about the seventeenth century change of style is both that it was conscious, and that it was so wide spread. Though, as Craik (8) points out, writers of the period lacked peace in which to perfect English style, at

any rate until the end of the century, nevertheless they laid down the principles which writers have followed, with little variation, till the present day.

The reasons for this change were many and varied. Much stress has been laid on the work of Bacon and the Royal Society, and they indeed were influential, but it is dangerous to exaggerate their effect. Jones (9) describes the influence of Bacon on the Puritans in their desire for plainness, and for matter rather than words; it is ironic that later in the century the desire for simplicity was in part due to the reaction against Puritan preaching. In this same chapter, Jones writes:

> "It is hard to overemphasize the fact that science in its youth considered the linguistic problem as importan as the problem of the true scientific method" (10),

and he claims that the new science is the dominating factor in the stylistic revolution. An article by Fisch and Jones (11) traces the influence of Bacon on the Royal Society, and possibly on Wilkins' attempt at a Real Character. Jones goes so far as to claim that the revolt against rhetoric was due practically entirely to the scientific movement:

> "In the concrete nature of the experimental philosophy is to be found the secret of the craving for a clear, accurate, plain style and the belief that such a style was essential to the attainment of scientific goals."(1

He argues that plainness differentiated the old from the new science, and that the anti-Ciceronianism of such writers as Browne was not related to the scientific influence on style.

The position of the Royal Society is in fact somewhat equivocal. The only concrete example of its attempting to reform the English language was the setting up of a Committee in 1664:

> "It being suggested, that there were several persons of the society, whose genius was very proper and inclined to improve the English tongue, and particularly for philosophical purposes; it was voted, that there be a Committee for improving the English language; and that they meet at Sir Peter Wyche's lodgings in Gray's-Inn, once or twice a month, and give an account of their proceedings to the society, when called upon"(13)

Dryden, Evelyn, Sprat and Waller were among the members of this Committee, and Wilkins was to attend the first meeting. Sprat, in his History, referred to the desirability of an Academy to

> "take the whole Mass of our Language...and...set a mark on the ill words; correct those, which are to be retain'd; admit, and establish the good; and make some emendations in the Accent and Grammar" (14).

Later he mentioned the Society's making a

> "constant Resolution to reject all the amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, when men deliver'd so many things, almost in an equal number of words"(15)

But little seems to have come of either of these projects, and it is argued that Dryden in fact anticipated the Royal Society by proposing the establishment of an English Academy himself (16). Williamson (17) goes so far as to say that the Royal Society imitated rather than initiated, and that it was confused by the twin aims of improving language for science,

and polishing it for literature, whilst Cope (18) claims that the movement towards plainness was due rather to the influence of Anglicanism than that of science. In opposition to this view, Christensen (19) supports the claim of the Royal Society, and particularly of Wilkins, to have rationalised English prose of the Seventeenth Century.

As has already been mentioned, there was a growing dislike during the Seventeenth Century of any form of controversy and of the passions which it engendered. Many people felt that much of the past controversy could be blamed on ambiguity both of thought and expression. Not only were many earlier beliefs faulty, but the terms used to express them were inadequate, and there was an increasing demand for a language of mathematical plainness, in which words were carefully defined, so that there could be no dissension over their exact meaning. Bush (20) refers to the post-Restoration belief that vague and metaphorical writing contributed to sectarian divisions, whilst Baker (21) points out that Hobbes, like Bacon, believed that language was the main source of error. Jones traces the parallelism between scientific and sermon styles, noting that

> "The clearest evidence...for the participation of science in the formulation of a standard for sermons is contained in several treatises by Joseph Glanvill" (22).

It will be shown later that this statement is not altogether correct. He, too, notes the belief that controversy was to

a large extent caused by language. That this belief was well founded is supported by the King's message to the Archbishops of 14th October, 1662:

> "The extravagance of preachers has much heightened the disorders, and still continues so to do, by the diligence of factious spirits, who dispose them to jealousy of the government. Young divines, in ostentation of learning, handle the deep points of God's eternal counsels, or wrangle about gestures and fruitless controversies" (23).

Then, too, much of the seventeenth century opposition to Aristotle was based on the claim that his wordiness and ambiguity had led to argument and "notionality".

This desire for exact definition was linked up with the search for a universal language or "real character," but again this factor in the simplification of the language should not be over-emphasised. De Mott (24) and Emery (25) have already published work on the history of the "real character," but perhaps one or two comments would not be out of place. Wallace (26) refers to Bacon's desire for a universal symbolic language, whilst Burnet (27) claimed that Bishop Bedell compiled both the first Irish grammar, and a "real character." As Bedell died in 1642, this must have been one of the earliest attempts. Hartlib's A Common Writing (28) is another early attempt, and he was possibly influenced by Comenius, although the latter's Way of Light was not published until 1668. In this work, which was dedicated to the Royal Society, Comenius referred to drawing up

schemes for "a Pansophic language, the universal carrier of light" (29), and later he described the necessary qualities of any universal language; it should express all concepts of the mind precisely, and it should be easy and unambiguous. His outlook was akin to the Cambridge Platonists in their concept of the benefits which would accrue from true knowledge Beck's work of 1657, referred to by Grainger (30), was more utilitarian in aim, and he was followed by Dalgarno, who claimed that the purpose of his Ars Signorum of 1661 was to improve language

> "by cutting off all redundancy, rectifying all anomaly, taking away all ambiguity and equivocation...In a word. to cure even Philosophy itself of the disease of Sophisms and Logomachies..." (31)

It is possible that Dalgarno influenced Wilkins' Essay Towards a Real Character (32), though Wilkins himself did not acknowledge this. Plot (33) listed three works: Dr. Wallis's Grammar of the English Tongue, of 1653, based on his discovery of the mechanical formation of all sounds in speech; Holder's Essay of Inquiry into the Natural Production of Letters, of 1669 (both these two works formulated methods for teaching speech to the deaf and dumb), and Dalgarno's Universal Character, of 1656, which was based on a shorthand applicable to all languages. Plot noted that Wilkins encouraged this project, though he disapproved of Dalgarno's Ars Signorum. But again it is important not to over-

emphasise the ~~importance~~ significance of this somewhat theoretical search for the perfect language. Though Hooke wrote:

> "I shall conclude this Tract with a short communication of the general ground of my Invention for Pocket-Watches...which...I have set down in the Universal and Real Character of...John Wilkins...In which I could wish, that all things of this nature were communicated, it being a Character and Language so truly Philosophical, and so perfectly and thoroughly Methodical that there seemeth to be nothing wanting to make it have the utmost perfection, and highest Idea of any Character or Language imaginable, as well as for Philosophical as for common and constant use...It being a Character and Language perfectly free from all manner of ambiguity, and yet the most copious, expressive, and significative of any thing or Notion imaginable, and, which recommends it most to common use, the most easie to be understood and learnt in the world" (34),

the idea does not seem to have gained much support. It is significant that Pepys' main interest in Wilkins' Essay was his theory about Noah's Ark (35), and it is probable that the search for a perfect language was a symptom rather than a cause of the seventeenth century development of simple prose. It is significant that stress was laid on the desire for clarity and comprehensiveness rather than on beauty or grace of style.

It is impossible to ignore the religious aspect of this stylistic revolution, for, as Bethell (36) points out, changes in the literature and criticism of the period ran parallel to changes in theology, whilst the article by Jones (37), already referred to, points out the similarities between scientific and theological style. Here again, there is considerable difference of opinion. Hutton (38) claims

that the religious writers accepted rather than influenced contemporary style, whilst Tulloch (39) points out that the Cambridge Platonists, who were direct descendants of the Christian Humanist tradition, were opposed to contemporary taste in that they were guilty of every excess of quotation and verbosity. Baker (40) claims that the seventeenth century concern with language was in part due to the general reaction against the verbal elegance of Renaissance Humanism, and Williamson (41) goes so far as to say that inheritors of the Humanist tradition were opposed to the Royal Society's attempt at improving the language. Nevertheless, the influence of the Church had a valuable place in the stylistic revolution. The sermon itself was of great importance during the Seventeenth Century, as can be seen from the publication of numerous collections of sermons, as well as by the use of common-place books to record sermons, and the compilation of various manuals on the matter and style of sermons. Mitchell (42) traces in great detail the changes in sermon style during the period, and he points out that a preacher's style, as much as his doctrine, reflected the ideas of the religious party to which he belonged. Mitchell argues that the change to plainness was due to a change in taste, and was not imposed externally, and that the sermon, then one of the foremost forms of literary art, influenced taste instead of being influenced by it. Several critics, such as Spingarn (43),

refer to the reaction against the wit of Metaphysical preaching. Moreover, there was a growing dislike of any style akin to the canting language of the Commonwealth, the over-imaginative sermons of the Extremists, and the ornate preaching of the High Anglicans. Reference has already been made to the plainness of earlier Puritan preaching, and the same simplicit was to be seen in the early Quaker style, which Cope (44) and Wright (45) have both studied. (Unfortunately the Quaker simplicity later became conventional rather than spontaneous.) Mitchell traces the development of simplicity in the preaching of every denomination, and concludes that "but for the reformation and simplification of the pulpit-address, it is almost certain that there would have been no simplification of English prose" or at least that it would not have been so universally accepted.(46) This perhaps puts the case rather too strongly, but, from the number of contemporary references to the evil effects of cant and enthusiasm on seventeenth century style, it would seem that the religious element was important.

The divorce of reason and imagination, already described in the previous chapter, was paralleled by the change in prose style. Williamson (47) links the new desire for plainness in the Seventeenth Century with the growing distrust of the imagination and passions. It was not until later in the century, with the rehabilitation of both rhetoric and, to

some extent, the imagination, that men like Glanvill realised the danger of a language directed only to the reason, and ignoring the more subjective parts of the human mind. In religion, the Nonconformists tended to play upon the imagination, the Anglicans to work upon the reason. Unlike the Elizabethans, seventeenth century writers did not look upon rhetoric as an intrinsic part of communication. Though Bacon had stressed the importance of influencing the imagination as well as the reason, and though there was an attempt during the Seventeenth Century, by such writers as Ferguson, to rehabilitate rhetoric, the general desire was for a strictly rational prose. Style was chosen to suit the audience rather than the subject, so that logic was reserved for scholarly work, rhetoric for popular communication. As will be shown later, Glanvill was one of the first to appreciate the dangers of this strictly rational, unemotional style when used for sermons.

Hamilton has made an interesting study of the development of prose and poetic style during the Seventeenth Century, and believes that Ramus had a profound influence on the growth of the utilitarian style.

> "Seen against this background (i.e. the shift from sound to sight, from listening and talking to observing) Ramism may be claimed to have provided not only the actual mechanics, through its separation of logic and rhetoric, of the seventeenth-century divorce of thought and discourse as revealed by the Royal Society's distrust of words, but also the direct link with the origins of the non-verbal modes of thought that lay

> behind the divorce. In particular, Ramism may serve to indicate the extent to which the new attitude to words was not a simple result of the new scientific methods, but rather a vital part of the whole process by which these methods came into existence; and by so doing it may reveal something of the fundamental changes in the pattern of discourse which were taking overt shape in the seventeenth century." (48)

There were other minor factors in the stylistic revolutio Wilson (49) lists, among others, the rise of the essay and of journalism, the breakdown of patronage, and the necessity for a language of movement rather than of formal rhetoric. There was a growing desire for a colloquial rather than an ornate style, and by the Eighteenth Century decorum had replaced plainness. Then the exiles who returned after the Restoration strengthened the trend to neo-Classicism. Amidst such a welter of conflicting evidence and possible causes, it is easy to overestimate or overlook one or more factors. It is significant that many seventeenth century writers gave no explanation of their desire for plainness, whilst Glanvill himself argued on the grounds both of science and religion. The revolution may have been conscious, but it was also spontaneous, and was a result rather of a general change of taste than of an enforcement by any particular sphere of thought; Cassirer is referring to the Renaissance when he writes:

> "the conception and treatment of speech is but a symptom of a general and fundamental intellectual disposition. The process of the cultivation of the intellect must begin with the cultivation of language, and the two must remain in the closest relationship" (50),

but he might equally well be writing of the period with which we are concerned. Science, religion, neo-Classicism, the rise of literary criticism all helped, but underneath lay the entire character of the Seventeenth Century, with its dislike of controversy and extremes, its desire for analysis, its love of experimentation, its trend towards democratisation, its patriotism. Had the change been enforced by any one particular factor, it would not have ~~neither~~ spread so far, reached so deep, nor lasted so long. Glanvill himself summarised the whole process in Scepsis Scientifica, when he wrote that the giving of names was "the people's charter" (51).

So much work has already been done, that it would be impertinent to attempt a full survey of contemporary material in a thesis of this type. But it is necessary to fill in some of the background to Glanvill's own ideas and development by quoting some of the relevant material, without attempting an exhaustive anthology. Reference has already been made to the fact that there was a demand for a plain style even during the Sixteenth Century. Gascoigne, writing in 1575, laid down rules, which, though they were directly concerned with poetry, might equally well be applied to prose. He told the poet to

> "eschew straunge words... frame your stile to perspicuity and to be sensible...auoyde prolixitie and tediousness... since brevitie (so that it be not drowned in obscuritie) is most commendable." (52)

Gosson, in 1579, praised

> "The two prose bookes played at the Belsavage, where you shall finde never a woord without witte, never a line without pith, never a letter placed in vaine." (53)

The Epistle Dedicatorie, written by Laud and Buckeridge in their edition of Andrewe's sermons, claimed that

> "his Learning had all the helpes Language could afford; and his Languages learning enough for the best of them to expresse. His Judgement, in the meane time, so commanding over both, as that neither of them was suffered idly, or curiously to start from, or fall short of, their intended scope." (54)

His funeral sermon, printed in the same collection, spoke of the exactitude and care of his preaching. Though it is impossible to describe Andrewe's style as simple, it is interesting that he was praised for his matching of style to matter, and his lack of verbosity. But Bacon of course is the most frequently quoted supporter of simplicity in that age - though it must be admitted that his practice was not so systematic as his theory. The Advancement of Learning attacked the tendency to put words before matter, and some of the various aphorisms pointed out that words might be ambiguous, unnecessary, or might hinder learning. Wallace's study of Bacon (55) stresses his belief in the importance of communication, his desire for clarity, appropriateness and agreeableness, and his belief that the style should suit the matter. Hooker's style, among others of that period, might be quoted as an example of simplicity and brevity.

It is ironical that, during the earlier part of the Seventeenth Century, it was particularly the Puritans and

the early Quakers who preserved this tradition of plainness. Despite the later reaction against the Extremists, the sermons of the moderate Nonconformists were simple, compared to the rhetorical devices of Donne, Traherne, and above all, Taylor, Milton was not alone in his party when he praised

> "those organic arts which enable men to discourse and write perspicuously, elegantly, and according to the fitted style, of lofty, mean, or lowly." (56)

But simplicity was not confined to the Puritans. Burnet wrote of Bedell

> "He did not affect to shew any other learning in his Sermons, but what was proper for opening his Text, and clearing the difficulties in it...His Stile was clear and full, but plain and simple; for he abhorred all affectations of pompous Rhetorick in Sermons, as contrary to the simplicity of Christ." (57)

By the mid-century, the tide had turned. Writing in 164[illegible] Howell complained

> "There's a strange Maggot hath got into their [Englishmen's] brains, which possesseth them with a kind of Vertigo; and it reigns in the Pulpit more than anywhere else, for some of our Preachers are grown dog-mad, there's a worm got into their Tongues as well as their Heads." (58)

The worm to which he referred was the fantastic style.

Felltham attacked the wordiness of much preaching:

> "Long and distended clauses are both tedious to the ear and difficult for their retaining. A sentence well couched takes both the sense and the understanding. I love not those Cart-rope speeches that are longer than the memory of man can fathom...A good orator should pierce the ear, allure the eye, and invade the mind of his hearer." (59)

South, too, pleaded for simplicity,

> "For there is a certain majesty in plainness...A substantial beauty, as it comes out of the hands of nature, needs neither paint nor patch; things never made to adorn, but to cover something that would be hid...All dress and ornament supposes imperfection...And thus also it is with the most necessary and important truths; to adorn and clothe them is to cover them, and that to obscure them."(60)

The Puritan attitude was summed up by Samuel How (61), who acknowledged the use of "humane learning" in worldly matters, but attacked its employment in spiritual things. Powicke quotes the Nonconformist Baxter's own words in defence of plainness, particularly when addressing the general mass of people: "The Plainest Words are the profitablest Oratory in the weightiest matters," and again,

> "But it was the plain and pressing down-right Preacher that onely seemed to me to be in good sadness, and to make somewhat of it, and to speak with life and light and weight...And yet I must confess that though I can better digest exactness and brevity than I could so long ago, yet I as much value seriousness and plainness; and I feel in myself...a despising of that wittiness as proud foolery, which savoureth of levity, and tendeth to evaporate weighty Truths and turn them all into very fancies, and keep them from the heart... Indeed, the more I have to do with the ignorant sort of people the more I find that we cannot possibly speak too plainly for them." (62)

That this tendency to the fantastic was not ended by 1670 is shown by Eachard (63), and Fowler, who praised the moderate divines, because

> "they affect not Bumbaste words, trifling Strains of Wit, foolish Quibling, and making pretty sport with Letters and Syllables in their Preaching, but despise those doings as pedantick and unmanly." (64)

The desire for plainness gave way increasingly to a deman

for naturalness. Sprat, in a lengthy passage on Cowley's style, praised his "unaffected modesty and natural freedom, and easie vigour, and chearful passions, and innocent mirth.." (65), whilst Cowley praised Sprat's History for its candid style, which

> "has all the Beauties Nature can impart
> And all the comely Dress without the paint of Art."(66)

Lloyd's funeral sermon on Wilkins claimed that

> "He spoke solid Truth, with as little Shew of Art as was possible. He express'd all Things in their true and natural Colours; with that Aptness and Plainness of Speech, that grave natural Way of Elocution, that shewed he had no Design upon his Hearers."(67)

Mulgrave pleaded for

> "Exact Propriety of Words and Thought,
> Expression easie, and the Fancy high,
> Yet that not seem to creep, nor this to fly;
> No Words transpos'd, but in such Order all,
> As, tho' with Care, may seem by Chance to fall." (68)

and criticised Cowley for sometimes failing to unite art and naturalness.

Along with naturalness of style came a demand for a more careful choice of words. In an interesting letter to Sir Peter Wyche, dated 1665, Evelyn laid down a method for analysing and improving the English language (69), whilst Fairfax advocated the use of "hail and clear English", the words of "Handy-craftsmen and Earth-tillers" rather than "cant words or terms of art." (70)

It is significant, however, that the stress altered during the latter decades of the century. Instead of plain-

ness and naturalness, writers were demanding elegance.

Dryden ascribed this change to the return of King Charles II:

> "At his return, he found a nation lost as much in barbarism as in rebellion: and, as the excellency of his nature forgave the one, so the excellency of his manners reformed the other. The desire of imitating so great a pattern first awakened the dull and heavy spirits of the English from their native reservedness; loosened them from their stiff forms of conversation, and made them easy and pliant to each other in discourse (71)

Evelyn complained of the English style

> "which yet wants the Culture of her more Southern Neighbours, and to be redeem'd from the Province, without wholly resigning it to the Pulpits and the Theater." (72)

Crusius stressed the importance to a preacher of "a good way and manner of interpreting or expressing himself;" (73).

Locke believed that

> "whatever foreign languages a young man meddles with... that which he should critically study and labour to get a facility, clearness, and elegancy to express himself in, should be his own, and to this purpose he should daily be exercised in it." (74)

And finally Phillips claimed that now (1671) the English language was second to none "for elegance, for fluency, and happiness of expression." (75). But this demand for elegance was not universal; Arderne demanded

> "a keenness and edge in your stile, wherein there should be no appearance of designed smoothness, or carefull ordering of the chiding speech, but much of strength and earnestness and hearty vigour." (76)

Blount was writing of poetry when he appealed for a style

> "natural, without affectation, according to the Rules of

> Decorum, and good Sense. Studied Phrases, a too fluid Stile, fine Words, Terms strain'd and remote, and all extraordinary Expressions, are insupportable...only Simplicity pleases, provided it be sustain'd with Greatness and Majesty."(77),

but his words were equally applicable to prose.

In view of the admiration expressed for Sprat's style by many of his contemporaries, it is interesting to study his own comments. In his History he praised Bacon's style for its vigour, majesty and naturalness. He advocated the reform of the English language, and the establishment of an English Academy both to select proper words and to judge writers' styles. He attacked the use of rhetoric, adding that the Royal Society had

> "exacted from all their Members, a close, naked, natural way of speaking; positive expression, clear senses; a native easiness; bringing all things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can, and preferring the language of Artizans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before that, of Wits or Scholars." (78)

Later on he claimed that experimental science was useful as a source of vigourous imagery for wits and writers, but it is clear that he did not approve of this "infection." (79)

There was a general dislike of any form of rhetoric: Sprat attacked it as pandering to the passions and retarding knowledge (80); More claimed that metaphors and symbolism were useless in science:

> "proper language is the most becoming sound Philosophy, and strict Reason. And when we enquire into the distinct Nature of Things, we are to bid adieu to Allusions and Metaphors; for to inquire into the proper

> Nature of a Thing is to search out the adequate Definition thereof, which is to be done in the most certain, and clear Terms that are." (81)

The causes of this dislike were mainly either religious or scientific. The philosophers were intent on exact definition, and on intellectual conviction; they ignored Bacon's belief that both mind and will should be persuaded. The moderates in religion were tired both of the excessive formalised ornamentation of the High Anglicans, and the emotionalism of the Puritan preachers, who believed "It was not enough for the mind to be convinced unless the will spontaneously elected to embrace the conviction." (82) (This interesting work by Miller traces the parallelism between the Puritan conception of the Church, the sermon, and literary style, and describes the extremism which led to so much reaction against the Puritan style of preaching.) But there were others who realised the dangers of excessive plainness. As will be shown later, Glanvill himself pleaded for greater zeal in religious writings, whilst by 1694 Wotton was advocating sermons with smoothness, beauty of language, and ornaments of "True and Masculine Eloquence" (83). Stubbe pleaded for the preservation of "The Standard of English Eloquence" (84). Ferguson, whilst he admitted that rhetoric was out of place in controversy, pleaded for the use of metaphors in sermons, and supported his plea with the example of the Scriptures. He claimed that "Phantastical trifling with Words and Syllables, and the Foyish affec-

tation of Cadencies" (85) were now out of fashion, but attacked the present

> "Effeminate, amorous stile...I will take the liberty for once to say, that their Preaching with an air more brisk and unconcerned, and a countenance more debonair and lightsome than becomes those who would work Compunction in others...together with their polisht artificialness of Words, hardly admitting a Quotation from Scripture for fear of spoyling their Oratory"(86)

was as culpable as the style they opposed. As Wilson says of late seventeenth century preaching:

> "The splendor departs as well as the pedantry. What remains is plain, clear, direct, rational, and something hardly distinguishable from the moral essay. The great days of pulpit oratory are over." (87)

It must once more be stressed that the foregoing passages by no means claim to be an exhaustive account of the stylistic development of the period, but they merely attempt to give some idea of the background against which Glanvill developed his own ideas. His stylistic versatility remains extraordinary, and it is significant that eighteenth century writers remembered him as a man of letters rather than as a theologian or a philosopher, as Popkin points out (88). His early works have been compared in style to those of Sir Thomas Browne; his later philosophical works were typical of the plain style of the new science; many of his sermons show signs of a return to the vividness and rhythm of Nonconformist preaching. But though his style varied, he discarded permanently many of the rhetorical devices which he had employed in The Vanity of Dogmatizing, and in a modified form

in Scepsis Scientifica. He turned away from the elaborate formalised style, but he quickly realised that an absolutely plain style was not adequate for a preacher; zeal was as important as clarity.

In the main, his comments on style were conventional. In the Preface to Scepsis Scientifica he criticised his own writing in The Vanity of Dogmatizing as being immature, commenting

> "For I must confess that way of writing to be less agreeable to my present relish and Genius, which is more gratified with manly sense, flowing in a natural and unaffected Eloquence, then in the musick and curiosity of fine Metaphors and dancing periods."(89)

Earlier he had made the significant observation "there is nothing in words and styles but suitableness, that makes them acceptable and effective."(90) Here he was closer to Bacon than were many of his contemporaries, and, though it may be argued that in some of his earlier sermons he tended to ignore this belief, that it remained with him is shown by his development of a distinctive style of preaching later. He attacked ambiguity and the Schoolmen's misuse of words; mathematics alone is unarguable, because of its essential clarity. Another fault he attacked was undue reliance on authority, with its tendency to unnecessary quotation and citation. It is noteworthy that, by the time he wrote Against Confidence in Philosophy, he maintained that this use of "old and useless Luggage"(91) was dying out.

The preface to the Sermon on Catholick Charity continued the plea for plain words, and Glanvill defended himself against accusations of over-elaboration:

> "I intend no subtilties of Wit, or Tricks of various phancy, no Wire-drawn Interpretations, or nice Divisions, to ostentate quaintness, or pedantick Learning." (92)

Perhaps those who had read his earlier works did not believe Glanvill capable of a completely plain style.

Like many of his contemporaries, Glanvill praised Sprat's History, which was written with

> "so judicious a gravity, and so prudent and modest an expression, with so much clearness of Sense, and such a natural fluency of genuine Eloquence...the Style of that Book hath all the Properties that can recommend anything to an ingenious relish: For 'tis manly, and yet plain; natural, and yet not careless; The Epithets are genuine, the Words proper and familiar, The Periods smooth and of middle proportion: It is not broken with ends of Latin, nor impertinent Quotations; nor made harsh by hard words, or needless terms of Art: Not rendered intricate by long Parentheses, nor gaudy by flanting Metaphors; not tedious by wide fetches and circumference of Speech, nor dark by too much curtness of Expression: 'Tis not loose and unjointed, rugged and uneven; but as polite and as fast as Marble; and briefly, avoids all the notorious defects, and wants none of the proper Ornaments of Language." (93)

But it was in his comments on sermon style that he was most illuminating. In 1676, he described "The unseasonable contempt, which the Church, and its Ministers suffer, from prophane, & fanatick enemies", and blamed some of this contempt on a style of preaching which was by then out of fashion:

> "The affectations of words, and Metaphors, and Cadencies and ends of Greek, and Latin, are now the scorn of the

> judicious, and as much despis'd, and (almost) as generally as they deserve. They are banish'd from conversation, and are not endured in common matters." (94)

From this, it appears that sermon style rather followed than formed popular taste. Glanvill then specified the qualities which should be found in sermons: they should be serious, plain and natural in style, clear and distinct in method, practical and affectionate in matter. Already Glanvill was appealing for zeal and veneration, and, like the Cambridge Platonists, he emphasised the importance of godliness rather than doctrine.

In the same year, Glanvill published his volume of Essays, most of which were amended versions of works already written. But Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy is particularly interesting, not only because it was entirely new, but because it went so fully into the differences between the Nonconformists and the new Moderate Divines. Nonconformist preaching, Glanvill claimed, was influenced by the desire for popular approval:

> "Accordingly the most empty, and fantastical Preachers were generally the most popular: And those that dealt most in jingles, and chiming of words, in Metaphors, and vulgar similitudes, in Fantastick Phrases, and Fanciful Schemes of Speech, set off by pleasing smiles and melting Tones, by loudness and vehemency; These were sure to be the taking, precious men, though their discourses were never so trifling, and ridiculous." (95)

But the new divines were not worried about popular taste; they

declared against "the Gibberish of that Age" (96), purging religion "from senseless phrases, conceited mysteries, and unnecessary words of Art" (97), thereby helping to promote peace and understanding. The rules of preaching which they followed were those which Glanvill had already advocated - plainness, lack of affectation, practicalness, zealousness - but it is significant that under practically each head he contrasted their methods with the fantastic preaching of the Enthusiasts, and concluded by noting that the new divines desired to influence not only men's imaginations and senses,

> "but by the weight of their sense, and the reason of their perswasions, endeavouring by the understandings, to gain the affections; and so to work on the will, and resolutions."(98)

He commented further that at first this more substantial and serious style of preaching was not popular, but that it was gradually winning people back from the fantastic preachers.

Two years later, in the Essay on Preaching, he went even morefully into the question of sermon style. He acknowledged that different listeners held different tastes, and remarked that "true plain preaching" was unpopular, whilst people applauded "Triflers, and Ignorant Canters" (99). The aim of sermons was to instruct in faith and godliness, and to this end they should be plain, practical, methodical and affectionate. The essay is concerned with expanding these points, listing common faults in preaching, and laying down the techniques, not only of style, but of the form and

delivery of sermons. In the main, he followed the conventional attack on hard words, rhetorical devices, and so on, but he made some interesting comments. The essay contained a more direct attack on the Nonconformist style of preaching than that in Seasonable Reflections; he used such terms as Canters, fancy, and "phantastical phrases," which were generally connected with the Nonconformists; he laid down a careful scheme for sermons, such as Nonconformists rarely followed: and he attacked

> "mysterious, notional preaching [which] hath put many conceited people upon medling with what they can never well understand, and so hath fill'd them with air, and vanity, and made them proud, phantastical, and troublesome; disobedient to their Governours, and contemptuous to their betters." (100)

But even so Glanvill realised that the polite style of much Anglican preaching was inadequate; coldness suggested lack of conviction; "Religion is zeal" (101). This dissatisfaction with much contemporary preaching was echoed in his attacks on

> "a bastard kind of eloquence which is crept into the Pulpit, which consists in affectations of wit and finery, flourishes, metaphors, and cadencies." (102)

The Essay is interesting in showing that Glanvill had moderated his first enthusiasm for absolute plainness; as the Anglican Church was the Middle Way between two extremes of Christianity, so should its preaching be between two extremes of style; the style should be suited to the listeners, but not so much as to descend into senseless phrases; plainness should not be allowed to degenerate into bluntness; there

should be neither too much nor too little wit, but what there was should be "proper, grave, and manly" (103). The Seasonable Defence of Preaching, which was published with the Essay, repeated the same themes, but attacked the Nonconformists even more violently. The early Puritan preachers had been popular because of their novelty:

> "it was all light and mystery, and Spirituality that they taught, set out by new conceits and new phrases, by great earnestness and fervours of mighty zeal, which things especially when they are new, fill the imagination, and by that work exceedingly upon the affections of the vulgar" (104).

But as time went on, they brought both preaching and religion into ill-repute. In contrast to the plainness which Glanvill advocated for the sake of clarity, the Nonconformists

> "generally state their doctrines confusedly, in words metaphorical and ambiguous; and direct to practice mystically, and obscurely in phrases and odd schemes of speech." (105)

They debased religion by "familiar Preaching" (106). They only temporarily moved

> "the affections of the senseless inconsidering vulgar, which are mightily transported by blistering and noise, as the waters are by a Storm, when as soon as the violence is over, they are still as before." (107)

They distorted doctrine, and attacked sin only in general terms. To remedy the evil effects of Nonconformism, Glanvill advocated plain preaching, by which he meant unstrained, unaffected, manly and solid sermons.

Three years later, his ideas on sermon style were still practically unaltered. Again he attacked the Enthusiasts'

preaching, and there was a note of personal bitterness in his words:

> "those people have been so long used to gibberish and canting, that they cannot understand plain sense; and vertue is become such a stranger to their ears, that when they hear it spoken of in a Pulpit, they count the Preacher a broacher of new divinity; and one that would teach the way to heaven by Philosophy: And he escapes well, if they do not say, that he is an Atheist, or that he would reconcile us to Gentilism, and Heathen Worship." (108)

In the Sermon on The Churches Prayer, and Complaint, Glanvill once more laid down the rules for good preaching, though he qualified them by saying that they were for the younger clergy not for the older, wiser men. They followed closely, if in an abbreviated form, rules which he had already laid down in earlier works.

It is interesting to observe that, by the time Glanvill came to write The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant, he had changed his target, and was attacking the formalised rhetoric of much Anglican preaching:

> "The preaching of too many is Declamatory, they deliver not Theological Sermons, not such as are apt to instruct or edifie, but seem to design the gratifying vain Phancies, and the pleasing of wanton Hearers: They aim at Wit, and fine Sayings to gain applause among the injudicious by silly Affectations, and when they are commended they have their end, and the work is done: They move no devout Affections, seem not to design it: Their Sermons are lifeless, dull Harangues, full of studied Vanity, without Piety, or as much as good Sense." (109)

The wheel had come full circle. The Anglican clergy had rejected all that was good along with all that was bad in

Nonconformist preaching; the desire for moderation, for rationalism, had led them to forget that men's imaginations and wills must be persuaded, as well as their intellects. Bacon had acknowledged the use of rhetoric, Ferguson had pleaded for its return; and now Glanvill realised the dangers inherent in the plain style of preaching. It had become formalised and lifeless, whilst the clergy themselves appeared cold and indifferent. No wonder Glanvill advocated "sober, active zeal" (110), and the need for affection in preaching. Cope ascribes this rehabilitation of rhetoric and the imagination to the defeat of the Enthusiasts, with the consequent danger of a swing towards over-rational preaching.

Glanvill's own stylistic development is remarkably interesting, and corresponds in the main with the various phases of his own life. Cope devotes a whole chapter in his work to this development, arguing that

> "Glanvill's theory of communication and his practice of the art, like his interest in scientific studies of nature, of his interest in scepticism, grow out of his attempt to apply this psychology in the interests of the Anglican Church." (111)

He perhaps over-emphasises this religious influence on Glanvill, overlooking such factors as Glanvill's increasing maturity, his susceptibility to changes in contemporary taste, and his friendship with some of the leading scientists of his day. The Vanity of Dogmatizing was written

when he was still comparatively unknown, but by the time he came to republish it as Scepsis Scientifica, he was anxious to make a name for himself among the new scientists, and so, though he made few changes in the text, he did apologise in the Preface for its immature style. The earlier work contained more classical, abstract, and unusual terms than Scepsis Scientifica, but both abounded in vivid passages, rhythmic phrases, flashes of real beauty. He made full use of many rhetorical devices; among them may be observed the use of parallels:

> "the shortness of our intellectual sight, the deceptibility and imposition of our senses, the tumultuary disorders of our passions, the prejudices of our infant education" (112),

and the use of unusual imagery and rhetorical questions:

> "How should a thought be united to a marble-statue, or a sun-beam to a lump of clay?...And to hang weights on the wings of the winde seems far more intelligible." (113)

There are numerous classical allusions, lengthy and involved sentences, transpositions of words. The imagery was on the whole drawn from conventional sources - geography, science, astronomy. Some passages recall the technique of the Metaphysical School. Strangely enough, one passage appears to foreshadow Fitzgerald's Omar Khayyam: "For we came into the world, and we know not how; we live in't in a self-nescience, and go hence again and are as ignorant of our recess." (114) On almost every page it is possible to find

a single phrase or a sustained passage of striking beauty. It is interesting that some of the poetic passages were preserved even in the final form of the work, and that, though Glanvill adopted the convention of plain prose, he quite obviously enjoyed the opportunity to revert to a more embroidered style at the beginning of Essay VII.

Even the works which Glanvill produced during the period of his greatest enthusiasm for the plain style did not conform strictly to its conventions. Some, such as the papers printed in the Philosophical Transactions, were purely factual, and allowed little latitude of style. His other philosophical works tended to be more formally set out, and were more concise than hitherto; there was less use of quotation, of obscure or classical allusions, of unusual words. But there were still signs, both in his philosophical and his religious writings, that he enjoyed using vivid imagery and some rhetorical devices. Lux Orientalis, despite its greater simplicity, has several striking phrases, occasionally conventional, but frequently apt and illuminating: "There is no straitness in the Deity, no bounds to the ocean of Love." (115) Plus Ultra, as befitted a defence of the new science, was written simply but strongly. Saducismus Triumphatus, on the other hand, again contained vivid imagery, and showed a tendency to return to rhetoric:

> "But, alas! our Age and Experience hath ended the Dispute, and we need not search the dark and barbarous

> corners of America, nor seek the Monster among the wild Men of the Desert, we have found him in times of Light, in a witty and civiliz'd Region, and in an Age of the greatest Knowledge and Improvements: He skulks not among the thickest of the Woods, nor seeks Caverns for concealment, but braves the sun, and appears in the clearest Day." (116)

The Essays, even though they were, in the main, abbreviated versions of earlier works, still retained some striking imagery.

Glanvill's sermons abound in vivid descriptive passages: God should be seen and loved

> "As well in the Paint upon the Butter-flies wing, as in the glorious uniform lustre of the Sun; as well in the composure of the little Ant, as in the vast Bodies of the Whale, or Elephant; in the least Herb under our feet, as well as in the Stupendous Fabrick of the Heavens over us." (117)

The Moral Evidence of a Life to Come described the miseries of our present state:

> "Like men in a Fever, we toss from side to side, and find rest no where but in the Grave...The best of our condition is, that we can die, and mingle with insensible rottenness and corruption. The Grave is the best bed we find till we turn to ashes; and the silent darkness of the house of worms and bones, is better than the light of the Sun, and comfort of the Elements." (118)

The Serious Consideration of the Future Judgement, also reprinted in Glanvill's Seasonable Reflections, contains several powerful but sombre passages, reminiscent of much Nonconformist preaching.

It would be possible to continue quoting from Glanvill's works at great length, but some conclusions may perhaps be

drawn from the few examples already given. Glanvill did indeed pay tribute to the strengthening desire for a simple colloquial prose, and on the whole his later works were written more simply and briefly, and in a more natural and flowing style, than the formalised and rhetorical periods of The Vanity of Dogmatizing. But whenever he was strongly moved, Glanvill tended to revert to a more ornate style; in his philosophical works the imagery was generally drawn from science, and in the main was not over-elaborate. In his sermons, however, Glanvill allowed himself greater latitude, both in complexity and length of imagery. It would be interesting, but outside the scope of this thesis, to study the ideas which did move Glanvill to these almost poetic passages. Another significant point is the way in which his imagery changed; in his earlier works much of it was scintillatingly beautiful, filled with light and colour, but in his later writings, though equally vivid, it was frequently sombre, if not actually ugly, and was symptomatic of his later disillusion and depression. It is strange that Glanvill, who was in so many ways representative of his age, should have retained his individuality so strongly in his prose style. Though he paid lip-service to the new taste, and though he did his best to conform, he remained a "florid" writer to the end of his life. And it is ironic that, though he blamed much of the deterioration of preaching onto the Nonconformists

in the end he was forced to accept some of their techniques.

CHAPTER IV - REFERENCES.

1. Johnson, F.R. — Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England. Baltimore, 1937.

2. Howell, W.S. — Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700. New York, 1961.

3. Croll, M.W. — "Muret and the History of "Attic" Prose." P.M.L.A., 39(1924), pp.254-309.

4. Wallace, K.R. — Francis Bacon on Communication & Rhetoric. University of North Carolina, 1943.

5. Greenslet, F. — Joseph Glanvill.

6. Arderne, J. — Directions Concerning the Matter and Stile of Sermons; ed.J.Mackay.

7. Jones, R.F. — Ancients and Moderns; 2nd ed.P.19.

8. English Prose; ed. H. Craik. London, 1894. Vol.III.

9. Jones, R.F. — Science and Language in England of the Mid-seventeenth Century. (In Jones, R.F. - The Seventeenth Century.)

10. Idem, p.157.

11. Fisch, H. and Jones, H.W. — "Bacon's Influence on Sprat's History of the Royal Society." M.L.Q., 12(1951), pp.399-406.

12. Jones, R.F. — "Science and English Prose Style... P.M.L.A., 45(1930), p.1007.

13. Birch, T. — History of the Royal Society of London. Vol.I, p.499.

14. Sprat, T. — History of the Royal-Society of London; 2nd ed. P.42.

15. Idem, p.113.

16. Emerson, O.F. — "John Dryden and a British Academy." P.B.A., 10(1921-3), pp.45-58.

Chapter IV - References, cont.

Emerson, O.F. "Dryden and the English Academy." M.L.R., 20(1925), pp.189-90.

17. Williamson, G. The Senecan Amble. Ch.9.

18. Cope, J.I. "Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist." P.M.L.A., 69(1954), pp.223-50.

19. Christensen, F. "John Wilkins and the Royal Society's Reform of Prose Style." M.L.Q., 7(1946), pp.179-87, 279-90.

20. Bush, D. English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 1600-1660. Oxford, 1945, Ch.9.

21. Baker, H. The Wars of Truth. Ch.4.

22. Jones, R.F. "The Attack on Pulpit Eloquence in the Restoration." J.E.G.P., 30(1931), p.198.

23. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series...1661-1662. P.517.

24. De Mott, B. "Comenius and the Real Character in England." P.M.L.A., 70(1955), pp.1068-81.

25. Emery, C. "John Wilkins' Universal Language." Isis, 38(1947-8), pp.174-85.

26. Wallace, K.R. Op.cit.

27. Burnet, G. Life of William Bedell.

28. Hartlib, S. A Common Writing...London, 1647.

29. Comenius, J.A. The Way of Light; transl. E.T. Campagnac. P.8.

30. Dalgarno, G. Works. Glasgow, 1834. Preface, p.xi, foot-note. (Maitland Club. Vol.29 (1834).)

31. Idem, p.113.

32. Wilkins, J. An Essay towards a Real Character. London, 1668.

Chapter IV - References, cont.

33. Plot, R. — The Natural History of Oxfordshire. London, 1705. Pp.286-90.

34. Hooke, R. — A Description of Helioscopes. London, 1676. Pp.30-1. (In Lectiones Cutlerianae. London, 1679.)

35. Emery, C. — "John Wilkins and Noah's Ark." M.L.Q., 9(1948), pp.286-91.

36. Bethell, S.L. — The Cultural Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. London, 1951. Ch.4.

37. Jones, R.F. — "The Attack on Pulpit Eloquence in the Restoration." J.E.G.P., 30(1931) pp.188-217.

38. Hutton, W.H. — "Divines of the Church of England." Cambridge History of English Literature. Cambridge, 1907-27. Vol.VIII, ch.xii.

39. Tulloch, J. — Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy; 2nd ed. Vol.II. ch.7.

40. Baker, H. — Op.cit., ch.4.

41. Williamson, G. — Op.cit., ch.9.

42. Mitchell, W.F. — English Pulpit Oratory.

43. Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century; ed. J.E. Spingarn. Oxford, 1908. Vol.I, Introduction, section 4.

44. Cope, J.I. — "Seventeenth Century Quaker Style." P.M.L.A., 71(1956), pp.725-54.

45. Wright, L.M. — The Literary Life of the Early Friends. 1650-1725. New York, 1932.

46. Mitchell, W.F. — Op.cit., p.396.

47. Williamson, G. — "The Restoration Revolt against Enthusiasm." S.P., 30(1933), pp.571-603.

48. Hamilton, K.G. — The Two Harmonies. Oxford, 1963. P.115.

Chapter IV - References, cont.

49. Wilson, F.P. — Seventeenth Century Prose. Cambridge, 1960. Ch.1. (Ewing Lectures.)

50. Cassirer, E. — The Platonic Renaissance in England; transl. J.P. Pettegrove. Edinburgh, 1953. Pp.173-4.

51. Glanvill, J. — Scepsis Scientifica. P.67.

52. Gascoigne, G. — Certayne Notes of Instruction. (In Elizabethan Critical Essays; ed. G.G. Smith. Oxford, 1904. Vol.I, pp.52-6.)

53. Gosson, S. — The School of Abuse. London, 1841. P.30.

54. Andrewes, L. — 96 Sermons; 2nd ed. P.A3.

55. Wallace, K.R. — Op.cit.

56. Milton, J. — Tractate of Education; ed. E.E. Morris. P.18.

57. Burnet, G. — Op.cit., pp.220-1.

58. Howell, J. — Epistolae Ho-elianae; the Familiar Letters; ed. J. Jacobs. London, 189[illegible] P.427.

59. Feltham, O. — Resolves. (In The Oxford Book of English Prose; ed. Sir A. Quiller-Couch. Oxford, 1925. P.209.)

60. South, R. — Sermon on Ascension Day. (In Specimens of English Prose Style; sel. G. Saintsbury. London, 1885. P.115.

61. How, S. — The Sufficiencie of the Spirits Teaching Without Humane Learning. London, 1644.

62. Powicke, F.J. — Life of...Richard Baxter. London, 1924. Pp.282, 283.

63. Eachard, J. — The Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy. (In An English Garner. Westminster, 1903.)

Chapter IV - References, cont.

64. Fowler, E. — The Principles and Practices of Certain Moderate Divines of the Church of England. P.104.

65. Cowley, A. — Works; ed. T. Sprat. London, 1669. Preface (b).

66. Cowley, A. — To the Royal Society. Stanza 9. (In Cowley, A. - Op.cit.)

67. Lloyd, W. — A Sermon Preach'd at the Funeral of John Wilkins. London, 1723. P.24.

68. Mulgrave, Earl of — An Essay on Poetry. (In Roscomon, Earl of - Poems. P.303.)

69. Evelyn, J. — Diary and Correspondence; ed.W.Bray Vol.III, pp.159-62.

70. Fairfax, N. — A Treatise on the Bulk and Selvedge of the World. (In Two Seventeenth Century Prefaces; ed. A.K. Croston. Pp.37,39.)

71. Dryden, J. — Defence of the Epilogue. (In English Prose; ed. H. Craik. London, 1894. Vol.III, p.155.)

72. Evelyn, J. — Publick Employment and an Active Life. London, 1667. To the Reader.

73. Crusius, T.T. — The Origine of Atheism in the Popish and Protestant Churches. P.23.

74. Locke, J. — Thoughts on Education. (In English Prose; ed. H. Craik. Vol.III,p.195.)

75. Phillips, E. — The New World of Words. London,1671 Preface, p.1.

76. Arderne, J. — Op.cit., p.18.

77. Blount, Sir T.P. — De Re Poetica. London, 1694.P.28.

78. Sprat, T. — Op.cit., p.113.

79. Idem, p.413.

Chapter IV - References, cont.

80. Idem, pp.111-2.

81. More, H. An Answer to a Letter of a Learned Psychopyrist. (In Glanvill, J.- Sadducismus Triumphatus. P.149.)

82. Miller, P. The New England Mind; the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge, Mass., 1954. P.285.

83. Wotton, W. Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning. P.394.

84. Stubbe, H. A Reply (In Stubbe, H. - The Lord Bacon's Relation of the Sweating-sickness. P.23.)

85. Ferguson, R. The Interest of Reason in Religion. P.296.

86. Idem, p.297.

87. Wilson, F.P. Op.cit., p.110.

88. Popkin, R.H. "The Development of the Philosophical Reputation of Joseph Glanvill. J.H.I., 15(1954),pp.305-11.

89. Glanvill, J. Scepsis Scientifica. To the Royal Society, p.27.

90. Idem, To the Royal Society, p.8.

91. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay I, p.27.

92. - Catholick Charity Recommended. To the Reader, p.2.

93. - Essays. Essay III, pp.34-5.

94. - Seasonable Reflections.P.102.

95. - Essays. Essay VII, p.42.

96. Idem, Essay VII, p.32.

97. Idem, Essay VII, p.31.

Chapter IV - References, cont.

98. Idem, Essay VII, p.45.

99. Glanvill, J. An Essay Concerning Preaching.P.91.

100. Idem, pp.19-20.

101. Idem, p.54.

102. Idem, p.23.

103. Idem, p.72.

104. Glanvill, J. A Seasonable Defence of Preaching. P.20.

105. Idem, p.41.

106. Idem, p.42.

107. Idem, p.76.

108. Glanvill, J. Some Discourses. Pp.74-5.

109. - The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant. Pp.39-40.

110. Idem, p.37.

111. Cope, J.I. Joseph Glanvill. P.146.

112. Glanvill, J. Scepsis Scientifica. P.6.

113. Idem, pp.15-6.

114. Idem, p.9.

115. Glanvill, J. Lux Orientalis. (In Glanvill, J.- Two Choice and Useful Treatises. P.51.)

116. - Sadducismus Triumphatus. P.455.

117. - Catholick Charity Recommended. P.21.

118. - Seasonable Reflections. Pp.121-2.

CHAPTER V - PHILOSOPHIA PIA.

As with so much seventeenth century thought, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate completely the various layers or facets of Glanvill's ideas. His attitude to the new science was inextricably bound up with his concept of God, of man, and of nature. Knowledge, virtue, beauty were all so closely related as to be practically synonymous in some contexts. God was a God of love and goodness, reflected in the beauty of His creation, the universe; true knowledge therefore helped man both to understand a little of Him, and to worship Him. The orderliness of nature supported the belief in a benign, rather than an arbitrary, God, whilst it also provided a welcome escape from the controversies and emotionalism of contemporary England. To Glanvill, a clockwork universe was not proof of mechanism, but of a God subject to the laws of reason, whose perfection was not marred by arbitrariness. Because creation was governed by these laws, there was always the hope that man, through science, could learn to understand them, and, through them, could reach true knowledge, both intellectual and spiritual. Like the Cambridge Platonists, Glanvill believed that virtue was essential to knowledge, as knowledge was to virtue.

In the development of his ideas, it is interesting to trace the influence of Nonconformist doctrine. In some places it was in direct opposition to Glanvill's beliefs, and he was

at pains to emphasise his disagreement. Elsewhere, particularly in the field of science, he adapted or developed some of the Puritan attitudes, but, like others of his period, he forbore to acknowledge his debt. And occasionally he avoided topics which might have proved embarrassing through their association with Puritan thought.

Pure and infinite benignity.

Baker sums up the Renaissance attitude to knowledge as

> "the conviction that an essentially rational God, who created and sustains the universe for His own benevolent ends, is the legitimate object of man's supreme knowledge, and that this knowledge, attained through the discourse of reason and confirmed by revelation, constitutes his ultimate well-being." (1)

This belief in a rational God permeated Hooker's Ecclesiasticall Politie (2); the idea that God is subject to His own immutable laws was referred to by Sir John Davies, who wrote, in Nosce Teipsum, of God's

> "own eternal Law,
> The settled order of the World..." (3)

But the Puritans replaced this rational, loving God with a God of fear and arbitrary power. The sermons of the mid-century were full of ugly or fearful imagery. Baylie wrote of the damned:

> "As ravenous beasts and theeves after their roving up and downe in the darknesse of the night at their pleasure, when the morning light doth arise, they take them to their dens and caves wherein oft they are hunted to their death" (4);

Cheynell compared the politicians to a "crackt-braine Serpent"(5)

(6)

Gillespie spoke of Priests and Jesuits as "vipers" (6). Descriptions of the Day of Judgement and of the fires of Hell were vivid and terrifying. God Himself was severe and unforgiving; His decisions were arbitrary, and man was deprived of free will, and of the power of redemption, for only the elect would be saved.

The Anglican writers of the later Seventeenth Century attacked this concept of God on two counts, firstly by stressing His essential goodness and love, and secondly by arguing that He, too, was bound by immutable laws, and could not act arbitrarily. Cope (7) notes the Restoration paradox: in order that men might believe in an orderly universe and an immutable God, they had to restrict God's direct intervention in His creation as far as possible, and so were forced to push Him outside the universe. Hallywell's Deus Justificatus emphasised the goodness of God, and attacked predestination both because of this goodness, and on the grounds of rationality:

> "Our Religion being in all the parts of it highly rational, it will appear from the nature of the thing it self, that there can be no such absolute Decree of Reprobation as some pretend." (8)

Rust's Letter of Resolution (9) based much of its arguments in support of the theory of the pre-existence of souls on the goodness and lack of arbitrariness of God. Lukin (10), whilst he promoted religion from a somewhat utilitarian angle, claimed that men should love as well as fear God. Even Polhill, though he attacked the use of reason in religion, wrote of the

goodness of God:

> "Indeed Heaven and Earth too should ring with the praises of it, and Eternity it self will be short enough to behold and admire it in." (11)

The Cambridge Platonists were particularly anxious to stress the loving kindness of God. Tulloch (12) refers to Smith's belief that a false conception of God led either to fear and superstition, or to defiance and atheism. Cudworth, preaching in 1647, spoke most eloquently of God's goodness and mercy:

> "it is the sweetest Flower in all the Garland of his Attributes, it is the richest Diamond in his Crown of Glory, that he is Mighty to save." (13)

As this sermon was delivered before a Puritan House of Commons, it betokened not only the strength of Cudworth's convictions, but also his moral and intellectual courage. Carré (14) comments on Cudworth's belief in a loving God, and his avoidance of the conception of a God who actually created and controlled the minutiae of the universe, by his use of the theory of a plastic nature or mundane soul. Fowler wrote of the Cambridge Platonists' preaching that through no other

> "had I ever so lovely an Idaea of the divine nature, which is the most powerful incentive to obedience to the divine will, nor so clear a sense of the excellency of the Christian Religion, the Reasonableness of its Precepts, the nobleness and generosity of its designe, and its admirable fitness for the accomplishment of it." (15)

Glanvill's Anti-fanatical Religion and Free Philosophy (16) emphasised the desire of the New Divines to prove the love and goodness of God.

To the Cambridge Platonists, for God "to act arbitrarily

is Imperfection and Impotence" (17), and this was a point stressed by the scientists of the time in defence of the new philosophy. Sprat (18) spoke of God's fixed laws, in order to defend scientists against charges of disproving miracles. Wilkins, in his Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, argued that God was omnipotent in that He could do anything which was not contradictory to the fixed laws of nature or His own perfection. Preacher after preacher emphasised the importance of good living as well as faith, repentance rather than spiritual pride, for predestination with the consequent aggrandisement of the Elect was completely alien to this concept of a rational, law-observing God.

Glanvill's earlier works, too, were permeated with this belief in a God of "pure and infinite benignity." (19) The whole of his arguments in Lux Orientalis in support of pre-existence were based on the belief that the Christian God was a God of love, that He had created the universe according to fixed laws, that every creature had its own proper place and quality, and that, all in all, everything was for the best in this best of all possible worlds. The Discourses, too, referred to Glanvill's belief that God was essentially good:

> "The Soul naturally loves Beauty and Perfection; and all mankind apprehend God, to be of all Beings, the most beautiful and perfect; and therefore must needs have an intellectual love for him." (20)

Here again may be seen the unification of the soul and the intellect. The laws which God imposes upon men are not

irrational, burdensome laws, but laws

> "which eternal Reason obligeth us to, and which of our selves we should choose to live under, were we freed from the intanglements of the World, and interests of Flesh." (21)

But it was in the sermon on The Various Methods of Satan's Policy Detected that Glanvill made his bitterest attack on the Nonconformist conception of God. It is a device of Satan to claim that God is arbitrary, tyrannical and cruel. The idea of Free Grace is a slur on God's righteousness. The belief that God works through the imagination is fostered by the devil.

Here and there, however, there was a note of disillusionment. Against Modern Sadducism claimed that

> "there is nothing can render the thoughts of this odd Life tolerable, but the expectation of another." (22)

The Sermon on the Serious Consideration of the Future Judgment argued that in this world God seemed to support the wicked:

> "The affairs of Providence are full of Mystery and Meanders, as dark as the midnights of December, and as crooked as the paths of the Desart." (23)

The Day of Judgement was essential to prove the justice of God. Though this sermon approached close to Nonconformist preaching in its style and its evocation of terror, yet Glanvill still clung to his belief that God was by nature just and impartial. The world would be judged by rule, and not by arbitrary power. It would be judged impartially, for

> "He that beggs in Raggs, and weeps in the Corners of the Streets, shall be heard as soon as the proud Gallant

that lives in Luxury, and Pomp." (24)
It would be judged universally. Though he had lost his youthful confidence in human justice, yet he held even more strongly to the belief that somewhere, sometime, a divine justice would be meted out, and that it would depend neither on worldly standards nor arbitrary election, but on true merit. All could strive, though all could not enter into the delights of the after-life.

It may be argued that it is difficult to fit a belief in witchcraft into this pattern of an essentially good and loving Creator. Both the Cambridge Platonists and Glanvill himself feared superstition almost as much as they feared atheism. One of the main virtues of reason was that it would destroy superstition, and yet to modern minds More's and Glanvill's belief in witchcraft was as superstitious as anything they condemned. But, as Craig (25) points out, we must allow for the climate and beliefs of the age. Despite the impact of the new science, many thinkers of the Seventeenth Century had still not lost the inherited beliefs of the Elizabethans; the earlier dualism had still not completely succumbed to the materialism of Hobbes. More and Glanvill were by no means alone in their belief in witchcraft; Boyle and Sprat were only two of the many others who subscribed to it.

The grounds for this belief were varied. For Glanvill, it was definitely linked with his form of scepticism; because

there was no proof of the existence of spirits, there was no reason to claim their non-existence. But for many theologians, belief in witchcraft was more important as a defence against atheism: the existence of witches proved the existence of evil spirits "which will necessarily open a Door to the Belief that there are good ones; and, lastly, that there is a God." (26) It was an argument which appeared frequently; Glanvill himself made use of it, as well as Hallywell (27) and Bonhome (28). Like Glanvill, Burthogge (29) tried to prove the existence of witchcraft scientifically, whilst More claimed that well-attested stories of witchcraft would help both religion and science. It is interesting to note the difference in attitude between More and Glanvill which appeared in Sadducismus Triumphatus: More approached the problem from the viewpoint of a mystic; because there were spirits, there must be witches, and those who did not believe in them were "polluted with the impure Dregs of Imagination," and "unable to abstract Metaphysical Extension from Corporeal Affections."(30). Glanvill, on the other hand, used witchcraft to prove immortality, and to combat the new materialism. Sadduceeism was a Satanic temptation to separate men from God, and to encourage the growth of atheism. As Cope points out, Glanvill tried to restrict God's immediate interference in the universe to a minimum.

> "Therefore, he could hardly depend upon divine miracles to sensibly illustrate the existence of a spiritual world unaccounted for in Hobbes's universe. This means that

> the only sensible evidence of the spiritual world must come from the interference of the diabolical in the affairs of mankind." (31)

Even as late as 1789, Sinclair's Satan's Invisible World Discovered was still being reprinted, so that apparently neither the new science nor the attacks of such writers as Ady (32), Webster (33) and Hutchinson (34) completely destroyed this strong and widespread superstition.

This Meddal of God.

Reference has already been made to the general belief that man had degenerated since the Fall, and also to the long-lived controversy as to the merits of the Ancients and the Moderns. This tendency towards pessimism was emphasised by the Jacobean awareness of the transcience of human life, and the frailty of man. Awareness of the immensity of the universe could have either a humiliating or an ennobling effect on the position of man, depending upon whether one saw him as sinking beneath the weight, or responding triumphantly to the feeling of infinity. But the Puritan conception of man was definitely derogatory. Baker (35) traces closely the effect which the Puritan belief in an arbitrary God, and the denial of free will had upon this concept. Man was nothing without God, and it mattered little whether he strove to improve himself or not; only the Elect would be saved, and human faculties were too weak to achieve any real progress. The human reason was faulty and was useless in religion. The only thing which man could

hope to do through science was to harness the power of nature, and to ameliorate his own position on earth; it was here that they followed the Baconian tradition of knowledge giving power. It was because of this that they emphasised the importance of technology and of the improvement of education, and unfortunately, during the latter part of the century, Puritanism became so unpopular that attempts to improve education were delayed for decades, because of their association with Puritanism.

But also during the latter part of the century a new note of optimism appeared. Milton was a devout Puritan, yet his works were permeated with a sense of the immense potential of man. Bunyan, for the Quakers, gave a vivid picture of the Christian succeeding through his own efforts, though aided by divine intervention. Some writers, such as Petty (36) and Houghton (37) based their optimism on the material wealth and progress of the country. Hallywell (38) believed in the possibility of regeneration, and Bates (39), whilst he stressed the imperfection of human reason, argued that man could recover with divine help. The writings of the Cambridge Platonists were full of references to the nobility of man. Copleston (40) refers to their hostility to the Puritan denigration of man. Ferguson, though he defended the Nonconformist attitude to reason, and claimed that

> "Now, the mind is not only weakned and rendred groveling by the loss of its primitive Sanctity and Rectitude, but is infected with Lusts, biassed by Passions, brib'd by

> the sensual Appetites, clogg'd and hindred by the distemperature of indisposed Organs" (41),

yet acknowledged that, with the help of grace, reason and philosophy could be of service to religion. Sprat's History of the Royal-Society, whilst it was careful to differentiate between human and divine knowledge, was illuminated with an optimistic belief in the capacity of man. Gradually this swing towards optimism gained momentum; the rise of Deism, the belief in the laws of nature, and many other factors culminated during the Eighteenth Century in the doctrine of the Noble Savage; man once more had regained his supremacy, albeit in another form.

Once more Glanvill followed convention to some extent, but again he added his own qualifications. Before the Fall, men indeed were a "Copy of the Divinity, this Meddal of God" (42), but

> "whereas our ennobled understandings could once take the wings of the morning, to visit the world above us...they now lye grovelling in this lower region, muffled up in mists and darkness." (43)

The same argument appeared in Lux Orientalis: if Adam had not fallen,

> "our apprehensions should have been more large and free, our affections more regular and governable; and our inclinations to what is good and vertuous, strong and vigorous." (44)

But throughout his works there is the belief that man can rehabilitate himself, though it must be through his own efforts and not through the arbitrary decision of God, "For vertue is a kind of victory, and supposeth a conflict." (45). He

stressed, too, that freedom of choice was an essential attribute of man, and that supreme happiness should be a reward of virtue and endeavour, rather than a gift of God. Here was his link between goodness and knowledge; uneducated man was a slave to his passions. Man's soul had a natural propensity to perfection, but this perfection was only achieved by subordinating passions, senses and imagination to minds enlightened and directed by divine and rational laws. And it was here that the Enthusiasts, with their "animal love to Religion" (46), failed. By denying the rightful place of reason in religion, they cleared the way for excesses of every kind; a religion built upon imagination was as unstable as knowledge grounded upon opinions and dogmatism.

There were two aspects to Glanvill's concept of man. At times his attacks on the vulgar mass appeared to contradict his optimistic view of man's capacity. But again it was the uneducated mob which he decried. He spoke of "half-witted censurers" (47), he accused them of "insolent Meanness of Spirit" (48), and he claimed

> "if we cast our Eyes upon Man as really he is, sunk into Flesh, and present Sense, darkned in his Mind, and governed by his Imagination; blinded by his Passions, and besotted by Sin and Folly, hardned by evil customs, and hurried away by the Torrent of his Inclinations and Desires...Humane Nature is incredibly degenerate; and the vileness and stupidity of Men is really so great, that things are customary and common, which one could not think possible, if he did not hourly see them." (49)

It was this type of person that Enthusiasm, like witchcraft,

both pandered to and influenced; the Nonconformists could move

> "the affections of the senseless inconsidering vulgar, which are mightily transported by blustering and noise as the waters are by a Storm, when as soon as the violence is over, they are still as before." (50)

Again and again he linked their instability with the imagination, which was the chief weapon of the Enthusiasts. To him, uneducated reason was based on the imagination:

> "the reason of the far greatest part of mankind, is but an aggregate of mistaken phantasms; and in things not sensible, a constant delusion." (51)

Against Modern Sadducism (52) accused the general mass of people of being unable to use their reason. And, as has already been noted, in his later works there was a note of general disillusionment and pessimism in connection with the justice of this world.

But for the educated, Glanvill foresaw a wonderful future. In The Apology for Philosophy, published with The Vanity of Dogmatizing, he acknowledged that man could never reach complete knowledge or perfection in this life, whilst Scepsis Scientifica listed both the weaknesses of man's knowledge, and the causes of these weaknesses. Nevertheless, there was ground for hope. In his terrestial state, as described in Lux Orientalis, man preserved some of the spiritual powers which he had possessed before the Fall; some men were still strong enough to subdue bodily passions and regain this perfect state. There were two groups who could help man in this struggle to perfect himself: the new scientists and the New Divines. In his address to the Royal Society, Glanvill wrote

> "how providentially you are met together in Dayes, wherein people of weak Heads on the one hand, and vile affections on the other, have made an unnatural divorce between being Wise and Good." (53)

The New Divines, as portrayed in Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy (54), stressed the need for goodness as well as wisdom, and argued that every man had the chance of achieving grace, through the light of reason, the law written in his heart, the common aids of the spirit, and (in the case of Christians) the Gospels. The new science will be studied more closely in a later section of this chapter, but it may be noted here that Glanvill contrasted the attitude of both the new scientists and the New Divines with that of the Enthusiasts, who declaimed against the new science, "villified Reason as Carnal, and Incompetent, and an Enemy to the things of the Spirit" (55), and decried morality. The whole of this essay was a sustained attack on the narrowness and arrogance of the Enthusiasts, and a laudatory recital of the virtues of the New Divines, who gave man hope and dignity. Again, the contrasts between the two groups will be studied in more detail later in this thesis. More's Annotations upon the Discourse of Truth summed up the position of the New Divines:

> "If it [the eye of the understanding] be shut through Pride, Prejudice, or Sensuality, the mysteries of Philosophy are thereby vailed from it; but if by true vertue and unfeigned Sanctity of mind that eye be opened, the Mysteries of Philosophy are the more clearly discovered to it." (56)

Thus to some extent Glanvill's theories placed him in an extremely difficult position. On the one hand was his belief

that "The Heart of man is as deep waters, hath a smooth surface, but is full of rocks and quicksands at the bottom," whose hidden thoughts "make up a dark Region cover'd with fear and shame, and the shadows of death" (57). This was the world where

> "the injurious are Courted by smiling successes, and born to the stars by flatteries and applauses. They lay down their heads upon peaceful pillows, and take farewell of the world in solemn and pompous obsequies." (58)

But this disillusionment with, even dislike of, his fellow-men had to be reconciled with his belief in an essentially loving God. Hence his stress on justice after death, and his denial of the Enthusiasts' doctrine of Free Grace, Predestination, and Justification by Faith. If there was hope for man, it must be striven for, and on every level, spiritual, mental and physical. It was here that the Cambridge Platonists, by their stress on the integration of man, their belief in virtue and wisdom, their condemnation of arrogant dogmatism, and above all, their optimistic emphasis on the essential goodness of the human race, helped him to solve his problem. Though the downfall of Enthusiasm had not made England a second Eden, yet there was hope in the future, both in this world and in the world to come.

<u>This elegant and orderly Fabrick...</u>

In view of the amount of interest which the subject has aroused, it would be useless, if not impossible, either to

trace the shifting attitude to nature in the period immediately prior to that with which this thesis is concerned, or to attempt to list fully the critics who have studied this changing attitude. But it is perhaps possible to summarise it briefly. Although again there have been conflicting opinions, it is generally accepted that nature in the Middle Ages was strictly subordinate both to God and to man, and knowledge of nature was to be used only for the glorification of God or the salvation of man. Willey (59) quotes Faustus as an example of the belief that natural science was forbidden knowledge. It was not until the Renaissance that nature was emancipated from theology, and even then it was still looked upon as a background for all-important man. Elizabethan parallelism was bound up with the belief that man was the microcosm, the universe the macrocosm, and that man was still the central figure of creation. Baker's interesting work (60) traces the development from this concept of nature to the later seventeenth century belief in a dehumanised machine, as expounded by such thinkers as Hobbes and Locke. Craig (61) and Nicolson (62), among many others, have studied this disintegration of Elizabethan beliefs. Spingarn relates both social and literary principles to the seventeenth century concept of an orderly universe:

> "Civilised society was governed by the same order and law which seventeenth-century science was discovering in the physical universe, and the social code therefore

> represented the equivalent of 'nature' in man's life... The mechanical universe of the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke is...the basis of seventeenth-century criticism; and the sense of mechanical order in nature was implicit in all thought. This was the highest justification of the Rules: they represent the order that is found in nature." (63)

Bacon had of course done much to emancipate nature, and to augment its importance. To him, knowledge was power, and nature was to be harnessed, not for the greater glory of God, but for the benefit of man. The Puritans, with their derogation of man's faculties, and their social conscience, were impressed both by Bacon's methods and his aims. It has already been pointed out that Bacon's belief in experimentation and co-operation made few demands upon man's faculties, whilst his desire to harness nature for man was a source of Puritan utilitarianism. Later philosophers, among whom must be placed Glanvill, helped to advance this materialism by continuing Bacon's divorce of things worldly and things spiritual. It was mainly the Cambridge Platonists who realised the dangers implicit in Bacon's, Descartes', and above all Hobbes' theories, and who attempted to restore God to the universe. It must be admitted that their influence in the development of eighteenth century Deism was perhaps not the result which they intended. It is strange that Glanvill, who sympathised so much with the theories of the Cambridge Platonists, and who was so antagonistic to the Nonconformists, should on the whole have shown greater affinity with the Puritan conception of nature, though

he did try to preserve the idea of God's guiding hand behind "the Motions of the great Automaton" (64).

What may be termed the rehabilitation of nature was a slow and protracted process. Even during the later Seventeenth Century, writers were still defending the belief that the study of nature led to the knowledge and glorification of God. Fairfax emphasised the need for knowledge so that

> "as God beholding what he had made, said with himself that all was good, we may see it & say it too, & love the Spring from whence they came, while we wonder at the wisdom by which they are" (65).

Boyle claimed that knowledge of "this vast, orderly, and (in a word) many ways admirable system of things, that we call the world" (66) led to the appreciation of God. Sprat tried to fuse both the worldly and the spiritual advantages of the study of nature:

> "And this is the highest pitch of humane reason; to follow all the links of this chain, till all their secrets are open to our minds; and their work advanc'd, or imitated by our hands. This is truly to command the world; to rank all the varieties, and degrees of things, so orderly one upon another; that standing on the top of them, we may perfectly behold all that are below, and make them all serviceable to the quiet, and peace, and plenty of Man's life. And to this happiness, there can be nothing else added: but that we make a second advantage of this rising ground, thereby to look the nearer into heaven: An ambition which...when it is carried on by that humility and innocence, which can never be separated from true knowledge; when it is design'd, not to brave the Creator of all things, but to admire him the more: it must needs be the utmost perfection of humane Nature." (67)

A rational and law-abiding God both necessitated and was

reflected in a rational and law-abiding universe. Bonhome used "the Disposition and admirable Order of the Universal World" (68) as one proof of God's existence. Ferguson (69) claimed that the wonderful construction of man, the beauty of the world, and the established order of everything argued the existence of God. This was an argument repeated by Ray in The Wisdom of God (70). Maynard stressed that the aim of creation was the glorification of God: "Let every thing that hath Beeing, serve as a stream to lead back thy thoughts to God..." (71). Wilkins, too, in part argued the existence of God

> "From that excellent Contrivance which there is in all natural Things. Both with respect to that Elegance and Beauty which they have in themselves separately considered, and that regular Order and Subserviency wherein they stand towards one another; together with the exact fitness and propriety, for the several purposes for which they are designed." (72)

From these few quotations, it may be gathered that this idea of the universe reflecting and glorifying God was not limited to any particular denomination.

An interesting corollary of this idea was the belief that harmony was equivalent to goodness and beauty. Here can be seen some of the roots of the eighteenth century desire for decorum, and love of symmetry; neo-Classicism was perhaps not entirely devoid of Christian undercurrents. Hallywell (73) linked sin with disharmony, and deflection, goodness with harmony and obedience to laws. Cudworth (74) compared love to harmony. Sprat referred to the "admirable order, and

workmanship of the creatures" (75). Thus, by the end of the century, as Willey (76) points out, nature had become idealised; it was both the basis and the visible manifestation of law and order.

Glanvill, too, represented the universe as essentially orderly, though his disillusionment with humanity has already been noted. Lux Orientalis referred to universal harmony, and to "the order, beauty, and wise contrivance" of this world (77). In A Whip for the Droll Fidler, Glanvill spoke of "such regular and accurate Productions" (78). Harmony was implicit in his claim that "The great Fabrick of the World is maintained by the mutual Friendship, and conspiracy of its parts" (79). His belief that the Enthusiasts were among the greatest enemies of the "Friendship" will be discussed in the following chapter. In his Essays Glanvill attacked the idea "that all the regular Motions in Nature should be from blind tumultuous jumblings, intermixtures" as being "the most unphilosophical Fansie, and ridiculous Dotage in the World" (80), and pointed to the "beauty, and order, and ends, and usefulness of the Creatures" which were evidence of the omnipotence of God, who framed all things "regularly and exactly" (81). Against Modern Sadducism spoke of "this elegant and orderly Fabrick" (82), and argued

> "'tis not absurd to believe that there is a Government that runs from Highest to Lowest, the better and more perfect orders of Being still ruling the inferiour & less perfect." (83)

the chaos of the present world was an argument in favour of an afterlife in "a world of light and order", for

> "the Universe is a great beauty, made up of regular variety; there is no monstrousness or unbecoming disharmony in nature." (84)

This belief in an essentially rational universe could be used to support various of Glanvill's other theories. As has already been described, it argued the existence of a rational and loving God, and not the arbitrary figure of fear which the Enthusiasts had created. So, too, it endorsed his support of the rationality of man, and of the value of reason both in religion and in science. Because he believed that the Church of England was truly rational, as opposed to the imaginative excesses of the Enthusiasts, and the superstitious formalism of the Catholics, he felt that the demonstration of the universe as being rational was a further bulwark for the Established church. Because the universe was orderly, there was always the hope that man might obtain some, if not complete, knowledge. If nature was good, so, too, was the exploration of her secrets. And finally, if harmony and co-operation were essential to every part of creation, how much more essential were they to humanity? Controversy and sectarianism would destroy religion and stable government, and lead to the major crimes of atheism and anarchy.

A Spirit that dwells with Stars

Although nature had to a large extent been emancipated

from theology, and its rehabilitation generally accepted, there were still many who attacked the new science as being irreligious. How accepted that human learning, the "knowledge of Arts and Sciences, divers Tongues, and much reading" as useful for worldly matters, "but bring it once to the perfecting of the Gospel, and it will be found to be the spoyling of it" (85). Du Chastelet attacked the tendency to "admit of no other principles but Reason, Experience, and the Testimony of their Senses" (86). An anonymous writer derided the belief that man could understand the ways of God:

> "We are capable of the knowledge of it no otherwise then by an unbyassed Faith, and a constantly upright Hope; and if we may call this knowledge, the perfection thereof consisteth in not knowing." (87)

Bates (88) claimed that philosophy had hindered religion by demoting God, ignoring piety, and arguing that virtue and happiness depended on the individual. Stubbe (89) declared that innovations in education would harm the Universities, the Church, and the Monarchy.

Others sprang to the defence of learning. Nonconformist though he was, Ferguson believed that ideally philosophy should be useful to religion, though at present, being made up of "insignificant Terms and idle Phantasms...absurd Dogm's" (90), it more often proved a nuisance. Boyle's Christian Virtuoso was permeated with the conviction that learning was an aid to religion. But besides Glanvill himself, Sprat was of course the chief apologist for the new science. On a mundane

level, he argued that it was not un-Christian to try to better human life in this world, and stated defiantly that there could be an excess of holiness. Like Pope, he believed that a little learning was dangerous, but deeper knowledge brought men back to the love of God. And, though it is impossible to analyse them fully here, it may be observed that it is significant that many of his arguments in support of learning and reason were, like Glanvill's, directed at the pride, narrowness and hypocrisy of the Enthusiasts. Again, it is impossible to isolate the controversy as to whether or not philosophy was inimical to religion, as it was linked so closely with the argument as to the place of reason in religion, and the defence of the Royal Society.

Glanvill, whilst he repeated the conventional arguments in support of learning, claiming that it led to the study and appreciation of God, revealed an almost mystical belief in the power of learning. It would be superfluous to quote his famous passage in Scepsis Scientifica which has been held to foretell some of the marvels of modern science, but his Apology for Philosophy claimed that intellectual pastimes anticipated heavenly pleasures:

> "He that hath been cradled in Majesty, and used to Crowns and Scepters; will not leave the Throne to play with Beggars at Put-pin or be fond of Tops and Cherry-stones: neither will a Spirit that dwells with Stars, dabble in this impurer Mud; or stoop to be a Play-fellow and Copartner in delights with the Creatures, that have nought but Animal." (91)

The same idea appeared in The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion:

> "the study of God's works joyned with those pious Sentiments they deserve, is a kind of anticipation of Heaven...it is one of the best and noblest Imployments; the one most becoming a reasonable Creature after the worship of God." (92)

In fact he went so far as to say that it was those who attacked philosophy who were irreligious. The lenses of the telescope were not only of practical use; they

> "bring the Stars nearer to us, and acquaint us better with the immense Territories of Light: They give us more Phaenomena, and truer Accounts; disperse the shadows and vain Images of the twilight of naked Sense, and make us a clearer and larger prospect: By those Advantages they inlarge our Thoughts, and shew us a more magnificent Representation of the Universe: So that by them the Heavens are made more amply to declare the Glory of God, and we are help'd to nobler, and better-grounded Theories." (93)

Glanvill, at any rate was not overawed by infinity! He might almost have been forestalling Wordsworth when he described the scientist as one who

> "observes God in the colour of every Flower, in every Fibre of a Plant, in every particle of an Insect, in every drop of Dew." (94)

Many of his arguments in support of science were akin to those which he had used to defend reason. Reference has already been made to its power to curb dogmatism:

> "the Free and Real Philosophy makes men deeply sensible of the infirmities of humane Intellect, and our manifold hazards of mistaking, and so renders them wary and modest, diffident of the certainty of their Conceptions, and averse to the boldness of peremptory asserting." (95)

It was in Philosophia Pia and the essay based upon it, but

particularly in the earlier work, that he stated most explicitly philosophy's power to destroy enthusiasm, that "false conceit of Inspiration" (96). It acted in two main ways: firstly, by helping to differentiate between true and false religious inspiration, and secondly, by supporting the reason in face of the Enthusiasts' denial of it. Like the reason, too, philosophy helped to counteract atheism, sadducism, superstition, and disputing. Cope (97), writing of Philosophia Pia and A Seasonable Recommendation, claims that they are the central documents for understanding Glanvill's attitude to experimental science, and his utilization of it to defend Anglicanism; indeed, he goes so far as to say that Glanvill portrayed the Royal Society itself as a hand-maiden to the Church of England.

As reason and philosophy were so closely related, so too were learning, knowledge, science and philosophy; in fact at times they appeared almost synonymous. They were all means by which man could hope to reach ultimate truth. It has been generally accepted that the Seventeenth Century saw the birth of the new or modern science. Craig (98) claims that much Renaissance thought was merely a modified Medievalism, but Butterfield (99) believes that the scientific revolution started even before the Sixteenth Century, and Johnson (100) points out that Bacon inherited a tradition of scientific thought, and that his position as an innovator should not be over-emphasised. Metz (101). too, places Bacon's claim to modernism on his utilitarianism, and his divorce of science

and religion, rather than on his scientific discoveries. Jones speaks of Bacon's belief that the aim of science should be "to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful" (102). The development of modern science during the Seventeenth Century has again been studied by many critics. Jones (103) traces both the Puritan influence on the new science, and the later reaction against Puritanism and its ideas, which led to the further separation of science and religion. Houghton (104) traces the rise and decline in interest in the history of Trades during the Seventeenth Century, particularly in relation to the Royal Society.

Many writers, too, refer to attempts to reunite science and religion: Tulloch (105) claims that the Cambridge Platonists were the first to attempt this fusion in the Seventeenth Century. Wolf (106) ascribes it mainly to More and Boyle, Bush (107) to Browne and Burton, though elsewhere (108) he differentiates between the mysticism of Browne and Vaughan, and the fusion of science and religion found in the Cambridge Platonists. Cragg (109) and Stimson (110) both refer to the unifying influence of science, after the controversies of the earlier part of the century.

Reference has already been made to the utilitarian aspect of Bacon's theory of science. Nature was to be organised for the benefit of man; knowledge was power. It was this idea, grafted on to their growing social conscience, which

was to influence the Puritans in their attitude to the new science. Their desire for the reform of the somewhat theoretical contemporary education was another aspect of this attitude. Ustick refers to the seventeenth century penchant for a "self-imposed obligation to one's fellows" (111), and it is significant that, after the Restoration, Anglican scientists were to continue this tradition of utilitarianism, without acknowledging their debt to the Puritans. Arderne claimed that the common nature of all truth was that it must be "uniform, probable, excellent and productive of good." (112) Evelyn argued that "Action is the proper fruit of Science" and again "Action is the enamel of virtue." (113) Sprat praised the Royal Society for trying to make science

> "an Instrument, whereby Mankind may obtain a Dominion over Things, and not onely one anothers Judgements,"

for

> "such a Philosophy they would build; which should first wholly consist of Action, and Intelligence, before it be brought in Teaching, and Contemplation." (114)

It is significant that Glanvill contrasted the practical aims of the Royal Society with the speculation of the sects: they were

> "not the little Projects of serving a Sect, or propagating an Opinion; of spinning out a subtile Notion into a fine thread, of forming a plausible System of new Speculations: but they are Designs of making Knowledge Practical" (115)

so that nature should"be master'd, managed, and used in the Services of humane life." (116) Copleston (117) points out

that the Cambridge Platonists did not believe that knowledge was power, and claims that they had little understanding of contemporary science, and that therefore they had little influence. Nevertheless, it may be argued that Glanvill, one of the chief apologists for the science of the period, and at the same time sympathetic towards the ideas of the Cambridge school, revolted against the Puritan over-emphasis on utilitarianism; though he, too, believed that knowledge should be practical, yet, as has already been pointed out, he was capable of an almost mystical appreciation of the potentialities of science.

Puritan utilitarianism could be adopted and adapted by Anglican scientists; it was unfortunate that the need for the reform of education was largely ignored, because of its association with Puritanism. Thinkers such as Comenius and Cowley might draw up plans for a Philosophical College, Glanvill might attack the universities with youthful impetuosity, but it was soon appreciated that, if the new science was to develop unopposed, it must be represented as not being hostile to the universities. And so English education was to suffer because of blind prejudice against the valuable aspects of Puritan thought.

Utilitarianism in science was paralleled by the appeal to self-interest in religion. Tillotson argued that

"surely nothing is more likely to prevail with wise and

> considerate Men to become Religious, than to be thoroughly convinced that Religion and Happiness, our Duty and our Interest are really but one and the same thing" (118),

whilst Wilkins advocated natural religion in that "It will teach them Charity and Meakness, and Forbearance, to study publick Peace and common Good" (119). Du Chastelet (120) stressed the advantages of being a Christian. Glanvill, too, used the argument of self-interest to promote his ideas. Uncharitableness was "very unwise, and unpolitick, and contrary to the principles of Safety, and Self-love." (121) Scoffing at religion was dangerous, in that the scoffer risked his eternal happiness (122). The sermon on The Way of Happiness stressed rewards as an incentive to virtue. This was a long way from the Puritan doctrine that only the Elect could depend on salvation, and the fearful descriptions of eternal damnation. But it was an essentially sensible and rational development. That this common-sense attitude was not entirely successful was demonstrated by Glanvill's plea for zeal (akin to that zeal desired by Cudworth, which Passmore (123) has studied), and his reversion to a more passionate style of preaching in his later sermons. The Church of England, too, threw out much that was good along with much that was bad in Puritanism, and has perhaps suffered for it since.

Disinterested Attempters for the universal good.

For Glanvill, science and the Royal Society were so closely related as to be indivisible. The history of this body

has already been traced by several writers (124), and it is outside the scope of this thesis to examine the various theories in detail. Bacon's New Atlantis (125) may or may not have been the major influence on its development; there is evidence that there were suggestions for co-operative learning before he put forward his proposals. Comenius, too, may have had a part in its history, and Boyle's Invisible College was perhaps its progenitor. What is interesting is that essentially the Royal Society had its roots in Puritanism, but that, by the time Glanvill and Sprat were defending it, they were anxious to emphasise its opposition to Nonconformism.

The Preface to Scepsis Scientifica was the fullest expression of Glanvill's conception of the aims and achievements of the Royal Society. Naturally he praised it highly; it was the "Most learned and ingenious Society in Europe" (126), and its members were "Disinterested Attempters for the universal good." (127) Their "impartial Search, wary Procedure, deep Sagacity, twisted Endeavours, ample Fortunes, and all other advantages" (128) were more likely to reach the truth than wordy disputes or unorganised research. That science was still in the hands of amateurs and gentlemen was implicit in the Preface. At the time that he was writing it, he was more concerned to attack the Schoolmen and Dogmatists, and to defend the Royal Society against accusations of irreligion, than to use it as a weapon against Enthusiasm. Hence his arguments were based on its practical aims, as opposed to the

vague theories of the Aristotelians, and he stressed that even the establishment of the true laws of Matter and Motion were to help in securing "the Foundations of Religion against all attempts of Mechanical Atheism" (129). His work was aimed at pedantry and dogmatism, but there was a significant reference to "those reckoning it a great instance of Piety and devout Zeal, vehemently to declaim against Reason and Philosophy"(130).

Plus Ultra, too, defended the Royal Society against charges of being a danger to the Church or the Universities. Again Glanvill stressed its practical aims, and its dislike of notions and disputes. It was to be "a Bank of all the useful Knowledge that is among men" (131). Above all, it was neither speculative nor sectarian. Modern Improvements of Useful Knowledge listed the inventions and improvements of the Royal Society in various sciences, and emphasised that it had brought science down from "the Clouds of Imagination" (132) to sober reality.

Thus, once again, Glanvill attacked the Enthusiasts at nearly every point of his theory of being and knowledge. He argued that a rational and kindly God ruled a rational and beautiful creation. Man himself, though marred by the Fall, was essentially rational, and his soul had a natural affinity to perfection. The sorry state of this world and of the vulgar mass was but a further argument in support of his

belief in justice after death. Nature was good, and the study of nature led not only to the betterment of man's lot, but to a fuller appreciation of God. Truth and goodness were inextricably related, so that the growth of knowledge was associated with the subjugation of imagination and the natural passions, and the supremacy of reason. Science was not confined to one sect, nor was it subject to dispute; calmness and caution were essential to its development. Knowledge might indeed be power, but at the same time it ennobled man, and led him nearer to God. Though he attacked the Enthusiasts where he opposed them, he forebore to acknowledge any debt to Nonconformism where he followed its lead, and this silence is as important as his accusations. Charges of witchcraft had reached an unprecedented height under the Puritans, and at times there had been almost a panic fear of witches, yet Glanvill made no mention of the Puritan belief in the black science. So, too, the Puritans had stressed the utilitarian aims of the new science, and had been influential in the development of the Royal Society. But again Glanvill ignored their contribution. And because the Puritans had attempted to reform education, Glanvill, like others of his time, was careful to avoid the subject. Enthusiasm was too close and too disliked to be offered that toleration which Glanvill claimed was part both of the Anglican Church and the new science.

CHAPTER V - REFERENCES.

1. Baker, H. — The Wars of Truth. P.4.
2. Hooker, R. — Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie... London, 1593-7.
3. Davies, Sir J. — Nosce Ipsum. (In Silver poets of the Sixteenth Century; ed. G. Bullett. P.367.)
4. Baylie, R. — Satan...A Sermon to the Honourable House of Commons. London, 1643. P. 19.
5. Cheynell, F. — Sions Memento...a Sermon...before the Honorable House of Commons. London, 1643. P.19.
6. Gillespie, G. — A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons. London, 1644. P.18.
7. Cope, J.I. — "Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist." P.M.L.A., 69(1954), pp.228-50. Section I.
8. Hallywell, H. — Deus Justificatus. P.63.
9. Rust, G. — Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen. 1661. (In The Phenix.)
10. Lukin, H. — The Chief Interest of Man; 2nd ed.
11. Polhill, E. — Precious Faith Considered. To the Christian Reader.
12. Tulloch, J. — Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy; 2nd ed. Vol.II, ch.3.
13. Cudworth, R. — A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons. P.37.
14. Carré, M.H. — "Ralph Cudworth," Philosoph.Q., 3(1953), pp.342-51.
15. Fowler, E. — The Principles and Practices of Certain Moderate Divines of the Church of England; 2nd ed. London, 1671. Pp.41-2.

Chapter V - References, cont.

16. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay VII.

17. Idem, Essay VII. P.21.

18. Sprat, T. — History of the Royal-Society of London; 2nd ed.

19. Glanvill, J. — Lux Orientalis. (In Glanvill, J. - Two Choice and Useful Treatises. P.96.)

20. - — Some Discourses. P.53.

21. Idem, P.64.

22. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay VI, p.60.

23. - — Some Discourses. P.308.

24. Idem, p.325.

25. Craig, H. — The Enchanted Glass. Oxford, 1950.

26. More, H. — Dr. More's Letter to Mr. Glanvill. P.10. (In Glanvill, J. - Sadducismus Triumphatus.)

27. Hallywell, H. — A Private Letter of Satisfaction to a Friend. London (?), 1667.

28. Bonhome, J. — The Arraignment and Conviction of Atheism. London, 1679.

29. Burthogge, R. — An Essay upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits.

30. More, H. — Excerpts from Enchiridion. (In Glanvill, J. - Sadducismus Triumphatus. P.102.)

31. Cope, J.I. — "Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist." P.M.L.A., 69 (1954), pp.223-50; Section III.

32. Ady, T. — A Candle in the Dark. London, 1656.

33. Webster, J. — The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft.

Chapter V - References, cont.

34. Hutchinson, F. — An Historical Essay Concerning Witchcraft. London, 1718.

35. Baker, H. — Op.cit.

36. Petty, Sir W. — Political Arithmetic. London, 1690. (In Later Stuart Tracts. Westminster, 1905.)

37. Houghton, J. — England's Great Happiness. London, 1677.

38. Hallywell, H. — Deus Justificatus.

39. Bates, W. — The Harmony of the Divine Attributes.

40. Copleston, F. — A History of Philosophy. London, 1946-. Vol. V, ch. 3.

41. Ferguson, R. — The Interest of Reason in Religion. P.19.

42. Glanvill, J. — Scepsis Scientifica. P.3.

43. Idem, pp.5-6.

44. Glanvill, J. — Lux Orientalis. Pp.32-3. (In Glanvill, J. - Two Choice and Useful Treatises.)

45. Idem, p.68.

46. Glanvill, J. — Some Discourses. P.56.

47. - — Lux Orientalis. Preface (p.?1). (In Glanvill, J. - Two Choice and Useful Treatises.)

48. - — Sadducismus Triumphatus. Preface. (p.21.)

49. - — Essays, Essay VI. P.47.

50. - — A Seasonable Defence of Preaching. P.76.

51. - — Scepsis Scientifica. P.75.

Chapter V - References, cont.

52. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay VI.

53. - — Scepsis Scientifica. To the Royal Society. Pp.10-1.

54. - — Essays. Essay VII.

55. Idem, Essay VII, p.6.

56. More, H. — Annotations upon the Two Foregoing Treatises. Pp.187-8. (In Glanvill, J. - Two Choice and Useful Treatises.)

57. Glanvill, J. — Some Discourses. Pp.311-2.

58. Idem, p.275.

59. Willey, B. — The Seventeenth Century Background.

60. Baker, H. — Op.cit.

61. Craig, H. — Op.cit.

62. Nicolson, M.H. — The Breaking of the Circle.

63. Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century; ed. J.E. Spingarn. Vol.I, Introduction, p.lxviii.

64. Glanvill, J. — Scepsis Scientifica. To the Royal Society, p.18.

65. Fairfax, N. — A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World. To the Reader, p.22. (In Two Seventeenth Century Prefaces; ed. A.K. Croston.)

66. Boyle, R. — The Christian Virtuoso. P.42. (In Boyle, R. - Works. 1744. Vol.V.)

67. Sprat, T. — Op.cit., pp.110-1.

68. Bonhome, J. — Op.cit., p.137.

69. Ferguson, R. — Op.cit.

Chapter V - References, cont.

70. Ray, J. — The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation; 8th ed. London, 1722.

71. Maynard, J. — The Beauty and Order of the Creation. P.10.

72. Wilkins, J. — Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion; 8th ed. P.69.

73. Hallywell, H. — A Private Letter of Satisfaction to a Friend.

74. Cudworth, R. — Op.cit.

75. Sprat, T. — Op.cit., p.82.

76. Grierson, Sir H.J.C. — Seventeenth Century Studies. Ch. 23. Willey.

77. Glanvill, J. — Lux Orientalis. P.65. (In Glanvill, J. - Two Choice and Useful Treatises.)

78. - — A Whip for the Droll Fidler. (In Glanvill, J.- Sadducismus Triumphatus. P.457.)

79. - — Catholick Charity Recommended. P.16.

80. - — Essays. Essay IV. P.32.

81. Idem, Essay V, p.7.

82. Idem, Essay VI, p.4.

83. Idem, Essay VI, p.26.

84. Glanvill, J. — Seasonable Reflections. Pp.125,127.

85. How, S. — The Sufficiencie of the Spirits Teaching. (Pages unnumbered.)

86. Du Chastelet, H. — A Treatise against Irreligion. P.5.

87. The Causes and Remedy of the Distempers of the Times, P.2.

88. Bates, W. — Op.cit.

Chapter V - References, cont.

89. Stubbe, H. — A Reply. (In Stubbe, H. - The Lord Bacons Relation of the Sweating-Sickness.)

90. Ferguson, R. — Op.cit., Epistle Dedicatory, pp.4-5.

91. Glanvill, J. — An Apology for Philosophy. (In Glanvill, J. - Scepsis Scientifica. Pp.178-9.)

92. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay IV, p.43.

93. Idem, Essay III, p.24.

94. Idem, Essay IV, p.5.

95. Glanvill, J. — Plus Ultra. P.146.

96. - — Essays. Essay IV, p.17.

97. Cope, J.I. — Joseph Glanvill. P.82.

98. Craig, H. — Op.cit.

99. Butterfield, H. — The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800.

100. Johnson, F.R. — Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England.

101. Grierson, Sir H.J.C. — Op.cit., ch.2, Metz.

102. Bacon, F. — Essays; ed. R.F. Jones. P.215.

103. Jones, R.F. — Ancients and Moderns; 2nd ed.

104. Houghton, W.E. — "The History of Trades." J.H.I., 2(1941), pp.33-60.

105. Tulloch, J. — Op.cit., vol.II.

106. Wolf, A. — A History of Science; new ed.

107. Bush, D. — English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century.

108. - — Science and English Poetry.

Chapter V - References, cont.

109. Cragg, G.R. — From Puritanism to the Age of Reason.

110. Stimson, D. — "The Critical Years of the Royal Society, 1672-1703." J.H.M., 2(1947), pp.283-98.

111. Ustick, W.L. — "Changing Ideals of Aristocratic Character and Conduct in Seventeenth-Century England." M.P., 30(1932-3), p.152.

112. Arderne, J. — Directions Concerning the Matter and Stile of Sermons; ed. J. Mackay. P.17.

113. Evelyn, J. — Publick Employment and an Active Life. Pp.78, 113.

114. Sprat, T. — Op.cit., pp.62,93.

115. Glanvill, J. — Plus Ultra. P.5.

116. Idem, p.187.

117. Copleston, F. — Op.cit., Vol.V, ch.3.

118. Wilkins, J. — Op.cit., Preface (By Tillotson), p.vii.

119. Idem, p.284.

120. Du Chastelet, H. — Op.cit.

121. Glanvill, J. — Catholick Charity Recommended. P.45.

122. - — Seasonable Reflections.

123. Passmore, J.A. — Ralph Cudworth. Cambridge, 1951.

124. For example:-

Birch, T. — History of the Royal Society of London.

Bredvold, L.I. — "Dryden, Hobbes, and the Royal Society." M.P. 25(1927-8), pp.417-38.

Chapter V - References, cont.

Christensen, F. "John Wilkins and the Royal Society's Reform of Prose Style." M.L.Q., 7(1946), pp.179-87, 279-90.

De Beer, E.S. "Earliest Fellows of the Royal Society." B.I.H.R., 15(1937), pp.79-93.

Denny, M. "The Early Program of the Royal Society and John Evelyn." M.L.Q., 1(1940), pp.481-97.

Emerson, O.F. "John Dryden and a British Academy." P.B.A., 10(1921-3), pp.45-58.

Emerson, O.F. "Dryden and the English Academy." M.L.R., 20(1925), pp. 189-90.

Fisch, H. and Jones, H.W. "Bacon's Influence on Sprat's History of the Royal Society." M.L.Q., 12(1951), pp.399-406.

Sprat, T. Op.cit.

Stimson, D. Op.cit.

Syfret, R.H. "The Origins of the Royal Society." N.R.R.S., 5(1948), pp.75-137.

125. Bacon, F. New Atlantis... London, 1659.

126. Glanvill, J. Scepsis Scientifica. Preface, p.4.

127. Idem, Preface, p.9.

128. Idem, Preface, pp.3-4.

129. Idem, Preface, p.7.

130. Idem, Preface, p.11.

131. Glanvill, J. Plus Ultra. P.108.

132. - Essays. Essay III, p.37.

CHAPTER VI. - A MISERABLE TYRANNY OF PASSION AND SELF-WILL.

There is sometimes a tendency in literary criticism to divorce a writer from his period, and to examine him rather as a scientist might examine a specimen in a glass jar, devoid of natural environment. With any writer this is a mistake, but with Glanvill, who so closely mirrored the ideas and attitudes of his times, it is particularly dangerous. Without knowledge of the political, religious and social events which affected his intellectual and emotional development, it would be tempting to agree with Stubbe and Wood, and to label him a turncoat and hypocrite. It must be agreed that he showed masterly timing and remarkable shrewdness in producing some of his works, but it must also be remembered that he laid himself open to considerable ridicule and even persecution rather than succumb to popular pressures, when he was convinced of the rightness of his beliefs.

England during the whole Seventeenth Century was in a state of ferment. Intellectually, there was the discovery of new horizons of knowledge, and the increasing importance of science and technology. In religion, there was continual dissension between Puritanism, Anglicanism, and Catholicism. Politically, there was the conflict between Monarchy and Parliament, which reached its climax in the beheading of Charles I, but which was not resolved until the accession of William and Mary, which signified the end of supreme

monarchy. Socially, the century saw the growth of democracy; it is true that the aristocracy, which had gone into an eclipse under the Protectorate, achieved fresh lustre at the Restoration, and that Englishmen continued to love a Lord, but much influence had passed into the hands of merchants, lawyers, and the growing body of professional politicians, and the Court was no longer the centre of power.

Once again, this thesis can make no attempt at a detailed survey of the political events of the century, But it is important to describe something of the general trends in order to understand Glanvill's position more clearly. The seeds of civil war had been germinating throughout the century. Elizabeth, despite a period of unpopularity, had died both loved and respected by her Parliament and her people. But the Stuarts showed an almost incredible tactlessness in their handling of the political and religious issues, and, as Trevelyan (1) points out, it was almost inevitable that Charles I should be beheaded, if democracy and toleration were to be achieved. Church and State were so closely related at that time, that it is almost impossible to segregate the religious and political factors of the conflict. But the very nature of Puritanism ensured that there must be a conflict. It was essentially a religion of independence and individualism, of democracy and the questioning of accepted authority. In order to survive,

it had to bring about the separation of Church and State, yet paradoxically the means by which it attained this separation in fact resulted in its own downfall. Though the Puritan spirit still lingers on in many traditional beliefs and attitudes, yet the movement itself declined after the Restoration, and Nonconformism passed into the hands of the various sects.

Burnet's Life of Bedell (2) painted a sad picture of the state of the Anglican Church in Ireland, and it was a similar picture in England. The Clergy were of a poor quality, there was much absenteeism and pluralism, the bishops abused their privileges, the congregations, like their ministers, were poverty-stricken and ignorant. In this country there was general hatred of Laud and his Prelates, but the attack on the Bishops gradually spread to an attack on the Prayer-book and on the entire Anglican Church, and in so doing lost some of its support. Throughout the century, there were outbreaks of hatred against the Catholics, a hatred which was fanned by the Stuarts' mishandling of affairs. Under Charles I, this hatred strengthened the Puritan cause; under the later Stuarts, it helped to establish the Church of England. But in the 1640's, Catholicism was for many an ally of the Laudian Church; in 1644, Gillespie asked

> "Hath not England harboured and entertained Papists, Priests and Jesuites in its bosome? Is it not just,

> that now you feel the sting and poison of these vipers? Hath there not bin a great compliance with the Prelates, for peace sake, even to the prejudice of Truth?" (3)

Incidentally, the Puritan movement was greatly assisted by the vivid, simple style of sermon which its preachers adopted, which was far more to the taste of the lower classes than the formalised and elaborate rhetoric of the Laudian Church. As early as 1643, Palmer (4) was defending the Nonconformist clergy from accusations of sedition, on the grounds that they had acted according to conscience. And it was not surprising that, almost immediately after his accession, Charles II should lay down directions concerning preachers:

> "None are in their sermons to bound the authority of sovereigns, or determine the differences between them and the people; nor to argue the deep points of election, reprobation, free will, &c.; they are to abstain as much as possible from controversies." (5)

Church and State were so closely related that any attack on the Established Church was bound to be seditious. The bondage of both Church and State had to be broken if religious toleration was to be ensured; Christ was on the side of the Nonconformists not only religiously, but also politically:

> "What though the Dragon assist the Beast, be of good comfort, Christ hath overcome the Devil, he hath broke the Serpents Head, and that is the reason that the Politicians wits are so often crackt, and that they delude themselves with such feaverish conceits, and brain-sick inventions...Christ hath this same crackt-braine Serpent in a chaine, he can rebuke him, or trample on him." (6)

In their attack upon absolutism, the Puritans found other allies. James I and Charles I had both upset the balance of sovereign and parliament by their use of intrigue and favouritism, their unconstitutional attempts to obtain money, and their misuse of the English legal system. The rich merchants were annoyed by the awarding of monopolies to favourites. Parliament was shocked by Charles I's attempt to impeach, and later to arrest, five leading Puritan members. The whole of London was incensed by his use of penniless 'cavaliers' to put down riots. Then, too, there was a growing desire to define the rights of the sovereign and the people; political science was developing along with every other science. Hobbes's Leviathon based law and government upon self-interest rather than upon divine right, and many people, though they did not accept this idea completely, were against absolute monarchy. Though many were shocked by the beheading of Charles I, yet, as Trevelyan (7) points out, the Royalist defeat was the only way to ensure the victory of Parliamentary institutions.

With so much religious and political discontent in the country, there was bound to be conflict in some form or another. After his abortive attempt to arrest five Members of Parliament, Charles withdrew to York and the First Civil War began. Neither it nor the Second Civil War were very general struggles, but unfortunately the second outbreak was marred by a bitterness lacking in the first, and it

culminated in the beheading of Charles I, an event deplored by most people except the Parliamentary army. Reconciliation was impossible after this, and the Clarendon Code of 1661-4 which so effectually ended the sway of Puritanism, was to a large extent the natural result of this extremism.

The Puritan movement had reached its zenith, and from then on it was to become increasingly unpopular. Hutton (8) describes the rise and fall of Puritanism, showing that reaction against Cromwell started as early as 1658. The causes of its downfall were varied, and ranged from the financial strain imposed upon Royalist landlords to the religious intolerance which it forced upon the country; many who had sincerely believed that Puritanism was the religion of tolerance were to be sadly disillusioned. Then, too, by its very nature, Puritanism was a source of dissension, for, as its individualism and sectarianism had bred revolt, so they brought about its downfall. For a time under Cromwell religious unity could be maintained by force, but it was essentially an artificial unity, and unorthodoxy spread rapidly, whilst martial force was no adequate replacement for a stable constitution. The army which had ensured the victory of Puritanism became both hated and feared. Thomas, Lord Fairfax (9), described how the army gradually grew more and more fanatical and aggressive, and claimed that the contest between army and Parliament would

have caused yet another civil war, but fortunately one of the first actions of Charles II after the Restoration was to pay up and disband the soldiers, who had become a major source of discontent and sedition. The rule of the Major-Generals, which Cromwell established, along with the strict moral legislation of the Puritans, were both unpopular with, and alien to, the majority of Englishmen. Much of the hypocrisy noted by foreigners in the English nation stemmed from this attempt to force an unnatural discipline on to a hitherto uninhibited nation. Then, too, as so often happens, the death of one strong man signalised the end of one form of government, for there was no-one powerful enough to succeed Cromwell, and anarchy was the inevitable result. General Monk, along with many others, felt that the Restoration was the only possible solution, and many moderate Puritans supported this Restoration, failing to realise that the return of Charles II meant the return of Anglicanism, an Anglicanism so embittered and vengeful, so afraid of further rebellions by the Nonconformists, that it deliberately destroyed Puritanism. Finally there must be mentioned a less tangible reason for the decline of Puritanism; the growth of rationalism along with the new interest in science, meant that people were less swayed by, and more averse to, emotionalism. As has already been noted, the imagination and the passions were increasingly mistrusted, so that it was the intellect

rather than the will which must be persuaded, and reason was to be the instrument of religion as well as of science.

Naturally, as Puritanism lost ground, so Anglicanism tended to gain in popularity. To some extent this was due to the swing of the pendulum, and to the Englishman's traditional sympathy with the underdog. Many of the aristocracy and upper class were persecuted, socially and financially, by the Puritans, and, though they might originally have been sympathetic towards, if not actually members of, the Puritan movement, they were naturally alienated by this treatment, and tended to revert both to Royalism and to Anglicanism. Nevertheless, the re-establishment of an essentially Laudian and Episcopal Church of England following the intolerant religious settlement of the Restoration, so ably traced by Bosher (10), along with the wave of anti-Catholicism which swept the country, meant that there was still quite a strong feeling of sympathy with the Puritans. Marvell's Rehearsal Transpos'd (11) defended the Nonconformists against Parker's attack in a typically controversial style, mixing vituperation, reason and wit; Ferguson (12) criticised Glanvill's claims in Philosophia Pia that all Nonconformists denied the place of reason in religion, and that they clung to incomprehensible mysteries, although he was careful to differentiate between Nonconformism and Enthusiasm. These were only two of the works which appeared after the

Restoration defending the Nonconformist position.

But on the whole, fanaticism was looked on as one of the main sources of sedition. Cudworth (13) stressed as early as 1647 the danger of fanaticism breeding dissension and destroying religion. In 1653, Gauden (14) argued that Sects were more dangerous to the Church of England than was Catholicism, and that the main cause of the unpopularity of the clergy was that they had been the chief promoters of the rebellion. The anonymous author of The Counter-plot wrote bitterly that

> "The contempt of Authority linked with an obstinate contumacious and seditious humour, is so very a monster, that it makes an error of judgment, which might otherwise have been venial in it self, a diabolical and damning quality." (15)

Fullwood (16) linked religious nonconformity with civil disobedience. Peacham claimed that "The vulgar innocence and simplicity is in these daies notably wrought upon by cunning Sectaries" (17), and argued that, because the truly religious man was humble and peaceable "hence is he opposite... to separatists, and schismaticks" (18). Taylor pleaded that "Any Zeal is proper for Religion...but the Zeal of the Sword and the Zeal of Anger" (19).

As Nonconformism was linked with sedition, so Anglicanism was the religion of a stable government. One anonymous writer (20) pleaded for the Established Church on such grounds as patriotism, rationalism, honour and so on. Three years later, Fullwood (21) argued that conformism was

essential on rational and political, as well as religious, grounds. Even religion was rapidly becoming mundane and materialistic.

There was still support for the belief that the Monarchy and the Church were vital to each other. Stubbe, though he was concerned with learning rather than politics, claimed that "the interest of our Monarchy is an interest of Religion" (22). Evelyn, on 29th May, 1678, referred to

> "our Viccar...shewing by very learned and excellent readings, The reason of the preference of Monarchical above all other formes of Government: & that from Adam... that it seemed to be not onely of divine, but most natural Institution...The weaknesse of all other Constitutions" (23).

And it is clear that the controversy as to the position of the Monarchy continued until late in the century; writing in 1684, Hickes (24) argued that not only was it illegal to rise against the king, but also, as he was God's vice-regent, irreligious.

The suggested remedies for this long-lived dissension were varied. There was a wide-spread plea for meekness, charity, and tolerance, already described in Chapter II of this thesis, in part a reaction against the Puritans' arrogance. From the King downwards, many people argued that Ministers should concern themselves with pastoral matters rather than national affairs. Henry Lukin's manuals on The Practice of Godliness (25) and The Life of Faith (26) may be quoted as early examples of this tendency to return to the simple fundamentals of religion. Linked with this

aspect was the Cambridge Platonists' constant stress on the importance of a good life, rather than on inessential points of doctrine. Other writers saw in science and rationalism the cure for strife and bitterness. Sprat argued that the English were particularly prone to sects and schisms in religion, but that science would help to end animosity, make subjects more obedient, end poverty and destroy pride, that "most fruitful parent of sedition" (27). To some extent, peace was forced upon the nation, for, as Cragg (28) points out, the overthrow of the Puritan political party meant the end of Puritan theology. Then, too, the renewed fear of Catholicism under both Charles II and James II led to a vital, if uneasy, alliance between the less extreme Puritans and the Anglicans. Many Puritan ministers were able, quite conscientiously, to move over to Anglicanism after the Restoration and so there were fewer centres of sedition.

But above all the temper of the nation had changed. Sprat commented that "now men are generally weary of the Relicks of Antiquity, and satiated with Religious Disputes" (29). There was a growing indifference to, if not apathy towards, religion. The successors of the Cambridge Platonists were too careful not to offend and not to excite, so it was no wonder Glanvill pleaded for greater zeal. References to atheism became more and more frequent, and disbelief was no longer a social stigma. There was a new spirit of mockery about, and even religion was open to jeering and

cynicism. As Fell wrote:

> "That this Age of ours has somewhat of mockery for its particular Genius...I think is a truth so notorious, that I may say it without offence to any" (30).

This, too, had its roots in various causes, and particularly in the shattering of long-held beliefs, in the corrupted morals of the Court, in the sense of self-sufficiency engendered by the new science, in the stress on materialism. So, too, it revealed itself in many ways, from the satire of Butler and Dryden to the immorality of the Restoration dramatists. And it is significant how many contemporary writers referred to this spirit of mockery. It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between the Seventeenth Century use of wit and of scoffing. To Sprat and Cowley wit appears to have been a stylistic device, yet Wotton's Reflections complained specifically of the damage done to the Royal Society by the satire of Wits. Again and again Glanvill referred to the dangers of scoffing, both as a weapon of Enthusiasm and also of atheism. In his Seasonable Reflections, he went so far as to label it the sin against the Holy Ghost, worse even than atheism. Unfortunately there is not space to explore this avenue fully, but it is clear, from the numerous references, that scoffing had become a general practice, and it was unlikely that men would quarrel over that which they ridiculed.

It is against this background of increasing opposition to, and disillusionment with, Puritanism, followed by a

period of comparative religious indifference, that Glanvill must be studied. As has been said, he was not alone in moving from Puritanism to Anglicanism. Many moderate Puritans, both ministers and laity, felt that the Restoration, both of the Monarchy and of Anglicanism, was preferable to dissension and bloodshed. Glanvill frequently stressed that to him Anglicanism was the middle way between the extremes of fanaticism and Catholicism, and one of the main ways to ensure peace was to

> "Study the moderate pacifick ways, and principles, and run not in extremes: both Truth, and Love are in the Middle; Extremes are dangerous...He that is extreme in his Principles, must needs be narrow in his Affections" (31).

It must be remembered, too, that he attacked the Sectarians and Enthusiasts rather than the more moderate Puritans. As has been noted, he was prepared to accept some toleration, even though it was to be strictly limited.

Various aspects of Enthusiasm which Glanvill attacked, and which have been studied in earlier chapters of this thesis, were to be found again in his political attacks on the Enthusiasts. The love which their religion lacked, and which Glanvill believed to be essential to any form of Christianity, was just as necessary to the State; the whole of the sermon Catholick Charity was an impassioned plea for that love which

> "Dispels the Clouds, and Alays the Tempests that arise from the Body, and it's Appetites; and composeth the

> Soul to the Sweetest, and most even Temper...inlarges our Minds, and Softens our Affections, and calms our Passions, and Smooths the Ruggedness of our Natures ...destroys our Pride and Selfishness, and so Strikes up the Roots of Enmity, and Divisions" (32).

Dogmatism was destructive both of self-discipline, for

> "'Tis Pride, and Presumption of ones self that causeth such forwardness and assurance; and where those reign, there is neither Vertue nor Reason; No regular Government, but a miserable Tyranny of Passion and Self-will"(33),

and of national government,

> "For this is the ground of all the Schisms, and Strivings of Sects, that have fill'd our Air with Smoke and Darkness; yea, and kindled the fierce Flames that have consumed us." (34)

So, too, the Enthusiasts' denial of reason was a danger to the State: "This was the Engine to overthrow all sober Principles and Establishments" (35).

But there were other aspects of Enthusiasm which he criticised more briefly, and which are interesting studied chronologically rather than thematically. The Vanity of Dogmatizing and Scepsis Scientifica were written in the early 1660's, when Glanvill was excited by the possibilities both of science and of the Restoration. Comparatively little mention was made of Enthusiasm. An Apology for Philosophy did indeed refer to "stupid and Enthusiastic Ignorants" (36), but in connection with philosophy rather than government. The Preface to Scepsis Scientifica similarly attacked the Extremists' anti-rationalism, but Glanvill's words could refer equally well to either the Enthusiasts or the Roman Catholics. The main body of the work referred to the false

images conjured up by the corrupted imagination, but again it was related to science rather than sedition. He did indeed blame "the passionate Hurricanoes of the wild Enthusiast" (37) for undermining religion by destroying the rational foundations upon which it was built, but there was no political connotation.

Lux Orientalis preceded Scepsis Scientifica, but as the latter work was purely a revised edition of The Vanity of Dogmatizing, the two are best studied in conjunction with each other. Lux Orientalis, as has already been noted, was concerned mainly with stressing the goodness and amiability of God, and, though it was a tacit denial of the cruel Nonconformist God, there was no direct attack on Enthusiasm. In Philosophia Pia, essentially a defence of his own conformity, Glanvill made a fleeting reference to the Sectarian tendency to twist Scriptural texts, but again he was concerned with intellectual dogmatism rather than religious fanaticism. Seducismus Triumphatus contained attacks both by Glanvill and by More on the Sects, but again because of their detrimental effect on religion. The authors' aim was to help to stem the tide of atheism which had resulted from the quarrels and mistakes of Sectarianism.

With the sermon, Catholick Charity, came a new realisation of the wider issues involved in Enthusiasm. There was a note of pessimism: "How many, and how great have been the Feuds, and still are, of this tottering, and broken

Age" (38). Obviously the Restoration had failed to solve the religious and political differences of the period. Not only religion, but the good of the whole nation, necessitated love and charity to heal the divisions:

> "things in nature will quit their particular interests, when the common good so requireth; as heavy bodies will ascend, and light bodies descend, to prevent a chasme, and breach in nature." (39)

(This simile is interesting, in recalling Shakespeare's relation of private or national upsets to natural upheavals; the dreadful portents which preceded the assassination of Julius Caesar are but one example of this relationship which appears so often in Shakespeare's works.) Love, by destroying pride and selfishness, would root out enmity and divisions, and love, like truth, was not to be found in extremes, but only in the middle way. Differences of opinion were not dangerous unless men tried to "vex their Neighbours, provoke their Rulers, and dissettle Government for the Propagation of them." (40) This sermon was the religious parallel to The Vanity of Dogmatizing, with the Sectarians replacing the Aristotelians and Schoolmen. It was their dogmatism and lack of charity which had degraded religion; they did not err through infirmities of the understanding, which would be forgiveable, but through the sins of pride and malice. Universal toleration would be the perfect solution, provided that it was indeed universal, but, by the nature of Sectarianism, this would be impossible, and so he advocated

limited toleration as befitted the "Interests of Religion, and Publick Safety." (41)

The Seasonable Recommendation returned to the defence of reason in religion, accusing both the Enthusiasts and the Roman Catholics of attacking reason, and thereby both degrading religion and encouraging atheism. But it was the Enthusiasts who were chiefly responsible. Their

> "sickly Conceits, and Enthusiastick Dreams, and unsound Doctrines that have poyson'd our Air, and infatuated the Minds of Men, and expos'd Religion to the scorn of Infidels, and divided the Church, and disturbed the Peace of Mankind, and involv'd all the Nation in so much Blood, and so many Ruines; I say hereby, all these fatal Follies, that have been the occasions of so many Mischiefs, have been propagated and promoted. On which accounts I think I may affirm, with some confidence, That here is the Spring-Head of most of the Watters of Bitterness and Strife; And here the Fountain of the Great Deeps of Atheism and Fanaticism, that are broken up upon us." (42)

The Praefatory Answer was a defence of his scientific attitude, but Philosophia Pia, which was again a defence of reason in religion, continued the attack on the Enthusiasts. As it received its final form in The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion (43), it will be studied in its place among the Essays.

Essay I, Against Confidence in Philosophy, was, as has already been noted, based on The Vanity of Dogmatizing; Essay II was concerned with Scepticism and Certainty. Essay III with Modern Improvements of Useful Knowledge, and none of them contained political attacks on the Enthusiasts, apart

from the passage already quoted from Essay I. The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion linked scientific ignorance with sedition:

> "For 'tis ignorance of God and his Works, that disposeth Men to absurd ridiculous Surmises, uncharitable Censures, seditious Machinations; and (so) to Thoughts that are prejudicial to the Glory of God, the Interests of Religion, and the security of Government." (44)

In this particular context, Glanvill may well have been referring to Roman Catholicism rather than Enthusiasm, as he was attacking superstition, but he frequently argued that the ignorant were more susceptible to the influence of Enthusiasm than were the better-educated, and Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy (45) referred specifically to the superstitiousness of the Sects. The fifth and sixth Essays on The Agreement of Reason and Religion and Against Modern Sadducism have already been studied in their original forms, but the final essay was a new work, and continued the attack on Enthusiasm even more strongly. Glanvill pictured the Sects, having failed in their attempt to become the established religion, and having turned to rebellion and regicide, as being "Monsters, full grown at their Birth, with weapons in their hands ready for Battel" (46). This was the period of dissension and controversy, when the Enthusiasts were dogmatic and intolerant, and Glanvill went so far as to say that erroneous beliefs, if held with humility, were preferable to correct doctrines, if they were maintained by proud, ungovernable disputers. He attacked the

Sects for their lack of tolerance, and for their destruction of church government; for, because they had nothing with which to replace the Episcopacy, there was continual dissension. He referred to the increase in appeal of Sectarian preachers for a period, because they were persecuted. Although this essay was ostensibly a picture of religion in Bensalem, it was in fact, as Glanvill himself said, "a mixture of an Idaea, and a disguised History" (47), and, as such, plays an important part in the study of Glanvill's attitude to Enthusiasm. It is interesting that he depicted the New Divines as doing most to counteract the influence of the Fanatics. From the methods and ideas which he quoted it is clear that he was referring to the Cambridge Platonists. He clearly did not consider them blameworthy in that they turned against the Puritanism in which they had been educated. The extreme form of this religion which had survived was corrupted and bigotted, and he made the point that the New Divines, in that they grew up during the period of bitterest Sectarianism, were enabled both to understand it and therefore to combat it, for knowledge of the Sects increased their hatred of this form of religious extremism.

By the time that he wrote the Essay Concerning Preaching, Glanvill, as has already been noted, realised the dangers of sermons entirely devoid of zeal or emotion; he felt that coldness suggested lack of conviction, and attacked the contemporary Anglican style of preaching as well as the

"Ignorant Canters" (48) of the Nonconformist church. But he criticised the Nonconformist preaching for its wider effect on the nation:

> "mysterious, notional preaching hath put many conceited people upon medling with what they can never well understand, and so hath fill'd them with air, and vanity, and made them proud, phantastical, and troublesome; disobedient to their Governours, and contemptuous to their betters." (49)

The Seasonable Defence of Preaching traced briefly the rise and fall in the popularity of Puritan preachers in recent years, and stressed that much of the later dislike of ministers of any denomination was due to the preaching of rebellion by Puritan ministers. At this time (1678), he attributed the increased popularity of Puritanism to several causes, particularly fear of Popery, discontent, opposition to the Establishment, the glamour of persecution, and the glory of so-called godliness.

The sermon on The Way of Happiness linked self-discipline with submission to God and one's superiors as essential to true virtue. Christian goodness did not only ensure one's personal happiness but also public happiness, by establishing national peace. The Enthusiasts, on the other hand, claimed to be religious, but in fact were wicked in that they destroyed this public peace and religious unity. The Fast Sermon on the King's Martyrdom was of course one of the plainest statements of his attitude to the seditious tendencies of Nonconformism. He acknowledged that the

period in which he lived was unfortunate in that it was particularly susceptible to harmful religious doctrines:

> "And if ever Times were under cross and unlucky Aspects, if ever there were a publick Spirit of Phrensie and Mischief in the World in any days, since the first; certainly this Lot is fallen upon ours" (50).

He made a biting attack on the damage which the Enthusiasts had done to the nation; their "seditious Principles have shot their poysonous arrows into the vitals of the publick Body." (51) He argued that it was actually sinful to resist lawful authority in that it affronted the authority of God, for the King was divinely appointed, and that it was contrary to the spirit of religion. The result of sin was punishment, which in this case took the form of the destruction of society and its interests. It was inconsistent for men to quibble over minor points of doctrine, when they accepted sacrilege and rebellion without argument. Glanvill described vividly the way that rebellion grew from minor discontents until it destroyed government, and led to anarchy. The promises of the Enthusiasts were never fulfilled:

> "O the blessed Reformation, that filled our Pulpits, and emptied our Purses...Were we not well freed from evil Counsellors, when we made Kings of the worst we had? And was not Tyranny well extirpated, when we were under an Army of Tyrants?...the Nation shall be made happy with New-nothings, and golden Mountains; with Chimaera's of Common-wealths, and fine names for Slavery." (52)

Cromwell's dictatorship was followed by anarchy and then fortunately by the Restoration, but the government and the

laws were irremediably weakened by the Rebellion. As the Rebellion was destructive of civil peace, so it was also destructive of Christian religion and virtue. This is an aspect of Glanvill's attack on Enthusiasm which will be studied in further detail in the final chapter of this thesis, but it is important to realise that he saw rebellion not only as a crime, but also as a sin. Humility both in spiritual and worldly matters would ensure an everlasting peace. Interestingly enough, this sermon is one of Glanvill's most elaborate and rhetorical pieces of writing. His eulogy of Charles I may sound overdone and insincere, but nevertheless there was a real feeling of bitterness against the Enthusiasts throughout the sermon. The last sermon by Glanvill in this collection, on The Antiquity of our Faith, attacked the Roman Catholics as well as the Sectarians for their destruction of both ecclesiastical and civil peace, but there was not the same bitterness as in the Fast Sermon.

His final work, The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant, showed an even more determined bias against Popery. Religious dissent might well cause Roman Catholicism to triumph, for the Church of England

> "now is twisted with our Monarchy, and the whole frame of our Civil Government, so that the overthrow of one, will be the destruction of both. If this Church should be overturned...confusion in the State must follow, and then Anarchy, and cutting Throats; and 'tis most likely, Popery at last." (53)

Apparently Popery was now a greater threat than atheism. Neither Presbyterianism nor Independency could ward off that danger; only the Church of England could claim to "stand on the grounds of Scripture, right Reason, and the best and purest Antiquity" (54), as well as at the same time being suitable to English civil government and laws. There are times when it appears that Glanvill supported the Church of England because he saw in it a source of peace, rather than because he found in its doctrines a basis for religious truth and spiritual inspiration. The threat of Popery forced Glanvill to plead for greater, though still limited toleration, even whilst he admitted that many Nonconformists had actually forwarded the cause of Roman Catholicism by their attacks on the Church of England, and by their lack of unity, which gave grounds for the Papists' accusations that

> "You have no Principles, are fastned to no Foundation; float up and down like the Waves of the Sea, still rouling from one Sect to another." (55)

The whole work was depressing and somewhat incoherent. In one passage Glanvill, as has been mentioned, pleaded for greater toleration, yet later he argued that compromise with the less extreme dissenters alone was feasible. He spoke in one place of the "wild Beasts of the Roman Forrest" (56), and the main part of the work was an attack on Popery, but at the end he argued that it would be impossible to establish Roman Catholicism in England. He painted a

gloomy view of the Anglican Church, with poor, ignorant clergy, ridiculed or ignored by the majority of the population, labelled as Papists by the Nonconformists, and accused of coldness and indifference. Yet, conversely, he claimed that it was people's hatred of the Dissenters' zeal which had led to this lack of affection. The work gives the impression of having been written rather carelessly, without much attention to detail, and apparently as an attempt to clear himself from charges of Popery. There was a new virulence in his attacks on both the extreme forms of religion, allied with a note of personal bitterness. Disillusionment had again set in, for the Restoration of the Monarchy had by no means proved the Restoration of the Established Church as he believed it should be, and, though he clung to his belief in Anglicanism as the one safe form of religion for England, it might well be destroyed by its own weaknesses, as well as by attacks from outside.

This attempt at a chronological study of Glanvill's attacks on Enthusiasm shows some consistency in the development of his ideas. It is difficult, of course, to separate phases completely, when so much of his work was either rewritten or republished so frequently. But there does appear to be a general trend. In the beginning, he was more concerned to attack the dogmatism and authoritarianism which beset the new philospohy, and to defend his own position against accusations of atheism. Later he was con-

cerned with the effects on religion of Enthusiasm, with its own faults of dogmatism, tyranny, and anti-rationalism. Then he saw the wider issues at stake, for, as the Church and the Monarchy were so inextricably related, Nonconformism could only lead to the fall of stable government and to [illegible] anarchy. At the same time, as the Monarch held his position by Divine Right, and was the representative of God, rebellion was not only against the nation's interest, but was actually a sin.

It is possible to accuse Glanvill of being somewhat superficial in his religious ideas, and there are times when it may be felt that he pleaded for the Anglican Church on political and social, rather than spiritual grounds. And possibly he was himself intolerant to the point of irrationality in his accusations against Enthusiasm - though it is a natural human trait to attack most bitterly that with which one has previously sympathised. He was neither a great nor a particularly respected man, and, to modern eyes, occasionally appears over-credulous, if not actually stupid, but it is unfair to accuse him of hypocrisy and inconsistency in his attitude to Enthusiasm. That he was brought up in the Puritan religion in no way falsified his own position. Increasing disillusionment with the movement, the rejection of childhood prejudices, and developing maturity all helped to account for his conversion to the

Church of England. What did matter was that he remained loyal to his own beliefs, even in the face of ridicule and persecution.

CHAPTER VI - REFERENCES.

1. Trevelyan, G.M. England under the Stuarts; 21st ed. London, 1957. Chs.7-12. (Much of the historical detail of this chapter is based on this work of Trevelyan's. Other works consulted, but not specifically referred to, include:-
   Baker, H. The Wars of Truth.
   Bush, D. English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 1600-1660.
   Trevelyan, G.M. English Social History. London, 1945

2. Burnet, G. The Life of William Bedell.

3. Gillespie, G. A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons... 1644.

4. Palmer, H. Scripture and Reason Pleaded for Defensive Armes. London, 1642

5. Calendar of State Papers. Domestic Series...1661-1662. P.517.

6. Cheynell, F. Sions Memento...a Sermon... before the Honourable House of Commons...1643.

7. Trevelyan, G.M. England under the Stuarts.

8. Hutton, W.H. The English Church from the Accession of Charles I. London, 1903.

9. Fairfax, T., Third Lord Short Memorials of Some Things to be Cleared during My Command in the Army. (In Stuart Tracts, 1603-1693. London, 1903.)

10. Bosher, R.S. The Making of the Restoration Settlement. London, 1951.

11. Marvell, A. The Rehearsal Transpos'd. Pt.I.

Chapter VI - References, cont.

12. Ferguson, R. — The Interest of Reason in Religion.

13. Cudworth, R. — A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons... 1647.

14. Gauden, J. — Hieraspistes. London, 1653.

15. The Counter-plot, or the Close Conspiracy of Atheism and Schism. P.23.

16. Fullwood, F. — The Case of the Times Discuss'd.

17. Peacham, H. — The Truth of Our Times. P.183.

18. Idem, p.150.

19. Taylor, J. — Selections from his sermons. (In The Oxford Book of English Prose; ed. Sir A. Quiller-Couch. Oxford, 1925. P.240.)

20. The Counter-plot, or the Close Conspiracy of Atheism and Schism.

21. Fullwood, F. — Op.cit.

22. Stubbe, H. — A Reply. P.29. (In Stubbe, H.- The Lord Bacon's Relation of the Sweating-sickness.)

23. Evelyn, J. — The Diary; ed. E.S. de Beer. Vol.IV, entry dated 29.5.1678.

24. Hickes, G. — The Harmony of Divinity and Law. London, 1684.

25. Lukin, H. — The Practice of Godliness. London, 1658.

26. - — The Life of Faith. London, 1660.

27. Sprat, T. — The History of the Royal-Society of London; 2nd ed. P.428.

28. Cragg, G.R. — From Puritanism to the Age of Reason. Ch.2.

29. Sprat, T. — Op.cit., p.152.

Chapter VI - References, cont.

30. Fell, J. The Character of the Last Daies. Oxford, 1675.

31. Glanvill, J. Catholick Charity Recommended. P.28.

32. Idem, p.25.

33. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay I,, p.30.

34. Idem, Essay I,p.31.

35. Idem, Essay V, p.28.

36. Glanvill, J. The Vanity of Dogmatizing.P.236.

37. - Scepsis Scientifica. P.153.

38. - Catholick Charity Recommended. P.1.

39. Idem, p.17.

40. Idem, p.37.

41. Idem, p.60.

42. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay V, pp.1-2.

43. Idem, Essay IV.

44. Idem, Essay IV, p.16.

45. Idem, Essay VII.

46. Idem, Essay VII, p.5.

47. Idem, Essay VII, p.3.

48. Glanvill, J. An Essay Concerning Preaching. P.91.

49. Idem, pp.19-20.

50. Glanvill, J. Some Discourses.

51. Idem, p.153.

52. Idem, pp.170-1.

Chapter VI - References, cont.

53. Glanvill, J. The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant. P.3.

54. Idem, p.7.

55. Idem, p.25.

56. Idem, p.17.

CHAPTER VII - RELIGION IS AN HOLY LIFE.

Cope claims that Glanvill was an Anglican apologist, but it might well be argued that he was rather a hater of Enthusiasm, to whom the Church of England - or, at any rate, his conception of the Church of England - represented the best existing alternative form of religion. It is interesting to note that, whilst his bitterest comments were reserved for the extreme forms of Puritanism, his warmest praise was given to the Cambridge Platonists, with their blend of all that was best in Anglicanism and Puritanism. Various facets of Glanvill's attack on Enthusiasm have been studied in previous chapters of this thesis. His dislike of dogmatism, whether philosophical or spiritual, his belief in reason and distrust of the imagination, his plea for simple and practical, yet zealous preaching, his stress on the necessity for love and charity both in God and in man, his hatred of the seditious tendencies of Sectarianism; all these were bound up in his attack on Enthusiasm. Baker (1) maintains that the history of the differences between Anglicanism and Puritanism was virtually the history of English thought for half a century, and it is because Glanvill mirrored so consistently both English thought and these differences, that the study of his reaction against Enthusiasm is so interesting and illuminating.

It might also be argued that Glanvill was not, at any rate in his earlier years, a cleric by vocation. He could

well be termed a philosopher manqué, and one feels that his periodic outbursts of scorn against the vulgar mass were rather those of a scientist against the ignorant, than of a cleric against the laity. It is noticeable, too, that his praise of the Church of England emphasised its value in the preservation of the social order, rather than its spiritual qualities. One is tempted to describe his praise of it as negative rather than positive, and noticeably devoid of that zeal which he so ardently advocated.

In pursuance of the idea that Glanvill was rather a hater of Enthusiasm, than a convinced supporter of Anglicanism, it is interesting to study his picture of the four main religious groups of his time - the Anglican Church, the Cambridge Platonists, the Nonconformists, and the Roman Catholics.

The poor state of the Church of England has already been referred to. Bush (2) claims that Puritan zeal, hated as it was by many, was a rebuke to Anglican lethargy. Glanvill was not alone in appealing for greater affection, but unfortunately the later Latitudinarians were more anxious to be decorous and correct than zealous and inspiring. McAdoo, however, finds more to praise in seventeenth century Anglicanism. Like Glanvill, he sees in it a "Middle Way" opposing the extremes of Catholicism and Enthusiasm:

> "The verdict of the Anglican was that the Roman infallibilism tyrannises over conscience by striking at liberty, and the Puritan over liberty by offending against reason" (3).

Various writers ascribed the neglect of the Established Church to various causes: Gauden (4) blamed the fall of the clergy on internal sin, earlier conformity, and their tendency to quibble over points of doctrine. Crusius (5) put the evils of the times down to neglect of youthful education and discipline, and to the prevalent contempt for the clergy, largely occasioned by their poor standards of preaching (though it must be admitted that he did not confine his criticism to the Anglican Church). Eachard (6) again stressed poor preaching, along with the ignorance, unsuitability, and worldly poverty of the clergy, for their decline.

Praise for the Church of England was frequently half-hearted. Stubbe (7) spoke of it as ancient and apostolic, as the least defining and therefore most comprehensive, and as promoting sober piety. Sprat claimed that "The universal Disposition of this Age is bent upon a rational Religion" (8), and that the Church of England best fulfilled this demand. It is both typical and symptomatic that he compared the Anglican Church to the Royal Society. One of his visitation sermons stressed the desire of the Anglican Church to influence the reason rather than the emotions:

> "Here the more advised and modest, the more deliberate and prepared the preacher is, the better he is furnished, by God's grace, to deliver effectually our Church's solid sense, its fixed precepts, its unalterable doctrines. Our Church pretends not to enter into men's judgments merely by the affections; much less by the passions to overthrow their judgments. The door, which that strives first to open, is of the understanding and conscience: it is content, if by them a passage shall be made into the affections." (9)

But perhaps More (10) made some of the most illuminating comments when he argued that some people were not intelligent enough to choose their own religion, and that their safety and duty lay in the Church of England, which was authoritative, and left no room for individual voices.

On the whole, Glanvill's recommendation of the Anglican Church seemed to be based upon common sense rather than conviction. The Preface to his Lux Orientalis (11) gave some of his reasons for preferring it to any other form of religion: it was reasonable and charitable, in that it did not enforce conformity in non-essential beliefs, it was open to free enquiry, and based its doctrine on a few, essential beliefs. In Seasonable Reflections, Glanvill based his claim that the Church of England was the best Church on the fact that it was neither gaudy, like the Roman Catholic Church, nor sordid, like the Nonconformist religion. He asserted that no Church had better clergy, and none more scorned, but he ascribed this scorn to the faults of the laity, not to

the sins of the clergy. Conversely, in his Seasonable Defence of Preaching, Glanvill admitted that, even though the laity were to blame for much of the ill-repute of the Church, the clergy were not entirely blameless. The Churches Prayer, and Complaint again stressed that the Anglican Church was the best, being free from the superstition and idolatry of the Roman Catholic Church, and the vanity of the Enthusiasts, rejecting both "painted bravery" and "sordid slovenliness" (12). It was based upon the primitive form of Christianity, and its clergy were the best possible, yet still it was reviled, and accused of tyranny, idolatry and superstition. He laid down various rules to enable the younger clergy to improve their standing, and appealed above all for true, practical, sincere goodness. Again he blamed the laity for much of the disrepute into which the Church had fallen. The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant repeated the claim that the Church of England stood alone "on the grounds of Scripture, right Reason, and the best and purest Antiquity" (13), but argued that it was losing its authority to the Catholics and Nonconformists. The work was impregnated with his belief that the Anglican Church was essential to the nation not only spiritually, but also politically, for without it, England would fall into a state of anarchy. It was the mean between dangerous extremes. He went on

to list what were, to him, the virtues of the Anglican Church: it was sober and moderate, it was based on wholesome doctrines, its prayers were serious and unaffected, its ceremonies few, ancient and decent, it claimed only spiritual power, and did not encroach on political matters, it secured obedience, it was charitable, and so on. But there was need for "sober, active Zeal" (14), and again he emphasised the qualities in preaching which would help to increase the respect in which the clergy were held.

These were his main arguments in support of the Anglican Church, and it is significant that they never inspired him to such heights of rhetoric as did the glories of science, the wickedness of the Enthusiasts, or the virtues of the Cambridge Platonists. He based arguments upon reason, and he stated them with clarity, but one feels a lack of fervour, of emotional conviction in his praise of Anglicanism. It was a sensible, a rational, a peaceable religion, but it does not appear to have been to Glanvill a religion of inspiration or of personal commitment.

So much has already been written about the Cambridge Platonists or Latitudinarians, that it would be impertinent in a thesis of this type to attempt a complete assessment of their aims and achievements. But perhaps it will be admissible to try to bring out one or two points, and to emphasise that even now there is considerable variation of opinion not only as to the value of the school, but even

as to its composition. Its very terminology is confused. Cragg (15) claims that the Latitudinarians were originally the Cambridge Platonists, and later the more liberal clergy, who lacked the depth and genius of their predecessors. Gough separates "rationalistic latitudinarianism" from "an eclectic mysticism, the so-called Cambridge Platonism, which attempted, with the aid of the Cartesian philosophy, to unite Christianity with the Platonic, Neoplatonic and Talmudic systems" (16). Clark (17) gives Latitudinarianism as an alternative name, after about 1662, for the Cambridge Platonists, a view supported by Patrick's A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men (18), whilst Mullinger (19) claims that More founded the Cambridge Platonist movement, and Whichcote helped to establish Latitudinarianism. Some critics enlarge the School to admit Browne, Herbert, Worthington, and others (20), whilst other critics restrict it to the main figures of the movement. Nicolson (21) has an interesting article on the history of the Latitude-men, tracing their belief in the necessity for moderation and liberalism in both theology and politics, and the growing opposition to that belief. Similarly, there is disparity of opinion as to the quality and achievements of the movement. Cassirer (22) describes it as archaic and of minor importance, whilst Cragg (23) argues that it was the source of eighteenth century Deism and Orthodoxy, and the Cambridge History

of English Literature (24) claims that it saved the Church of England from further deterioration. It would be possible to continue further with examples of conflicting opinions, but there are some aspects of the movement upon which most critics appear to be agreed. It was rooted in Puritanism, preserving the best of Calvinism, but opposing that sect's concept of an arbitrary God, and its tendency to denigrate man. It attempted to carry on the tradition of Christian humanism, to reunite religion and reason, to stress moral goodness rather than unessential doctrine, to restore charity and tolerance. Passmore (25) writes on its influence in the secularisation of moral theory. Some of its members moved away from the main stream into mysticism or supernaturalism, but the general impression remains of a movement based upon an essentially civilised and humanitarian religion. Some of the Cambridge Platonists may be criticised for an archaic or pedantic style, but their works were imbued with love and sincerity, and in such writers as Cudworth, they frequently achieved passages of truly poetic beauty. Interestingly enough, in view of Glanvill's concept of the Anglican Church as being the Middle Way, Campagnac (26) describes the Cambridge Platonists as desiring to find the middle way between the Laudian and the Puritan Churches, urging morality against the former and reason against the latter, and the individual conscience, governed and illuminated by

the reason, against them both. Nevertheless, Nicolson argues "To More - and to most of the others of the group - both monarchy and episcopacy were more than traditionally right; they were rational and natural" (27), and this belief brought them much closer to the Anglican Church than to Nonconformism. In an interesting article on Passmore's study of Cudworth, Carré (28) points out that the morality and ethics of Cudworth, and indeed of all the Cambridge Platonists, were based upon humanitarian ideals, rather than upon rationalist principles, and this humanism was fully appreciated by their contemporary, Fowler (who also interestingly enough referred to their desire to find a middle way (29)). But unfortunately, as Powicke (30) points out, the mystical element which gave so much beauty and power to their teaching, gradually disappeared, and the morality based on humanitarianism which they preached gave way to utilitarianism. It would be possible to study the movement in very much greater detail, and to examine the relative importance of the influence of such philosophers as Plato, Plotinus and Bacon, but the important question in this thesis is not their philosophy, but their influence upon Glanvill. This aspect is studied in Chapter 3 of Cope's work (31), in which he concludes that Glanvill had a greater affinity with the Cambridge Platonists than with the later Latitudinarians.

The fullest expression of his attitude to Cambridge

Platonism appeared, of course, in the final essay, Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy, although there were earlier references to their ideas, as in Scepsis Scientifica, where Glanvill criticised their theory of the soul. In this Essay, the Cambridge Platonists or Latitudinarians appeared under the label of the New Divines. The first aspect which Glanvill stressed was their immense learning in every subject, and their clear thinking:

> "They furnished their Minds with great variety of Conceptions, and rendred themselves more capable of judging of the Truth, or likelihood of any propos'd Hypothesis." (32)

There were three main methods which they used to combat Sectarianism: they freed themselves and tried to free others from the tyranny of prejudice and authority, they advocated "modesty in Opinions" (33), and they refused to enforce their own ideas, for "Their main Design was, to make Men good, not notional, and knowing" (34). In order to further the spread of anti-fanatical religion, they studied the Sects closely, whilst remaining loyal to the old Church of Bensalem, and refuted the Enthusiasts' imagination by their advocacy of reason, for

> "'Twas time now, in such an Age as this, to assert the sober use of Reason, and to rescue Religion by it." (35)

They supported Christianity itself by demonstrating its truth and reasonableness, and answered accusations of

putting reason before religion by stressing the goodness and love of God, and the primary importance of truth and virtue. They attacked the theories of predestination and of justification by faith, emphasising that the aim of religion was to perfect human nature, by restoring the empire of the mind over the will and affections. For them, the essential principles of salvation were few and plain, which reduced religious dissension. They attacked the false spontaneity, ecstacies, zeal and over-particular doctrine of the Enthusiasts, believing

> "That every lover of God, and of the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, who lives according to the few, great acknowledg'd Doctrines, and Rules of a vertuous and holy life, is a true Christian, and will be happy;"

despite ignorance or errors (36). They turned the Enthusiasts' accusations of superstition back against them, as they did many of their other arguments. They supported the Episcopal form of church government as being the most venerable, antique and universal form, and based upon apostolic authority. Their rules for sermon style were, according to Glanvill, remarkably akin to his own. He went on to discuss briefly their philosophical, metaphysical, and mathematical ideas, and their attitude to various religious authorities, but one has the impression that he was not greatly interested in their deeper thinking. He summarised them, perhaps rather uninterestingly, as men who

> "followed a sober, vertuous course, without flanting shews, and pretensions; and liv'd in an innocent,

> even cheerfulness, without rapture, on the one hand, or dejection, on the other." (37)

There was certainly no room for Browne in Glanvill's definition of the New Divines.

Although he carefully referred to them as the New Divines, it is apparent from various comments that he was writing of the Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians, and several interesting points arise from the picture which he gave of them. Firstly, he chose to ignore any connections which they might have with the Puritans, and definitely grouped them with the ancient and apostolic Church of England. They had indeed studied the ideas and methods of the Sectarian churches, but only in order to combat them the better. Then he gave to them the full credit for preventing further deterioration in the position of the Anglican Church, and for defeating the Sectarians - though this latter achievement might be described as wishful thinking rather than reality. As has been mentioned, he ascribed to them ideas on sermon style which reflected his own beliefs, and to which, in fact, they did not conform. He spoke of their desire for zeal, which was noticeably absent from some of the later Latitudinarians. His portrayal of them as eminently sensible and restrained allowed no room for the mysticism of such a thinker as More - nor indeed for his own moments of passionate emotion. This final essay was, as Glanvill himself said, both an idea and a disguised history, but anyone who read it with-

out knowing anything more of the Cambridge Platonists would have a very biased impression of them. Glanvill failed to appreciate the depth of thought, the blending of humanism with religion, the breadth of vision, the intensity of the Cambridge Platonists. He indeed praised them highly, but he saw them as members of the Church of England, the middle way between Enthusiasm and Catholicism, and opposing both extremes, rather than as the middle way between Puritanism and Anglicanism, attempting to preserve and synthesise the best of both these forms of religion. It is significant that he criticised Quakerism as "that Sink of Folly and Madness" (38), whilst More, in his Observation on...the foregoing Letter later in the same work, defended the Quakers as being much improved since Glanvill wrote. Indeed, later writers (39) have noted the similarities between the Quakers and the Cambridge Platonists, whilst Bush (40) comments on the changes in Calvinism which, by as early as 1640, had brought it much closer to Cambridge Platonism. One is left with the impression that Glanvill looked on the New Divines or Cambridge Platonists as essentially rational and practical and as the most effective opponents of Sectarianism and Enthusiasm. To him they were members of the Anglican Church, and therefore he himself might be termed an Anglican Apologist, in that he defended their position. But the Cambridge Platonists themselves might well have

argued against his assessment of their position, and it would appear that Glanvill based his ideas of them rather upon his own anti-Enthusiasm than upon their own Anglicanism.

Seventeenth century Nonconformism is one of the most difficult religious movements to define. Puritanism itself first appeared in the second half of the Sixteenth Century, but by the Seventeenth Century there were three main groups of Nonconformists: the Presbyterians, who wished to reorganise the Anglican Church on the lines of Scottish Presbyterianism; the Independents, who were opposed to both the Anglican and the Presbyterian forms of church government; and the numerous Sects. Originally a purely religious movement, by the mid-Seventeenth Century Puritanism had become political as well, and the main achievement of Puritanism in this country was to obtain political rather than religious freedom. Many people, indeed, allied themselves to the Puritan movement from political rather than religious motives, because of the unconstitutionalism of the Stuart kings, and the intolerance of the Laudian Church. But many people, too, were alienated by the extremism of the Fanatics, and, as was noted in the previous chapter of this thesis, Puritanism ceased to be a force after the Restoration, and the tradition of Nonconformism was kept alive by various Sects.

Many Nonconformists disliked Sectarianism. Ferguson's

The Interest of Reason in Religion was careful to differentiate between Nonconformism and Enthusiasm. Both Cudworth (41) and More (42), although they had Nonconformist sympathies, attacked the Sects as endangering Christianity. Even George Cockayn (43) warned of the dangers which might ensue from religious dissension. The rapidly increasing fear of the Enthusiasts was recorded by many writers. As early as 1638, Peacham's The Truth of our Times attacked the cunning of the Sects, and its influence upon the ignorant. Sprat spoke of the Church of England's need to oppose both the Roman Catholics and the Enthusiasts (44). Gauden (45) believed that the new Sects were more dangerous to the Church of England than was the Papacy. Again, it would be possible to quote at far greater length on this fear and hatred of the Fanatics, but Glanvill himself summed up practically every point in his various works, so that Cope claims that

> "The impetus for his lifelong concern with the problem of knowledge was Glanvill's fear of and disgust for religious nonconformity and what he felt was its ultimate outcome, atheism" (46).

It is significant that his dislike of the Enthusiasts (he rarely used the term Nonconformists) evoked some of his most passionate and vivid writing.

Many of the charges which Glanvill levelled against the Enthusiasts have been studied in earlier chapters of this thesis. But in attempting to trace his attitude to the four main religious movements of his time, it is

perhaps permissible to summarise briefly some of the points which have already been made. The most serious attack which Glanvill made against a so-called religious movement was that in fact it helped to destroy religion, and to encourage atheism. Both the Dedication to the Duke of Richmond and Lenox, and A Whip for the Droll Fidler, in Saducismus Triumphatus, referred to the tendency for Sectarian dissension to spread atheism. The Agreement of Reason and Religion (47) blamed the Enthusiasts for atheism and fanaticism. The Fast Sermon on the King's Martyrdom claimed that men were so busy arguing about, and fighting for, religion, that they ended up by destroying it: "Men had learnt to be godly, without goodness, and Christians without Christianity." (48)

This tendency of Enthusiasm to destroy religion and to encourage atheism stemmed from many causes. To a large extent, it was due to the movement's lack of true morality. The sermon on The Way of Happiness (reprinted in Glanvill's Some Discourses) pointed out that a man may be devout and eloquent in prayer, but it was valueless if he was in fact evil. Later in the same sermon, he spoke of the danger of disparaging virtue, claiming that the Enthusiasts had divided religion from morality. The same theme reappeared in The Fast Sermon on the King's Martyrdom, but he went even further, in accusing the Enthusiasts

of basing their slovenly religion on pride and self-love. Pride was to him one of the greatest sins of the Sects:

> "Thus they swell and swagger in their fantastick imaginations, 'till some other Sect as well conceited as themselves endeavour to take their Plumes from them" (49).

(This passage reflects, too, his belief in the instability of the Enthusiasts, akin to that of the philosopher who formed his opinions without due consideration.) Glanvill's Seasonable Reflections also contained bitter attacks on this form of pride, whilst Against Modern Sadducism spoke of

> "those that are Passionate and Conceited, Turbulent and Notional, Confident and Immodest, Imperious and Malicious; That doat upon Trifles, and run fiercely in the ways of a Sect; that are lifted up in the apprehension of the glorious Prerogatives of themselves and their Party, and scorn all the World besides" (50).

This pride resulted in dogmatism and intolerance, which he described in the final essay, Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy, in loss of charity, which he pleaded for in Catholick Charity Recommended, and in tyranny:

> "Religion! We have seen it dy'd with humane blood, and swoln with spoil and rapine: written on the foreheads of tyrannies and usurpations, and pleaded as the CAUSE, the CAUSE of prosperous Villanies. Divided into Atoms of Sects, and disputed into Air of opinions: Entitled to all the vanities of sick imagination, and claim'd by all the follies of zealous ignorance." (51)

In The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant, he likened Presbyterianism and Independency to Roman Catholicism in that they all tried to bind men's thoughts. This intolerance was the cause of the controversies which had not only

split the country, but had brought religion itself into disrepute. And it was bound up with the Sects' degradation of religion "into meer empty Fantastick Notionality." (52) The Agreement of Reason and Religion (53) blamed the conceits, dreams, and unsound doctrines of the Enthusiasts for the civil and religious unrest, and for the accompanying tendency towards atheism. Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy (54) accused the Sectarians of turning to rebellion, and it made no attempt to convict any but the religious fanatics of causing the Civil War.

Glanvill's emphasis on the Enthusiasts' glorification of the imagination and denial of reason has already been studied in an earlier chapter of this thesis. Even in Scepsis Scientifica, in the Preface to the Royal Society, he accused the Nonconformists of being against both religion and philosophy, whilst Philosophia Pia, later reprinted as Essay IV, The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion, and Essay V, The Agreement of Reason and Religion, based upon A Seasonable Recommendation, carried on the attack. The Sects"villified Reason as Carnal, and Incompetent, and an Enemy to the things of the Spirit"(55). The Sermon on the Moral Evidence of a Life to Come blamed the Enthusiasts' irrationality and belief in the imagination for their inconsistency of doctrine. One moment they were convinced of immortality, the next certain that there was no afterlife. This note on reason and imagination

is not a summary of Chapter III, but an attempt to show that Glanvill's attack on the anti-rationalism of the Fanatics was consistent throughout his writing life.

The Enthusiasts were guilty of other lesser sins. Their slovenliness and showiness have already been referred to. They were as great formalists as the Roman Catholics, with their "Orthodox Opinions, devout Phrases, set Looks, melting Tones, affected Sighs, and vehement Raptures" (56). In The Fast Sermon on the King's Martyrdom, Glanvill accused the Nonconformists of being unwilling to accept the Scriptural commands of obedience, and of therefore twisting or evading them. Although

> "The great Precepts of the Gospel are cloathed in Sun-beams, and are as visible to the common eye, as to the Eagle upon the highest perch" (57),

yet the Enthusiasts insisted upon clouding them with their own interpretations, or bending them to their own use. Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy accused them of a long list of sins, arguing

> "That though they shew'd great seeming tenderness of Conscience in other smaller matters ofMint, Anise, and Cummin; Yet they seldom appear'd sensible, or troubl'd at their transgressions in those greater matters of the Law." (58)

This theme of the hypocrisy of the Enthusiasts occurred frequently in Glanvill's writings. Not only did they deceive themselves, but they led others, particularly the ignorant, astray. Glanvill's Seasonable Reflections claimed that

> "They despise the publick orders of the Church, and contemn those that are not in the mode of singularity and separation." (59)

In the same work, in The Moral Evidence of a Life to Come, Glanvill blamed Enthusiasm as being one of the main causes of the current disbelief in an afterlife, with the consequent disregard of the necessity for virtue in this life.

The Roman Catholics on the other hand drew little virulence from Glanvill. True, he criticised their formalism and superstition, their anti-rationalism and tyranny, both spiritual and intellectual. But it was clear that he did not see in them the real enemies of religion and civil law. It was not until he himself was accused of sympathies with the Roman Catholics that he attacked them in The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant. And even then he laid much of the blame for their success on the sins of the Enthusiasts, and concluded that the Roman Catholics had very little hope of real success in England.

For further clarification of Glanvill's attitude to the four main religious groups of his time, it is interesting to study his various comments on what he believed to be the aims and qualities of true religion. To the young, scientifically-minded Glanvill, religion was as rational and well-defined as mathematics:

> "Our religious foundations are fastened at the pillars of the intellectual World, and the grand

> Articles of our Belief are as demonstrable as Geometry. Nor will ever either the subtile attempts of the resolved Atheist, or the passionate Hurricanoes of the wild Enthusiast, any more be able to prevail against the reason our Faith is built on, than the blustring winds to blow out the Sun. And for Mathematical Sciences, he that doubts their certainty, hath need of a dose of Hellebore." (60)

His early optimism and confidence, he later realised, were misplaced. By the time that he came to write Philosophia Pia, and its amended version in Essay IV, The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion, he was conscious that there were still many strong enemies of religion, of which the chief ones were atheism, sadducism, superstition, enthusiasm, and the humour of disputing. His fear of sadducism was so great that it led to the writing of Saducismus Triumphatus, and in The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion he also gave a short summary of his reasons for supporting the belief in witchcraft. Again there was constant stress on the clarity and certainty of religion, in order to destroy these various enemies. To combat atheism, he argued that

> "the Works of God are not like the compositions of Fancy, or the Tricks of Juglers, that will not bear a clear light, or strict scrutiny; but their exactness receives advantage from the severest inspection; and he admires most, that knows most." (61).

Superstition

> "consists, either in bestowing Religious Valuation and Esteem on things, in which there is no good; or fearing those, in which there is no hurt" (62).

Religion should make of man "a free, manly, and generous Spirit" (63), but superstition represents Christianity

> "as if it were a fond sneaking, weak and peevish thing, that emasculates Mens Understandings, making them amorous of toys, and keeping them under the servility of childish fears" (64).

Enthusiasm, too, painted a false picture of religion, and "hath introduced much phantastry into Religion, and made way for all imaginable Follies, and even Atheism it self." (65) And disputing not only resulted in losing the truth, but in pride and hypocrisy, so that men were led to value orthodoxy more than virtue, doctrine more than duty.

For Glanvill, religion should be clear and certain; it should also be essentially simple, being the worship of God through the duty we owe Him; duty comprised worship and virtue, and

> "Worship comprehends all Duties that immediately relate to God, as the Object of them; Vertue, all those that respect our Neighbour and our Selves." (66)

For Glanvill, there were three fundamental and essential principles of religion, and four accessory and assisting ones. In the sermon on Catholick Charity, Glanvill wrote of the necessity for a holy life, combined with a "few, plain, Fundamentals of Faith." (67) The whole sermon was full of the belief that "Religion is an Holy Life" (68). The same idea recurred in the sermon on The Way of Happiness: religion is plain and comprehensible,

> "'Tis no deep subtilty or high-strain'd notion; 'tis no gilded fancy, or elaborate exercise of the brain; 'Tis not plac'd in the clouds of Imagination, nor wrapt up in mystical cloathing" (69).

The aim of religion is "to live in a course of a sober vertue" (70), which can only be attained by faith, prayer and active endeavour. Religion and the Gospels seek to perfect human nature, and the state of grace is a sincere striving against evil, rather than conformity to unessential points of doctrine. Perfection for man consists in the subordination of his whole being to the mind as enlightened and directed by Divine and rational laws. Various forms of so-called religion are false, being rooted in pride, imagination, animal fervour and so on, and they are all equally worthless.

But there were other qualities of religion which Glanvill felt were essential. In his final sermon in "Some Discourses, he claimed that Christianity should be ancient, primitive, pure, peaceable, rational, certain and catholic. Both the Nonconformists and the Roman Catholics, he believed, had failed in all these; only the Church of England had preserved them.

It may be noted here that in his later years Glanvill appreciated the danger to religion of scoffers and wits, and it is interesting that he published his sermon on "The Sin and Danger of Scoffing at Religion along with sermons on the poor state of the Church of England, the evidence of an afterlife, and the consideration of a future judgement, in his Seasonable Reflections. Scoffing

was linked with Enthusiasm as two of the main causes of the degradation of the Established Church, and much of his argument against scoffing was bound up with his belief that it was against man's own interest. To Glanvill, scoffing had become the sin against the Holy Ghost, and it is interesting that Horneck felt these four sermons valuable enough to be reprinted in the posthumous volume of discourses and sermons.

From this summary of his religious ideas, it might well be argued that Glanvill was closer to the Cambridge Platonists than to orthodox Anglican opinion. He largely ignored the deeper layers of their thought, but, as once he had been a populariser of science, now he might well be termed a populariser of Cambridge Platonism. He viewed it with much the same optimism as once he had viewed science; it, too, would promote peace and benefit mankind.

This thesis has attempted to show that Glanvill's religious ideas were based rather upon his hatred and fear of the Enthusiasts, than upon his belief in the Anglican Church. Though he was perhaps inconsistent in some ways, yet in this he was, at any rate throughout the major portion of his life, surprisingly consistent. He maintained his attack even when it led to ridicule and persecution. His reaction against Enthusiasm was interesting, in that it coloured not only his religious ideas,

but every aspect of his thought. His political, philosophical, rational and stylistic beliefs were all bound up with it. It may perhaps be argued that he was not typical of his age, in that he came near to being a fanatic in his anti-fanaticism. It is true that he was particularly virulent in his attacks on Enthusiasm, but it should be remembered that many of the points which he made were also to be found in many other writers. What is interesting is that he, above all, co-ordinated and summarised these attacks. Others had written mainly from one specific angle, but he used every possible argument to support his contention that the Enthusiasts were dangerous spiritually, politically, and intellectually. By so doing, he chose to ignore any redeeming qualities which they may have had, but he also helped to clarify the reaction against Enthusiasm which was such an important factor in the development of later seventeenth century English thought.

CHAPTER VII - REFERENCES.

1. Baker, H. — The Wars of Truth.
2. Bush, D. — English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 1600-1660. Ch.10.
3. McAdoo, H.R. — The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology. London, 1949. P.6.
4. Gauden, J. — Hieraspistes.
5. Crusius, T.T. — The Origine of Atheism in the Popish and Protestant Churches.
6. Eachard, J. — The Grounds & Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy and Religion. (In An English Garner.)
7. Stubbe, H. — A Reply. (In Stubbe, H. - The Lord Bacon's Relation of the Sweating-sickness.)
8. Sprat, T. — The History of the Royal-Society of London; 2nd ed. P.374.
9. - — The Error of Extempore Prayer and Preaching. (In English Prose; ed. H. Craik. Vol.III, p.274.)
10. More, H. — Observations on...the Foregoing Letter. (In Glanvill, J.- Sadducismus Triumphatus.)
11. Glanvill, J. — Lux Orientalis. (In Glanvill, J. Two Choice and Useful Treatises.)
12. - — Some Discourses. P.144.
13. - — The Zealous, and Impartial Protestant. P.7.
14. Idem, p.37.
15. Cragg, G.R. — From Puritanism to the Age of Reason. Ch.4.
16. Cowley, A. — The Essays; ed. A.B. Gough; Introduction, p.xi.

Chapter VII - References, Cont.

17. Clark, G.N. — The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714. Oxford, 1934.

18. S.P. — A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-men. London, 1662.

19. Mullinger, J.B. — Cambridge Characteristics in the Seventeenth Century. London, 1867.

20. For example:-
Bush, D. — Op.cit., ch.10.
Tulloch, J. — Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy; 2nd ed.

21. Nicolson, M.H. — "Christ's College and the Latitude-men." M.P., 27(1929-30), pp.35-53.

22. Cassirer, E. — The Platonic Renaissance in England; transl. J.P.Pettegrove.

23. Cragg, G.R. — Op.cit.

24. Mullinger, J.B. — "Platonists and Latitudinarians." (In The Cambridge History of English Literature. Vol.VIII, ch.xi.)

25. Passmore, J.A. — Ralph Cudworth. Cambridge, 1951.

26. Campagnac, E.T. — The Cambridge Platonists.

27. Nicolson, M.H. — Op.cit.

28. Carré, M.H. — "Ralph Cudworth." Philosoph.Q., 3(1953), pp.342-51.

29. Fowler, E. — The Principles & Practices of Certain Moderate Divines of the Church of England; 2nd ed. P.295.

30. Powicke, F.J. — The Cambridge Platonists. London, 1926. Epilogue.

31. Cope, J.I. — Joseph Glanvill.

32. Glanvill, J. — Essays. Essay VII, p.9.

33. Idem, Essay VII, p.14

Chapter VII - References, cont.

34. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay VII, p.15.

35. Idem, Essay VII, p.19.

36. Idem, Essay VII, p.31.

37. Idem, Essay VII, pp.51-2.

38. Glanvill, J. Sadducismus Triumphatus. P.457.

39. For example:-
Hess, M.W. "A Quaker Plotinus." H.J., 29 (1930-1), pp.479-86.
Wright, L.M. The Literary Life of the Early Friends, 1650-1725.

40. Bush, D. Op.cit., ch.10.

41. Cudworth, R. A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons..1647.

42. More, H. Op.cit.

43. Cokayn, G. Flesh Expiring...a Sermon before the Honourable House of Commons. London, 1648.

44. Sprat, T. The History of the Royal-Society of London; 2nd ed., P.370.

45. Gauden, J. Op.cit.

46. Cope, J.I. "Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist." P.M.L.A., 69(1954), p.223.

47. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay V.

48. - Some Discourses. P.176.

49. Idem, pp.391-2.

50. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay VI, p.30.

51. - Some Discourses. P.207.

52. Idem, p.398.

Chapter VII - References, cont.

53. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay V.

54. Idem, Essay VII.

55. Idem, Essay VII, p.6.

56. Glanvill, J. Some Discourses. P.83.

57. Idem, p.4.

58. Glanvill, J. Essays. Essay VII, p.56.

59. - Seasonable Reflections. P.63.

60. - Scepsis Scientifica.

61. - Essays. Essay IV, p.6.

62. Idem, Essay IV, p.13.

63. Idem, Essay IV, p.13.

64. Idem, Essay IV, p.13.

65. Idem, Essay IV, p.17.

66. Idem, Essay V, p.3.

67. Glanvill, J. Catholick Charity Recommended. P.20.

68. Idem, p.31-2.

69. Glanvill, J. Some Discourses. Pp.3-4.

70. Idem, p.59.

CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WORKS OF JOSEPH GLANVILL.

(Note:- Italicisation, black-letter, rubrics and rules have been omitted.)

The VANITY of / Dogmatizing: / OR / Confidence in Opinions. / Manifested in a / DISCOURSE / OF THE / Shortness and Uncertainty / OF OUR / KNOWLEDGE, / And its CAUSES; / With some / Reflexions on Peripateticism; / AND / An Apology for PHILOSOPHY. / By JOS. GLANVILL, M.A. / London, Printed by E.C. for Henry Eversden at the Grey-/ Hound in St. Pauls Church-Yard. 1661.

Reprinted with minor alterations in Scepsis Scientifica, and forms the original version of Essay I, Against Confidence in Philosophy, and Matters of Speculation.

LUX / ORIENTALIS, / OR / An Enquiry into the Opinion of the / EASTERN SAGES, / Concerning the Praeexistence of Souls. / Being a Key to unlock the / Grand Mysteries of / PROVIDENCE, / In relation to mans sin and misery./ LONDON, Printed, and are to be sold / at Cambridge, and Oxford,1662.

Reprinted in Two Choice and Useful Treatises.

Scepsis Scientifica:/ OR,/ Confest Ignorance, the way to Science;/ In an Essay of / The Vanity of DOGMATIZING,/ AND / CONFIDENT Opinion./ WITH / A REPLY to the EXCEPTIONS / Of the Learned / THOMAS ALBIUS./ By JOSEPH GLANVILL, M.A./ LONDON:/ Printed by E. Cotes, for HENRY EVERSDEN at the / Gray-Hound in St. Paul's Church-yard. M.DC.LXV.

Contains preface to the Royal Society and Scire/i Tuum

Nihil Est, which in its turn contains the Author's Apology for his Style, To the Learned Thos. Albius, Sciri, and a Letter to a Friend Concerning Aristotle, in addition to the main work, which follows The Vanity of Dogmatizing closely. cont.

Some Philosophical / CONSIDERATIONS / Touching the Being of / WITCHES / AND / WITCHCRAFT,/ WRITTEN / In a LETTER to the much Honour'd / ROBERT HUNT Esq;/ By J.G. a Member of the Royal Society./ LONDON,/ Printed by E.C. for James Collins at the Kings-head / in Westminster-Hall, 1667.

Reprinted in A Blow at Modern Sadducism and in Saducismus Triumphatus, and forms the original version of Essay VI, Against Modern Sadducism in the Matter of Witches and Apparitions.

A / LOYAL TEAR / Dropt on the VAULT / Of our late Martyred / SOVEREIGN./ IN AN / ANNIVERSARY SERMON / On the Day of His Murther./ LONDON, Printed by E. Cotes, and are to be sold by James / Collins, at the Kings head in Westminster Hall, 1667.

Reprinted in Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains.

PLUS ULTRA:/ OR, THE / Progress and Advancement / OF / KNOWLEDGE / Since the days of / ARISTOTLE./ In an ACCOUNT of some of the most / Remarkable / LATE IMPROVEMENTS / OF / Practical, Useful Learning:/ To Encourage / PHILOSOPHICAL ENDEAVOURS./ OCCASIONED / By a Conference with one of the / NOTIONAL Way./ By JOS. GLANVILL./ LONDON,/ Printed for James Collins at the Kings-Head / in Westminster Hall, 1668.

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

A BLOW at / Modern SADDUCISM / In some / Philosophical Considerations / ABOUT / Witchcraft./ And the Relation of the Famed Disturbance / at the House of / M. MOMPESSON./ WITH / REFLECTIONS / ON / Drollery, and Atheisme./ The Fourth Edition Corrected and Inlarged / By Jos. Glanvill Fellow of / the Royal Society./ LONDON,/ Printed by E. Cotes for James Collins at / the Kings Head in Westminster-Hall, 1668.

Contains:- PALPABLE EVIDENCE / OF / SPIRITS / AND / Witchcraft: In an ACCOUNT of the Fam'd / Disturbance by the / DRUMMER,/ In the House of / M. MOMPESSON./ With / Another Modern and Certain Relation,/ IN TWO / LETTERS,/ One to the Right Honourable / William Lord Brereton;/ The other, to the Learned / Dr. Henry More, D.D./LONDON / Printed by E. Cotes for James Collins at the / Kings Head in Westminster-Hall, 1668.

and:- A / WHIP / FOR THE / DROLL / Fidler to the Atheist:/ BEING / REFLECTIONS / ON / Drollery and Atheism./ Sent, upon the occasion of the / Drummer of Tedworth,/ IN A / LETTER / To the most Learned / Dr. Hen. More, D.D./ LONDON,/ Printed by E.Cotes for James Collins at the / Kings-Head in Westminster-Hall, 1668.

Reprinted in Saducismus Triumphatus.

Catholick Charity / Recommended in a / SERMON,/ BEFORE / The Right Honorable the Lord Mayor,/ AND / Aldermen of LONDON:/ In order to the abating the Animosities among / Christians, that have been occasion'd by / Differences in Religion./ BY / Jos. Glanvill, Rector of Bath./ LONDON:/ Printed for H. Eversden, under the Crown Tavern in West-/

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

Smithfield, and J. Collins, at the Kings Head in Westminster-Hall,. 1669.

Reprinted in Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains.

The Way of Happiness:/ Represented in its / DIFFICULTIES / AND / INCOURAGEMENTS;/ And Cleared from many / Popular and Dangerous / MISTAKES./ By Jos. Glanvill, M.A./ LONDON:/ Printed by E.C. & A.C. for James Collins,/ at the Kings-head in Westminster-hall,/ M.DC.LXX.

Reprinted in Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains. Running title The Way to Happiness.

ΛΟΓΟΥ ΘΡΗΣΚΕΙΑ:/ OR, A / Seasonable Recommendation, and Defence / OF / REASON,/ In the Affairs of / RELIGION;/ AGAINST / Infidelity, Scepticism, and Fanaticisms / of all sorts./ LONDON,/ Printed by E.C. and A.C. for James Collins at the / Kings-head in Westminster-Hall, 1670.

Reprinted in Philosophia Pia, and forms the basis of Essay V, The Agreement of Reason and Religion.

A Praefatory / ANSWER / TO / Mr. Henry Stubbe,/ The Doctor of Warwick./ WHEREIN / The (Malignity / Hypocrisie / Falsehood) of his (Temper, / Pretences, / Reports, AND THE / Impertinency of his Arguings & Quotations / In his / ANIMADVERSIONS / ON / PLUS ULTRA / Are discovered./ By JOS. GLANVILL./ A Rod for the Fools back. Sol. / London, Printed by A. Clark, for J. Collins, at the Kings /

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

Arms in Ludgate-street, near the West-end of S. Pauls;/ and at the Kings Head in Westminster-hall. 1671.

A / FURTHER DISCOVERY / OF/M. Stubbe,/ IN A BRIEF / REPLY / To His / LAST PAMPHLET / AGAINST / JOS. GLANVILL,/ LONDON,/ Printed for H. Eversden, and are to be sold at / his Shop under the Crown Tavern in Smithfield./ MDCLXXI.

PHILOSOPHIA PIA;/ OR, A / DISCOURSE / OF THE / Religious Temper, and Tendencies / OF THE / Experimental Philosophy,/ Which is Profest / By the ROYAL SOCIETY./ To which is annext / A Recommendation, and Defence of / Reason in the Affairs of Religion./ By Jos. Glanvill Rector of Bath, and Fel-/ low of the ROYAL SOCIETY./ LONDON,/ Printed by J. Macock for James Collins at the Kings-Arms / In Ludgate street near the West end of S. Pauls, and / at his Shop at the King's Head in Westminster-/ Hall, 1671.

Forms the basis of Essay IV, The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion. A Recommendation, and Defence of Reason in the Affairs of Religion has its own title-page with the title ΛΟΓΟΥ ΘΡΗΣΚΕΙΑ, but is continuously paginated with the main work.

AN / EARNEST / INVITATION / TO THE / SACRAMENT / OF THE / LORD'S supper./ BY / JOS. GLANVILL,/ Chaplain in Ordinary to / His MAJESTY./ The Fourth Edition: with Additions of Prayers,&c./ LONDON:/ Printed for John Baker, at the Sign of the / Three Pigeons in St. Pauls Church-/ Yard, 1680.

Originally published 1672.

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

AN / ACCOUNT / OF / Mr. FERGUSON / His / Common-Place-Book,/ IN TWO / LETTERS,/ LONDON:/ Printed by Andrew Clark, for Walter Kettilby at the/ Bishops-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard. 1675.

Letters by Glanvill and Sherlock.

ESSAYS / ON SEVERAL / Important Subjects / IN /PHILOSOPHY / AND / RELIGION./ By JOSEPH GLANVILL,/ Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty, and / Fellow of the R.S./ Imprimatur,/ Martii 27.1675. Thomas Tomkins./ LONDON,/ Printed by J.D. for John Baker, at the Three Pid-/ geons, and Henry Mortlock, at the Phoenix in / St. Pauls Church-Yard, 1676.

Essay I, Against Confidence in Philosophy, and Matters of Speculation. Based on The Vanity of Dogmatizing.
Essay II, Of Scepticism and Certainty. Based on his reply to White, but much of it unpublished before.
Essay III, Modern Improvements of Useful Knowledge. Based on his replies to Stubbe and Casaubon.
Essay IV, The Usefulness of Real Philosophy. Based on Philosophia Pia.
Essay V, The Agreement of Reason and Religion. Based on A Seasonable Recommendation, and Defence of Reason.
Essay VI, Against Modern Sadducism in the Matter of Witches and Apparitions. Based on Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft.
Essay VII, Anti-fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy. Entirely new as published, but based on the Bensalem M.S.

Seasonable Reflections / And / DISCOURSES / In Order to the CONVICTION, & CURE / Of the / Scoffing,& Infidelity / of a Degenerate Age./ BY / JOS. GLANVILL,/ Chaplain in Ordinary

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

to / His MAJESTY./ LONDON,/ Printed by R.W. for H.Mortlock at the Phoenix / in St. Paul's Church-yard, and the / White-Hart in Westminster-Hall, 1676.

Sermon I, The Sin and Danger of Scoffing at Religion.
Sermon II, The Unseasonable Contempt, which the Church, and its Ministers Suffer, from Prophane, and Fanatick Enemies.
Sermon III, Moral Evidence of a Life to Come.
Sermon IV, The Serious Consideration of the Future Judgment.
All these sermons were reprinted in Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains.

AN / ESSAY / CONCERNING / Preaching:/ Written for the Direction / OF / A Young Divine;/ AND / Useful also for the PEOPLE,/ In order to Profitable Hearing./ LONDON:/ Printed by A.C. for H. Brome, at / the Gun in St. Paul's Church-yard./ M.DC.LXXVIII.

A Seasonable / DEFENCE / OF / Preaching:/ AND THE / Plain Way of it. / LONDON:/ Printed by M. Clark, for H. Brome, at / the Gun in St. Paul's Church-yard./ MDCLXXVIII.

The Zealous, and Impartial / PROTESTANT,/ SHEWING / Some great but less heeded DANGERS / OF / POPERY:/ In Order to / Thorough and Effectual Security against it./ In a LETTER / To a Member of PARLIAMENT./ LONDON:/ Printed by M.C. for Henry Brome at the Gun in S. Pauls/Churchyard, 1681.

SOME / DISCOURSES,/ SERMONS / AND / REMAINS / Of the

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

Reverend / Mr. Jos. Glanvil,/ Late Rector of BATHE, and / Chaplain in Ordinary to His MAJESTY./ Collected into one Volume, and published / BY / ANT. HORNECK, Preacher at the SAVOY./ Together with a / SERMON / Preached at his FUNERAL by Joseph Pleydell,/ Arch-Deacon of CHICHESTER./ LONDON,/ Printed for Henry Mortlock at the Sign of the Phoenix / in St. Pauls Church-yard, and James Collins at his / Shop under the Temple Church, 1681.

Preface by Horneck.
Sermon I - The Way of Happiness.
Sermon II - Catholick Charity Recommended.
Sermon III - Fast Sermon on the King's martyrdom (A Loyal Tear.)
Sermon IV - Against Scoffing at Religion.
Sermon V - The Churches Prayer, and Complaint.
Sermon VI - The Moral Evidence of a Life to Come.
Sermon VII - The Serious Consideration of the Future Judgment.
No Sermon VIII.
Sermon IX - The Necessity of an Unfeigned Repentance.
Sermon X - The Various Methods of Satan's Policy Detected.
Sermon XI - The Antiquity of our Faith Stated and Cleared.
A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of Mr. Jos. Glanvil ...By Jos. Pleydell...

Saducismus Triumphatus: / OR,/ Full and Plain EVIDENCE / Concerning / WITCHES / AND / APPARITIONS./ In TWO PARTS./ The first treating of their /POSSIBILITY,/ The Second of their Real / EXISTENCE./ by Joseph Glanvil late Chaplain in Ordinary to / his Majesty, and Fellow of the Royal Society./ With a Letter of Dr. HENRY MORE / on the same Subject./ And an Authentick, but wonderful story of certain Swe-/dish

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

Witches; done into English by Anth. Horneck / Preacher at the Savoy./ LONDON: Printed for J. Collins at his Shop under the Temple-/ Church, and S. Lowndes at his Shop by the Savoy-gate, 1681.

Sadducismus triumphatus:/ Or, A full and plain / EVIDENCE / CONCERNING / Witches and Apparitions./ In TWO PARTS./ The First Treating of their / POSSIBILITY./ The Second of their/ Real EXISTENCE./ By JOSEPH GLANVIL, Chaplain in Ordi-/ nary to King CHARLES II: and F.R.S./ The Fourth Edition, with Additions./ The Advantages whereof, the Reader may under / stand out of Dr. H. MORE'S Account prefixed / hereunto. Also / Two Authentick / but wonder-/ ful Stories of certain Swedish Witches. Done into / English by Dr. HORNECK./ WITH / Some Account of Mr. Glanvil's Life and Writings./ LONDON:/ Printed for A. Bettersworth, andJ. Batley, in Pater-noster-Row;/ W. Mears, and J. Hooke, near Temple - bar, in Fleet-street./ MDCCXXVI.

Contains Some Account of the Author's Life and Writings, The Publisher to the Reader, Dr. More's Letter to Mr. Glanvill, with its postscript, as well as the main work. The first part of the main work contains the Dedication, Preface, the letter to Robert Hunt, part of the last two chapters of More's Enchiridion, and More's Answer to a Letter of a Learned Psychopyrist. The Second part of the main work contains another Preface, two letters written by Mr. Mompesson, An Introduction to the Proof of the Existence of Apparitions, Proof from the Holy

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

Scriptures, two collections of relations of stories of witchcraft, A Whip for the Droll Fidler to the Atheist, and An Account of what Happened in the Kingdom of Sweden.

TWO / CHOICE and USEFUL / TREATISES:/ THE ONE / LUX ORIENTALIS;/ OR / An Enquiry into the Opinion of the / EASTERN SAGES / Concerning the / PRAEEXISTENCE of SOULS./ Being a Key to unlock the Grand My-/ steries of PROVIDENCE./ In Relation to Mans Sin and Misery./ THE OTHER, A / DISCOURSE of TRUTH;/ By the late Reverend Dr. RUST Lord Bi.-/ shop of Dromore in Ireland./ WITH / ANNOTATIONS on them both./[Quotation from Plato]/ LONDON,/ Printed for James Collins, and Sam. Lowndes, over against / Exeter Exchange in the Strand, 1682.

The original version of Lux Orientalis is preceded by a Dedication and Preface. It is followed by Rust's Discourse of Truth, and More's Annotations upon both works.

Mr. J. Glanvil's / FULL / VINDICATION / Of the Late / Reverend, Pious, and Learned / Mr. Richard Baxter. (Printed for John Salusbury, at the Rising-Sun over against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhil.) (London, 1691.)

Consists chiefly of a reprint of Glanvill's letter to Baxter, dated 3rd September, 1661.

Modern editions of Glanvill's works.

Scepsis Scientifica; ed. J. Owen. London, 1885.
The Story of a Languishment. Mill House Press: Stanford

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

Dingley, 1928.

The Story of Mr. John Bourne. Mill House Press: Stanford Dingley, 1928.

Both these are reprints of narratives from Saducismus Triumphatus.

The Vanity of Dogmatizing. Reproduced from the Edition of 1661 with a bibliographical note by Moody E. Prior. New York, 1931.

Plus Ultra...1668...A facsimile reproduction with an introduction by Jackson I. Cope. Gainesville, Fla., 1958.

Contributions by Glanvill to the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society.

"Answers to Some of the Inquiries Formerly Publish'd Concerning Mines." Phil.Trans., 3, no.28(1667),pp.525-7.

"Additional Answers to the Queries of Mines." Phil.Trans., 3, no.39 (1668), pp.767-71.

"Observations Concerning the Bath-Springs." Phil. Trans., 3, no. 49 (1669), pp. 977-82.

Manuscript Works by Glanvill.

BENSALEM / being / A DESCRIPTION / of / A CATHOLICK & FREE / SPIRIT / both in / RELIGION & LEARNING / In / A CONTINUATION / of The Story / of the / LORD BACON'S NEW ATLANTIS / By J. Glanvil.

Reprinted in part by Cope, J.I. - ""The Cupri-Cosmits": Glanvill on Latitudinarian Anti-Enthusiasm." H.L.Q., 17(1953-4), pp.269-86.

Anonymous Works ascribed to Glanvill.

Ballad of Gresham Colledge.

Originally appears in Henry Power's Letterbook, and is there ascribed to W. Glanvill.

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont

Anonymous Works ascribed to Glanvill.

Reprinted with comments by Stimson, D. - "Ballad of Gresham College." Isis, 18(1932), pp.103-17. Reprinted in part with comments by Taylor, F.S. - "An Early Satirical Poem on the Royal Society." N.R.R.S., 5(1948), pp.37-46.

The Character of a Coffee-House, with the Symptoms of a / Town-Wit. With Allowance, April 11th, 1673. / London: Printed for Jonathan Edwin, at the Three Roses in Ludgate-street,/ 1673.

Reprinted in Harleian Miscellany, 6(1810), pp.465-70.

AN / APOLOGY / AND / ADVICE / For some of the / CLERGY,/ Who Suffer under / FALSE, and SCANDALOUS / REPORTS./ Written on the Occasion of the Second Part / Of the / Rehearsal Transpos'd;/ IN A / LETTER / TO A / FRIEND:/ And by Him Publish'd./ LONDON, Printed for A.E. 1674.

Published correspondence by Glanvill.

Letter to Richard Baxter. dated approximately February, 1662-3, reprinted as "A Letter on Preexistence from Joseph Glanvill to Richard Baxter." Bibliotheca Platonica, 1(1890), pp.186-92.

Letter to John Beale, dated 10th September, 1667. Reprinted in Glanville-Richards, W.U.S. - Records of the Anglo-Norman House of Glanville. London, 1882.

Letters to Robert Boyle, undated. Reprinted in Boyle, R. - Works. London, 1744. Vol.5, pp.627-9.

Letter to Andrew Marvell. Quoted in Marvell, A. - The Rehearsal Transpos'd. London, 1673. Part II.

Chronological Bibliography of the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

Published Correspondence by Glanvill.

Letter to Henry More, dated 13th March, 1667. Reprinted by Edelen, G. - "Joseph Glanvill, Henry More, and the Phantom Drummer of Tedworth." H.L.B., 10(1956), pp. 186-92.

Letters to the Duchess of Newcastle, mostly incompletely dated. Reprinted in Newcastle, Margaret, Duchess of - Letters and Poems in Honour of the Incomparable Princess, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. London, 1676. Pp.85, 98-100, 102-3, 104-5, 126-7, 135-6, 137-42.

Letter probably to George Rust, dated 20th January, 1661. Reprinted by Mullett, C.F. - "A Letter by Joseph Glanvill on the Future State." H.L.Q., 1(1937-8), pp.447-56.

Will, dated 3rd October, 1680. Reprinted in Glanville-Richards, W.U.S. - Op.cit., p.162.

Unpublished correspondence by Glanvill.

Letters to Richard Baxter in the Baxter Collection, held by the Dr. Williams's Library, London. These are itemised and dated by Cope, J.I. - Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist. St. Louis, 1956. P.8, note 29.

Letters to the Royal Society of London. Held by the Library of the Royal Society, under Correspondence G(1) 12-20.

Letters to Sir James Thynne, incompletely dated. Held by the Marquis of Bath at Longleat, Warminster. Thynne Papers, vol.X, ff.43, 232-3, 234-5.

Works ascribed to Glanvill, but not traced.

Ad Clerum Somersetensem Epistola, 1671.
Noted by Green, E. - Bibliotheca Somersetensis. Taunton, 1902. Vol.I.

Chew Gazette.
Noted by Glanvill, J. - A Praefatory Answer to Mr. Henry Stubbe... London, 1671. P.187.

Letter to the Earl of Bristol, and Letter to a Friend on

Chronological Bibliography on the Works of Joseph Glanvill, cont.

Works ascribed to Glanvill, but not traced.

the Universal Character. Both noted by Wood, A. - Athenae Oxonienses. London, 1691-2. Vol.II, item No.431.

Letters to Henry More.
Noted by Crossley in Worthington, J. - Diary and Correspondence. Manchester, 1847-86. Vol.I, p.300.

Palpable Evidence of Spirits.
Noted by Wood, A. - Op.cit., who describes it as a reprint of the Mompesson narrative.

A Philosophical Endeavour Towards the Defence of the Being of Witches and Apparitions, 1666.
Noted by Cope, J.I. - Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist. St. Louis, 1956.P.19, note 61.
Destroyed in the Great Fire. Second edition appeared as Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft.

Propositions for the Carrying on a Philosophical Correspondence... in the County of Somerset. 1670.
Noted by Green, E. - Op.cit.

Reply to Wagstaffe.
Noted by Glanvill, J. - Sadducismus Triumphatus. (Editor's note in Section 5, Proof...from Holy Scripture in the second part of Sadducismus Triumphatus.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS, OTHER THAN THOSE BY GLANVILL, REFERRED TO IN THE THESIS.

Ady, T. — A Candle in the Dark...London, 1656.

Andrewes, L. — 96 Sermons...2nd ed. London, 1632.

Arderne, J. — Directions Concerning the Matter and Stile of Sermons; ed. J. Mackay. Oxford, 1952. (Luttrell Reprints, No.13.)

Aubrey, J. — Brief Lives...ed. A. Clark. Oxford, 1898.

Bacon, F. — Essays...and Other Pieces; ed. R.F. Jones. New York, 1937.
Instauratio Magna...London, 1620.
New Atlantis...London, 1659. (Originally published as Sylva Sylvarum...London, 1627.)
Of the Proficience and Aduancement of Learning...London, 1605.

Baker, H. — The Wars of Truth...London, 1952.

Bates, W. — The Harmony of the Divine Attributes...London, 1675.

Baxter, R. — A Second True Defence of the Meer Nonconformists...London, 1681.

Baylie, R. — Satan...A Sermon to the Honourable House of Commons...London, 1643.

Bethell, S.L. — The Cultural Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. London, 1951.

Biographia Britannica...London, 1747-66. Vol.IV.

Birch, T. — History of the Royal Society of London...London, 1756-7.

– — The Life of...Robert Boyle... (In Boyle, R. - Works...London, 1744. Vol.I.)

Blount, Sir T.P. — De Re Poetica...London, 1694.

Essays on Several Subjects... London, 1691.

Bibliography of Works, other than those by Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Bond, D.F. — ""Distrust" of Imagination in English Neo-Classicism." P.Q., 14(1935), pp.54-69.

Bonhome, J. — The Arraignment and Conviction of Atheism...London, 1679.

Bosher, R.S. — The Making of the Restoration Settlement...London, 1951.

Boyle, R. — Works...London, 1744.

Bramhall, J. — Bishop Bramhall's Vindication... London, 1672.

Bredvold, L.I. — "Dryden, Hobbes, and the Royal Society." M.P., 25(1927-8), pp. 417-38.

Brent, W. — A Discourse upon the Nature of Eternity...According to the Grounds of Reason... London, 1674.

Brown, H. — Scientific Organizations in Seventeenth Century France (1620-1680). Baltimore, 1934.

Browne, Sir T. — Pseudodoxia Epidemica. (In Browne, Sir T. - Works; ed. S. Wilkin. London, 1852. Vols. I-II.)

Burnet, G. — The Life of William Bedell... London, 1685.

Burthogge, R. — An Essay Upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits. London, 1694.

Bush, D. — English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 1600-1660. Oxford, 1945. (Oxford History of English Literature.)

- — Science and English Poetry...New York, 1950. (Patten Lectures.1949.)

Bibliography of Works, other than those by Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Butterfield, H. — The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800. London, 1949.

Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series...1661-1662... London, 1861.

Cambridge History of English Literature. London, 1907-27. Vol. VIII.

Campagnac, E.T. — The Cambridge Platonists...Oxford, 1901.

Carré, M.H. — "Ralph Cudworth." Philosph.Q., 3(1953), pp.342-51.

Casaubon, M. — A Letter to Peter du Moulin... Cambridge, 1669.

Cassirer, E. — The Platonic Renaissance in England; transl. J.P. Pettegrove. Edinburgh, 1953.

Causes, The, and Remedy of the Distempers of the Times... London, 1675.

Character, The, of a Coffee-House, with the Symptoms of a Town-Wit. London, 1673. (In Harleian Miscellany, 6(1810), pp.465-70.)

Cheynell, F. — Sions Memento...A Sermon...Before the Honorable House of Commons... London, 1643.

Christensen, F. — "John Wilkins and the Royal Society' Reform of Prose Style." M.L.Q., 7(1946), pp.179-87, 279-90.

Clark, G.N. — The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714. Oxford, 1934.

Clifford, M. — A Treatise of Humane Reason. London, 1674.

Cokayn, G. — Flesh Expiring...A Sermon Before the Honorable House of Commons... London, 1648.

Colie, R.L. — Light and Enlightenment...Cambridge, 1957.

Bibliography of Works, other than those by Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Comenius, J.A. — The Way of Light; transl. E.T. Campagnac. Liverpool, 1938.

Conway Letters...ed.M.H. Nicolson. London, 1930.

Cope, J.I. — ""The Cupri-Cosmits": Glanvill on Latitudinarian Anti-Enthusiasm." H.L.Q., 17(1953-4), pp.269-86.

– "Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist P.M.L.A., 69(1954), pp.223-50.

– Joseph Glanvill; Anglican Apologist. St. Louis, 1956.

– "Seventeenth Century Quaker Style." P.M.L.A., 71(1956), pp.725-54.

Copleston, F. — A History of Philosophy. London, 1946-.Vol.V.

Counter-Plot, The, or the Close Conspiracy of Atheism and Schism...London, 1680.

Cowley, A. — The Essays and Other Prose Writings; ed. A.B. Gough. Oxford, 1915.

– Poems; ed. A.R. Waller. Cambridge, 1905.

– Propositions for the Advancement of Learning. (In Cowley, A. - The Essays...ed. A.B. Gough. Oxford, 1915.

– Works...London, 1669 (?).

Cragg, G.R. — From Puritanism to the Age of Reason...Cambridge, 1950.

Craig, H. — The Enchanted Glass...Oxford, 1950.

Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century; ed.J.E. Spingarn. Oxford, 1908-9.

Croll, M.W. — "Muret and the History of "Attic" Prose." P.M.L.A., 39(1924), pp.254-309.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Grusius, T.T. — The Origine of Atheism in the Popish and Protestant Churches...London, 1684.

Cudworth, R. — A Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House of Commons...Cambridge, 1647.

– — The True Intellectual System of the Universe...2nd ed. by T. Birch, London, 1743.

Culverwel, N. — An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature...London, 1652.

Dalgarno, G. — Works...Glasgow, 1834. (Maitland Club. Vol.29, 1834.)

Davies, Sir J. — Nosce Teipsum. (In Silver Poets of the Sixteenth Century...ed.G. Bullett. London, 1947.(Everyman's Library. No.985.))

De Beer, E.S. — "Earliest Fellows of the Royal Society." B.I.H.R., 15(1937),pp. 79-93.

De Mott, B. — "Comenius and the Real Character in England." P.M.L.A., 70(1955), pp.1068-81.

Denny, M. — "The Early Program of the Royal Society and John Evelyn." M.L.Q. 1(1940), pp.481-97.

Dixon, R. — The Doctrine of Faith, Justification and Assurance...London, 1668.

Donne, J. — Poems. London, 1947. (Everyman's Library; No.867.)

Dryden, J. — Defence of the Epilogue. (In English Prose...ed. H. Craik. London, 1894. Vol.III.)

Du Chastelet, H. — A Treatise against Irreligion... London, 1678.

R.E. — A Scriptural Catechism: or, the Duty of Man...London, 1682.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Eachard, J. — The Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy and Religion Enquired into...London, 1670. (In An English Garner...Westminster, 1903)

Edelen, G. — "Joseph Glanvill, Henry More, and the Phantom Drummer of Tedworth." H.L.B., 10(1956), pp.186-92.

Edwards, E. and Waller, M.J. — "Joseph Glanvill: Divine and Scientist." N.Q., 204(1959), p.192.

Elizabethan Critical Essays; ed. G.G. Smith. Oxford, 1904.

Emerson, O.F. — "Dryden and the English Academy." M.L.R., 20(1925), pp.189-90.

– — "John Dryden and a British Academy." P.B.A., 10(1921-3), pp.45-58.

Emery, C. — "John Wilkins and Noah's Ark." M.L.Q. 9(1948), pp.286-91.

– — "John Wilkins' Universal Language." Isis, 38(1947-8), pp.174-85.

Encyclopaedia Britannica; 9th ed. Edinburgh, 1875-89. Vol.X, pp.635-6.

English Garner; Critical Essays and Literary Fragments... Westminster, 1903.

English Prose...ed. H. Craik. London, 1894. Vol.III.

Evelyn, J. — Diary and Correspondence...ed.W.Bray. London, 1859. Vol.III.

– — The Diary...ed. E.S. de Beer. Oxford, 1955. Vol.IV.

– — Publick Employment and an Active Life...Prefer'd to Solitude... London, 1667.

Fairfax, N. — A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World. (In Two Seventeenth-Century Prefaces; ed. A.K.Croston. London, 1949.)

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Fairfax, T., Third Lord — Short Memorials of Some Things to be Cleared During My Command in the Army. (In Stuart Tracts, 1603-1693. London, 1903.)

Fell, J. — The Character of the Last Daies. A Sermon...Oxford, 1675.

Fellthem, O. — Selection from his writings in The Oxford Book of English Prose...ed. Sir A. Quiller-Couch. Oxford, 1925.

Ferguson, R. — The Interest of Reason in Religion.. London, 1675.

- — A Sober Enquiry into the Nature, Measure, and Principle of Moral Virtue...London, 1673.

Fisch, H. — Review of Cope's book on Glanvill. R.E.S., N.S.9(1958), pp.324-5.

Fisch, H. and Jones, H.W. — "Bacon's Influence on Sprat's History of the Royal-Society." M.L.Q., 12(1951), pp.399-406.

Fontenelle, B. de — A Plurality of Worlds. John Glanvill translation...London, 1929.

Fowler, E. — The Principles and Practices, of Certain Moderate Divines of the Church of England...London, 1670.

- — The Principles and Practices, of Certain Moderate Divines of the Church of England; 2nd ed...London, 1671.

Fullwood, F. — The Case of the Times Discuss'd... London, 1683.

Gascoigne, G. — Certayne Notes of Instruction. (In Elizabethan Critical Essays; ed. G.G. Smith. Oxford, 1904. Vol.I, pp.52-6.)

Gauden, J. — Hieraspistes; a Defence ...of the Church of England...London, 1653.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Gillespie, G. — A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons... London, 1644.

Glanville-Richards, W.U.S. — Records of the Anglo-Norman House of Glanville...London, 1882.

Goldwell, C. — Reasons Metamorphosis, and Restauration...London, 1621.

Gosson, S. — The School of Abuse...London, 1841. (First published 1579.)

Gough, J.W. — The Mines of Mendip... Oxford, 1930.

Green, E. — Bibliotheca Somersetensis...Taunton, 1902. Vol.I.

Greenslet, F. — Joseph Glanvill: a Study in English Thought and Letters of the Seventeenth Century. New York, 1900.

Grierson, Sir H.J.C. — Cross Currents in English Literature of the XVIIth Century...London, 1929.

- — Seventeenth Century Studies Presented to Sir H. Grierson. Oxford, 1938.

Habicht, H. — Joseph Glanvill, ein spekulativer Denker im England des XVII. Jahrhunderts. Zurich, 1936.

Hakewill, G. — An Apologie of the Power and Providence of God...Oxford, 1627.

Hallam, H. — Introduction to the Literature of Europe...London, 1837-9. Vol.IV.

Hallywell, H. — Deus Justificatus...London, 1668.

- — A Private Letter of Satisfaction to a Friend...London (?),1667.

Hamilton, K.G. — The Two Harmonies: Poetry and Prose in the Seventeenth Century. Oxford, 1963.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Hartlib, S. — A Common Writing...London, 1647.

Herbert, Lord, of Cherbury — De Religione Laici; ed. H.R. Hutcheson. New Haven, 1944. (Yale Studies in English. Vol.98.)

– — De Veritate; transl. M.H. Carré, Bristol, 1937.

Hess, M.W. — "A Quaker Plotinus." H.J., 29(1930-1 pp. 479-86.

Hickes, G. — The Harmony of Divinity and Law... London, 1684.

Hill, H. — A Short Treatise Concerning the Propagation of the Soul...London, 1667.

Historical Manuscripts Commission. — 12th Report. Appendix pt. IX. London, 1891.

Hooker, R. — Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie...London, 1593-7.

– — Works...arr. J. Keble; 2nd ed. Oxford, 1841.

Houghton, J. — England's Great Happiness... London, 1677.

Houghton, W.E. — "The History of Tracles." J.H.I., 2(1941), pp. 33-6

How, S. — The Sufficiencie of the Spirits Teaching Without Humane Learning... London, 1644.

Howell, J. — Epistolae Ho-elianae: the Familiar Letters...ed. J. Jacobs. London, 1890

Howell, W.S. — Logic and Rhetoric in England -, 1500-1700. New York, 1961.

Hutchinson, F. — An Historical Essay Concerning Witchcraft...London, 1718.

Hutton, W.H. — "Divines of the Church of England, 1660-1700." (In Cambridge History of

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

English Literature. Cambridge, 1907-27. Vol. VIII, ch. xii.)

Hutton, W.H. — The English Church from the Accession of Charles I... London, 1903.

Johnson, F.R. — Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England... Baltimore, 1937.

Jones, R.F. — Ancients and Moderns... 2nd ed. St. Louis, 1961.

— "The Attack on Pulpit Eloquence in the Restoration: an Episode in the Development of the Neo-Classical Standard for Prose." J.E.G.P., 30(1931), pp.188-217.

— "Science and English Prose Style in the Third Quarter of the Seventeenth Century." P.M.L.A., 45(1930), pp.977-1009.

Jones, R.F. and others — The Seventeenth Century: Studies in the History of English Thought and Literature... Stanford, 1951.

Jonston, J. — An History of the Constancy of Nature. London, 1657.

King, H. — Exequy on His Wife. (In A Treasury of Seventeenth Century English Verse... ed. H.J. Massingham. London, 1941. Pp.150-2.)

Krook, D. — "Two Baconians: Robert Boyle and Joseph Glanvill." M.L.Q., 18(1954-5), pp.261-78.

Lecky, W.E.H. — History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe. London, 1865.

Letter to Mr. Henry Stubs Concerning his Censure upon Certain Passages Contained in the History of the Royal Society. London, 1670.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Lloyd, W. — A Sermon Preach'd at the Funeral of... John Wilkins...London, 1723.

Locke, J. — Thoughts on Education. (In English Prose...ed. H. Craik. London, 1894. Vol. III.)

Lukin, H. — The Chief Interest of Man...2nd ed. London, 1670.

– — The Life of Faith...London, 1660.

– — The Practice of Godliness... London, 1658.

Lyford, W. — The Plain Mans Senses Exercised to Discern Both Good and Evill... London, 1657.

McAdoo, H.R. — The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology. London, 1949.

Marlowe, C. — The Best Plays; ed. H. Ellis. London, 1947. (Mermaid Series.)

Marvell, A. — The Rehearsal Transpos'd...London, 1672-3.

Masson, Sir J.I.O. — Three Centuries of Chemistry. London, 1925.

Maynard, J. — The Beauty and Order of the Creation. London, 1633.

Miller, P. — The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century. Cambridge, Mass., 1954.

Milton, J. — Tractate of Education...ed. E.E. Morris. London, 1895.

Mitchell, W.F. — English Pulpit Oratory...London, 1932.

Moloney, M.F. — John Donne, His Flight from Mediaevalism. (Illinois Studies in Language and Literature. Vol.29, nos. 2-3, 1944.)

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

More, H. — An Answer to a Letter of a Learned Psychopyrist. (In Glanvill, J. - Sadducismus Triumphatus...4th ed. London, 1726.)

Morell, J.D. — An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century; 2nd ed. London, 1847. Vol. I.

Mulgrave, Earl of — An Essay on Poetry. (In Roscomon, Earl of - Poems...London, 1717.)

Mullett, C.F. — "A Letter by Joseph Glanvill on the Future State." H.L.Q., 1(1937-8), pp.447-56.

Mullinger, J.B. — "Platonists and Latitudinarians." (In Cambridge History of English Literature. Cambridge, 1907-27. Vol. VIII, ch.xi.)

- — Cambridge Characteristics in the Seventeenth Century...London, 1867.

Newcastle, Margaret, Duchess of — Letters and Poems in Honour of the Incomparable Princess, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. London, 1676.

Nicolson, M.H. — The breaking of the Circle. Illinois, 1950.

- — "Christ's College and the Latitudemen," M.P., 27(1929-30), pp.35-53.

- — "Milton and the Telescope." E.L.H., 2(1935), pp.1-32.

- — "The "New Astronomy" and English Literary Imagination." S.P., 32(1935), pp.428-62.

- — "The Real Scholar Gipsy." Y.R., N.S.18 (1928-9), pp.347-63.

Oxford Book of English Prose...ed. Sir A. Quiller-Couch. Oxford, 1925.

~~Oxford University. Exeter College.~~

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Oxford University. Exeter College. Register.

Palmer, H. — Scripture and Reason Pleaded for Defensive Armes...London, 1643.

Parker, S. — A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie... London, 1670.

— A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophie...Oxford, 1666.

Passmore, J.A. — Ralph Cudworth...Cambridge, 1951.

Patrick, S. — A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-men...London, 1662.

Peacham, H. — The Truth of our Times...London, 1638. (Facsimile Text Society; ed. R.R. Cawley. 1942.)

Pepys, S. — Diary...ed. H.B. Wheatley. London, 1904-5.

Petrescu, N. — Glanvill and Hume...Berlin, 1911.

Petty, Sir W. — Political Arithmetic...London, 1690. (In Later Stuart Tracts...Westminster, 1903.)

Phillips, E. — The New World of Words; or a General English Dictionary;..London, 1671.

Polhill, E. — Precious Faith Considered... London, 1675.

Popkin, R.H. — "Development of the Philosophical Reputation of Joseph Glanvill." J.H.I., 15(1954), pp.305-11.

— "Joseph Glanvill: a Precursor of David Hume." J.H.I.,14(1953), pp.292-303.

Powicke, F.J. — The Cambridge Platonists: a Study. London, 1926.

— A Life of the Reverend Richard Baxte ...London, 1924.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Prior, M.E. "Joseph Glanvill, Witchcraft, and Seventeenth-Century Science." M.P., 30(1932-3), pp.167-93.

- Review of Cope's book on Glanvill. M.P., 55(1957-8), pp.279-81.

Ray, J. The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation...8th ed. London, 1722.

Redgrove, H.S. and I.M.L. Joseph Glanvill and Psychical Research in the Seventeenth Century. London, 1921.

Remusat, C. de Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre. Paris, 1875. Vol.II.

Rust, G. A Discourse of Truth. (In Glanvill, J.. Two Choice and Useful Treatises... London, 1682.)

- Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen...London, 1661. (In The Phenix...London, 1707.)

Scot, R. The Discoverie of Witchcraft... London, 1584.

Sherlock, W. A Discourse Concerning the Knowledge of Jesus Christ...London, 1674.

Smith, J. Selections from his writings. (In Campagnac, E.T. - The Cambridge Platonists...Oxford, 1901.)

South, R. Sermon on Ascension Day. (In Specimens of English Prose Style... Sel by G. Saintsbury. London, 1885.)

Specimens of English Prose Style...Sel. by G. Saintsbury. London, 1885.

Sprat, T. The History of the Royal-Society of London, for the Improving of Natural Knowledge...2nd ed., London, 1702.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Stewart, W.K. "Scepticism." H.J., 29(1930-1), pp.680-91.

Stimson, D. "Ballad of Gresham Colledge." Isis, 18(1932), pp.108-17.

- "The Critical Years of the Royal Society, 1672-1703." J.H.M., 2(1947), pp.283-98.

Stubbe, H. Campanella Revived...London, 1670.

- A Censure upon Certaine Passages Contained in the History of the Royal Society...Oxford, 1670.

- Legends No Histories...London, 1670.

- The Lord Bacon's Relation of the Sweating-Sickness...London, 1671.

- The Plus Ultra Reduced to a Non Plus...London, 1670.

- A Reply, by Way of Preface to the Calumnies of Eccebolius Glanville. (In Stubbe, H. - The Lord Bacon's Relation of the Sweating-Sickness... London, 1671.)

- A Reply unto the Letter Written to Mr. Henry Stubbe in Defense of the History of the Royal Society, Whereunto is Added a Preface against Eccebolius Glanvill...Oxford, 1671.

- Rosemary & Bayes; or, Animadversions upon a Treatise Called The Rehearsal Transpos'd...London, 1672.

- A Specimen of Some ~~Adversions~~ Animadversions upon a Book Entituled Plus Ultra...London, 1670.

Syfret, R.H. "The Origins of the Royal Society." N.R.R.S., 5(1948), pp.75-137.

Taylor, F.S. "An Early Satirical Poem on the Royal Society." N.R.R.S., 5(1948), pp. 37-46.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Taylor, J. — Selections from his sermons. (In The Oxford Book of English Prose... ed. Sir A. Quiller-Couch. Oxford, 1925.)

Temple, Sir W. — Essay upon Ancient and Modern Learning. (In Temple, Sir W. - Works... London, 1740. Vol.I.)

Thorpe, C.D. — The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas Hobbes... Ann Arbor, 1940. (University of Michigan Publications. Language and Literature. Vol.18.)

Trevelyan, G.M. — England under the Stuarts; 21st ed. London, 1957.

\- — English Social History...London, 1945.

Tulloch, J. — Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century; 2nd ed. Edinburgh, 1874. Vol.II, The Cambridge Platonists.

Two Seventeenth-Century Prefaces; ed. A.K. Croston... London, 1949.

Ustick, W.L. — "Changing Ideals of Aristocratic Character and Conduct in Seventeenth-Century England." M.P., 30(1932-3), pp.147-66.

Vaughan, H. — Corruption. (In The Oxford Book of Seventeenth Century Verse; ed. Sir H.J.C. Grierson. and G. Bullough. Oxford, 1934.)

W., E. — No Praeexistence, Or, a...Dissertation against the Hypothesis of Humane Souls Living in a State Antecedaneous to this. London, 1667.

Wagstaffe, J. — The Question of Witchcraft Debated... London, 1669;

Walker, R.R.A. — "Joseph Glanvill: Divine and Scientist 1636-80." N.Q., 204(1959), p.338.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Wallace, K.R. — Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric...University of North Carolina, 1943.

~~E.W.~~ — ~~No Praexistence, Or a Brief Dissertation Against the Hypothesis of Humane Souls, Living in a State Antecedaneous to this. London, 1667.~~

Webster, J. — The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft...London, 1677.

Weiss, S.A. — "Joseph Glanvill and "The Character of a Coffee-House."." N.Q.,197(1952), pp. 234-5, 343.

Weld, C.R. — A History of the Royal Society... London, 1843.

Whichcote, B. — Selections from his writings. (In Campagnac, E.T. - The Cambridge Platonists...Oxford, 1901.)

White, T. — Scirri, Sive Sceptices et Scepticorum à Jure Disputationis Exclusio... London, 1663.

- — An Exclusion of Scepticks from all Title to Dispute...London, 1665. (Translation of preceding work.)

Wilkins, J. — An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language... London, 1668.

- — Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion...8th ed. London, 1722.

Willey, B. — The Seventeenth Century Background. London, 1934.

Williamson, G. — "Mutability, Decay, and Seventeenth-Century Melancholy." E.L.H., 2(1935), pp.121-50.

- — "The Restoration Revolt Against Enthusiasm." S.P., 30(1933), pp. 571-603.

Bibliography of Works, other than those of Glanvill, referred to in the Thesis, cont.

Williamson, G. — The Senecan Amble...London, 1951.

Wilson, F.P. — Seventeenth Century Prose. Cambridge, 1960. (The Ewing Lectures.)

Wolf, A. — A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the 16th & 17th Centuries...New ed. by D. McKie. London, 1950.

Wood, A. — Athenae Oxonienses...London, 1691-2.

Woodhouse, A.S.P. — Review of Cope's Book on Glanvill. M.L.N., 73(1958), pp.436-9.

Worthington, J. — Diary and Correspondence. Manchester, 1847-86. Vol.I and Vol.II,pt.i, ed. Crossley; Vol.II,pt.ii, ed. Christie.

Wotton, W. — Reflections upon Ancient & Modern Learning... London, 1694.

Wright, L.M. — The Literary Life of the Early Friends, 1650-1725. New York, 1932.

"The Writings of Joseph Glanvill." Temple Bar...A London Magazine, 98(1893), pp.250-60.